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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Introduction 
As a northern European humanist' and a biblical 
scholar Philip Melanchthon was both philosophically and 
theologically inclined to encourage Christian piety and 
good works. In his tertius usus legis Melanchthon 
introduced to Lutheran theological vocabulary the 
'Northern European humanism may be distinguished 
from the Renaissance of southern Europe by its focus on the 
reform of the church and its emphasis on Christian piety. 
With its accent on the ad fontes return to the sources of 
western civilization and more importantly, its return to the 
biblical foundations of the Christian religion, it provided 
many of the materials to be used by the evangelicals in 
their desire to reform the church theologically. Two 
northern European humanists figure prominently in the life 
of Philip Melanchthon. Johann Reuchlin, Melanchthon's great 
uncle, was instrumental in guiding the education of 
Melanchthon, especially after Melanchthon's father died when 
he was eleven years of age. Reuchlin's fame rested on his 
reputation as a philologist and he is best remembered as a 
scholar and advocate of Hebraic studies. It was Reuchlin 
who encouraged the Elector to appoint Melanchthon to his new 
university at Wittenberg as a teacher of Greek. The re-
lationship between Melanchthon and Erasmus was less direct 
but more enduring (the relationship between Melanchthon and 
Reuchlin ended when Melanchthon embraced the theology of 
Luther). The two men corresponded throughout their lives 
although they never met. Melanchthon shared with Erasmus 
the skills of a philologist, the reputation of a stylist, an 
abiding concern for unity in the church, and an emphasis on 
personal piety. They differed in that the focus of reform 
in the church for Melanchthon was theological while for 
Erasmus it was for reform in morality and church structure. 
1 
2 
distinctive pedagogical or instructional function of the 
Decalogue as the means by which God revealed his will for 
the regenerate and instructed them in righteousness.2 It 
In 1516 Erasmus published the Novum Instrumentum, 
the editio Greek edition of the New Testament. The 
importance of this publication for Melanchthon and Luther 
can be found in its use as the basis of Luther's German 
translation of the New Testament (in the preparation of 
which Luther frequently utilized Melanchthon's skills in 
Greek). Erasmus typifies the northern European humanist. 
His Handbook of the Militant Christian (Enchiridion Militis  
Christiani) characterizes his personal striving for 
perfection in Christian piety. The Praise of Folly (Morias  
Egkomion) satirizes the church and the absurdity of 
superficial morality. His sermon (really a treatise) 
Concerning the Immense Mercy of God (De Immensa Dei  
Misericordia) underscored his desire to base theology in the 
Scriptures (in this case, Saint Paul) and his concern for 
making the Gospel a factor in Christian living. In his, On 
Mending the Peace of the Church (De Sarcienda Ecclesiae  
Concordia) Erasmus articulates his hope to restore peace to 
the church through a program of reform based on tolerance 
and evangelical enlightenment. Erasmus' reform was doomed 
by the distrust of both the Roman and evangelical parties 
but his concerns were ultimately incorporated, in part, by 
the "Reformation" Decrees of the Council of Trent (Session 
22). Helpful in understanding Erasmus as theologian, in 
relation both to the church fathers and to the evangelical 
movement is John William Aldridge, The Hermeneutic of  
Erasmus (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1966), passim. On 
the influence of Erasmus and Reuchlin on Melanchthon, see 
Carl S. Meyer, "Christian Humanism and the Reformation," 
Concordia Theological Monthly 41 (November 1970): 637-647. 
The definitive study on Melanchthon as humanist is Wilhelm 
Maurer, Der Junge Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus and 
Reformatio, 2 vols. (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1967 and 1969). The first volume is entitled "Der 
Humanist." The second volume concerns Melanchthon as 
theologian. 
2That Luther also taught a pedagogical function of 
the Law will be maintained and supported later in this study 
(Chapter III). The point here is that Melanchthon 
introduced the terminology which has been adopted through 
the Formula of Concord as the classic expression of the 
3 
is not remarkable that a Christian theologian should be 
concerned about the Decalogue and Christian sanctifica-
tion. This function of the Law, however, raised 
distinctive questions and problems for the first generation 
of evangelical Lutheran theologians. If sinners are 
justified by grace, through faith, alone, apart from works 
of the Law, and if the Law always accuses sin, then 
logically it would seem that the Law has no distinctive 
function for those who are righteous by grace through faith 
and the Law has only a negative, accusing function for the 
Christian who sins. How then can there be a pedagogical, 
non-accusatory function of the Law? 
For Roman theologians, the problem did not arise 
since justification by grace through faith was understood 
as necessarily including caritas in fulfilling the works of 
the Law. The sola gratia, sola fides was denied.3 For 
continuing validity of the Law for the regenerate. On 
Luther's relation to the Formula of Concord, Article VI, 
"Third Use of the Law," see Armin W. Schuetze, "On the 
Third use of the Law: Luther's Position in the Antinomian 
Debate (FC, VI)," in No Other Gospel: Essays in 
Commemoration of the 400th Anniversary of the Formula of  
Concord, ed. Arnold J. Koelpin (Milwaukee: Northwestern 
Publishing House, 1980), pp. 207-228. For a carefully 
prepared opposing opinion (that is, that the third use of 
the Law vocabulary is not descriptive of Luther's position 
and in fact distorts it) see Ragnar Bring, Das Verhaeltnis  
von Glauben and Werken in der Lutherischen Theologie  
(Munich: Kaiser Verlag, 1955), passim, but especially pp. 
39-67. 
3Although the theological positions and vocabu-
lary of the various Roman schools at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century were anything but monolithic, there was 
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other theologians the problem did not arise because the 
continuing validity of the Law was summarily rejected.4  
Lutheran evangelicals denied both solutions to the problem 
of the Law in relation to the Gospel, contending that the 
Roman position obscured the Gospel and the antinomian 
position denied the Law and perverted the Gospel. Against 
the work righteousness and scholasticism of Roman 
theologians and the antinomianism of some evangelical 
agreement among both Dominican (Thomist) theologians and 
Franciscan (following Scotus) theologians on the 
progressive nature of justification and the necessity of 
good works for salvation. Hubert Jedin provides a helpful 
and detailed picture of the process by which Dominican, 
Franciscan, and other theologians reached consensus at the 
Council of Trent in a formulation which specifically 
rejected the evangelical understanding of forensic 
justification and the sola gratia, sola fide of the 
reformation. Hubert Jedin, A History of the Council of  
Trent, 2 vols., trans. Ernest Graff (St. Louis: B. Herder 
Book Co., 1961), 2: 166-169, 239-316. This consensus is 
best expressed in the eleventh canon of the article On 
Justification: "if any one saith, that men are justified, 
either by the sole imputation of the justice of Christ, or 
by the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion of the 
grace and the charity which is poured forth in their hearts 
by the Holy Ghost, and is inherent in them; or even that 
the grace, whereby we are justified, is only the favour of 
God; let him be anathema." The Canons and Decrees of the  
Sacred and Ecumenical Council of Trent, trans. J. 
Waterworth (Chicago: Christian Symbolic Publication Soc., 
n.d.), p. 46. 
4The antinomian theology of John Agricola will be 
investigated in chapter III. The Zwickau prophets and 
Thomas Muentzer, with their emphasis on private 
revelation,and the iconoclasts of Karlstadt also bring to 
mind movements within the reformation which disregarded the 
distinction between Law and Gospel and denied the function 
of the Scriptures in mediating the will of God through the 
Law. On Luther and his relation to Muentzer and Karlstadt, 
see Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther in Mid-Career (1521-1530), 
ed. Karin Bornkamm, trans. E. Theodore Bachmann 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), pp. 51-83 and 143-181. 
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theologians, the theologians of the Augsburg Confession 
affirmed both Law and Gospel, distinguishing Law and Gospel 
but not separating them, affirming the Gospel as the 
forgiveness of sin and the Law as God's judgment on sin. 
But if justification is by grace alone and the Law always 
accuses, what is the function of the Law in the life of the 
regenerate? If it does not motivate obedience (for this is 
the function of the Gospel) how is one to affirm a positive 
function of the Law without confusing Law and Gospel and 
without plunging the evangelical witness into the work 
righteous theology of the Roman party? 
The answer lay in the evangelical understanding of 
forensic justification. Justification is not a process but 
an event happening in a moment of time by which God by 
grace, through faith, for the sake of Christ, declares the 
sinner righteous. Forensic justification thus encompasses 
both the imputation of the righteousness of Christ and the 
non-imputation of sin. But what of the man justified? 
What has changed for him? His relationship to God has 
changed from an antagonistic relationship of fear and 
judgment to a filial relationship of love and forgiveness. 
His heart has been enabled to love God. Yet he remains a 
man. He still has within himself his previous sinful 
nature. He thus experiences the warfare of flesh and 
spirit Saint Paul describes in Romans 7. In this conflict 
of the new man by grace and the old man of sin, the Spirit 
6 
of God works through Word and sacrament to assure faith and 
strengthen renewal. This revealed Word contains the 
unchanging will of God in the Law as well as the abiding 
promises of Christ in the Gospel. In order that the 
Christian sinner-saint might not be left to his own devices 
or centered in his own opinions, the Spirit of God through 
the Word of God instructs the Christian in that which 
pleases God so that the new heart of the Christian may 
choose without coercion the will of God, although he 
remains spiritually weak and encumbered by sin. 
Justification is distinguished from this process of renewal 
(sanctification) as God's forensic decree establishing the 
relationship which empowers the Christian to do that which 
pleases God. But justification and sanctification, 
although distinguished (in that justification by grace, 
through faith, for Christ's sake, must precede 
sanctification and good works) dare not be separated from 
one another. In the economy of God justification 
necessitates sanctification and sanctification is dependent 
on justification. 
This brief overview indicates the theological 
conjunction of the third use of the Law, forensic 
justification, and regenerate free will first articulated 
in the theological writings of Philip Melanchthon. The 
title of this dissertation is not intended to suggest that 
forensic justification, third use of the Law, and 
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regenerate free will are in some sense logical constructs 
by which Melanchthon sought to synthesize Law and Gospel as 
the basis of Christian ethics. Rather, because Melanchthon 
accepted the divine Scriptures as the norm of Christian 
teaching, these terms expressed what he understood the 
Scriptures themselves to teach regarding justification, the 
instruction of the Law, and the regenerate free will: (1) 
Man is saved by grace, through faith, for the sake of 
Christ alone; (2) The Christian has a continuing need for 
instruction in the will of God through the Decalogue 
because of his dual nature as sinner and saint; (3) God 
holds the Christian responsible for choosing the divine 
will as the Holy Spirit works through the Word, instructing 
the renewed yet sinful heart of the Christian in the Law of 
God. 
It is the purpose of this study to investigate how 
forensic justification, the third use of the Law, and the 
free will of the regenerate Christian complement one 
another in Melanchthon's theology. The distinction of Law 
and Gospel, justification and sanctification, "old man and 
new man," sin and grace provide the pedagogical framework 
for this expression of evangelical theology. This study 
therefore focuses on the fundamental distinction basic to 
understanding the Scriptures and articulating Christian 
theology -- the distinction between Law and Gospel. In so 
doing, it underscores Melanchthon's great and continuing 
8 
legacy as the pedagogue of the Lutheran reformation.s 
But it also raises the important question of whether 
Melanchthon in formalizing the theology of the Lutheran 
church truly conveyed the spirit and insights of Martin 
Luther, or ossified Luther's prophetic and pastoral dynamic 
into a propositional theology based on scholastic 
(Aristotelian) distinctions and humanist presupposition?6  
The Formula of Concord, Solid Declaration, affirms 
that "The distinction between Law and Gospel is an 
especially brilliant light which serves the purpose that 
the Word of God may be rightly divided and the writings of 
sMelanchthon's contribution to the Lutheran 
reformation as educator and dogmatist have been universally 
recognized. For his contribution to German liberal arts 
education he has been accorded the title "Praeceptor 
Germaniae." The definitive work in this area remains Karl 
Hartfelder, Philip Melanchthon als Praeceptor Germaniae  
(Nieuwkoop: B. De Graf, 1964), passim. Reprint of the 1889 
Berlin edition. 
6Many have made this accusation, from a variety 
of theological points of view and for a variety of 
theological reasons. A sampling would include: Richard R. 
Caemmerer, "The Melanchthonian Blight," Concordia  
Theological Monthly 18 (May 1947): 115-36. Jaroslav 
Pelikan, From Luther to Kirkegaard (St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1963), pp. 24-75. Ragner Bring, Das 
Verhaeltnis von Glauben and Werken in der Lutherischen 
Theologie. Karl Holl, Die Rechtfertigungslehre im Licht  
der Geschicht des Protestantismus (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 
1922), passim but especially pp. 16-27. Karl Holl, 
"Gogarten's Understanding of Luther," trans. Walter F. 
Bense, in What Did Luther Understand by Religion, ed. and 
trans. Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1977), pp. 111-120. Albrecht Ritschl, The 
Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, 
trans. and ed. E. R. Mackintosch and A. B. Macaulay 
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1900), passim. Frank 
Hildebrandt, Melanchthon: Alien or Ally? (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1946), passim. 
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the holy prophets and apostles may be explained and 
understood correctly."' Theologically, the sixteenth 
century evangelical reformation may be described as a 
conscious desire to define Law and Gospel according to the 
testimony of Scripture alone. The Scriptures and not the 
accumulated philosophical and theological thought of the 
previous sixteen centuries were to serve as the norm of 
Christian theology. The evangelical affirmation that "the 
Law always accuses"8 and thus does not share a comple-
mentary function with the Gospel but rather stands in an 
adversarial role to the Gospel broke radically with what 
had become the scholastic teaching of the Western Church. 
The Gospel conversely and in contradistinction to the Law 
was described by the evangelicals in accordance with Saint 
Paul's epistles as the imputation of the righteousness of 
Christ and the non-imputation of sin. 
7FC, SD, VI, 1. see also Ap.,IV,5. 
Citations to the Lutheran Confessions will be made 
according to document, article number, and paragraph number 
in order to facilitate the use of the German-Latin 
Bekenntnisschriften and Tappert's English translation. Die 
Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche  
(Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967 [sixth edition]; 
The Book of Concord, trans. and ed. Theodore G. Tappert 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959). The following 
commonly used abbreviations will be used: AC: Augsburg 
Confession; Ap: Apology to the Augsburg Confession; SA: The 
Smalcald Articles; TPP: Treatise on the Power and Primary 
of the Pope; SC: Small Catechism; LC: Large Catechism; 
FC,Ep: Formula of Concord, Epitome; FC,SD: Formula of 
Concord, Solid Declaration. English translations in this 
dissertation will be those of the Tappert edition. 
8Ap,IV,38. 
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This formulation of Law and Gospel stands in stark 
contrast to the doctrine of justification in the sixteenth 
century Roman church.9 Justifacere was used to translate 
the Greek dikaioo and etymologically understood as the 
transformation by which God "made righteous" the 
unrighteous. The Western Church had rightly condemned 
Pelagianism. Yet through its transformational and 
progressional theology of justification it had made the 
continuing good works of the transformed Christian an 
essential ingredient in his reconciliation to God. For 
faith to be salvific it must be infused by works of love 
through which the Christian demonstrated that he was 
justifacere. The law of works which had been banished from 
the front door by the church's proscription of Pelagianism 
entered the church through the back door when justifacere  
was understood to describe not the conversion of the 
Christian but the process of renewal. This process was 
described and amplified by the schoolmen of the Middle Ages 
with a variety of definitions and distinctions. Although 
diverging among themselves in specifics, the schoolmen 
shared in common a denial that one is saved by grace, 
through faith, for the sake of Christ alone, viewing grace 
9A concise, accurate, and helpful summary of the 
evolution of Augustinian thought and its consequences for 
the western church's understanding of Justifacere is 
provided in the paper released by the U.S. Lutheran-Roman 
Catholic Dialogue entitled "Justification by Faith" in 
Origins: NC Documentary Service 13, no. 17 (October 6, 
1983), pp. 279-281. 
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as an infused quality, faith as intellectual assent, and 
Christ as the new Law giver whose death atoned for man's 
condition of sin but not for his voluntary sin. 
Justification described the process whereby the infused 
grace of God and the intellectual assent of man enabled the 
regenerated Christian to know and to choose the will of God 
revealed by Christ. In this process the Christian became 
righteous before God and justified.'° The admixture of 
Law and Gospel resulted, from an evangelical point of view, 
in a falsification of both Law and Gospel. The evangelical 
emphasis on sola qratia, sola fide, and soli per Christum 
'At the opening of the debate on justification 
at the Council of Trent, Jedin notes the presentation of 
Bertano, Bishop of Fano, a Thomist and an advisor to the 
papal legates. "Bertano begins by examining the two basic 
concepts of justice and faith. There is a three-fold 
justice, namely, the justice of God who promised to send us 
his Son for the forgiveness of sin; the justice of Christ, 
that is, the merits of his Passion and death, which must be 
appropriatd by us and become our own (iustia inhaerens); 
finally the justice of good works by which we prove 
ourselves to be just. The first justice does not justify; 
only the second does so because it effects the remission of 
sins and fits us for the justice of good works. . . . Only 
faith in the Gospel, that is, faith united to hope and 
charity justifies. . . . Faith freely bestowed by God is 
actively accepted by man, hence he does not remain purely 
passive in the process of justification. St. Augustine 
says: 'He who made thee without thee will not save thee 
without thee,' and St. Thomas declares that 'when we are 
justified, we assent to God's justice.' The difference 
between the Catholic and Lutheran doctrine of justification 
appears on three heads. Bertano declared: "the sola fide  
formula is too narrow because it excludes hope and charity; 
faith does not contain personal justification; good works 
are not merely tokens of justification, they are an 
essential element of it." Jedin concludes: "It can hardly 
be contested that Bertano's note evidences a profound 
insight into the real doctrinal differences and does not 
fasten on mere formulas." Jedin, p. 185. 
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restored the Gospel to the church and placed the Law in its 
proper subordinate position to the promises of Christ. But 
it left the evangelical church with a problem of 
terminology as it sought to redefine on a biblical basis 
the meaning of "Law," "Gospel," "justification," 
"sanctification," "regeneration," and "renewal." It is 
with this process of redefinition that this study is 
concerned. 
Philip Melanchthon occupies a pre-eminent position 
in this process of epitomizing and defining the evangelical 
insights of the Lutheran reformation. Pedagogue, 
classicist, philologist, logician, historian and biblical 
scholar, Melanchthon brought the academic talents necessary 
to formulate into theological propositions the insights of 
Luther, whom he highly esteemed. Through the editions of 
his Loci Communes Theologicae, first published is 1521, 
Melanchthon sought to epitomize in "Commonplaces" the basic 
themes of biblical teaching and to refute the errors of 
scholasticism. These copies or commonplaces expanded in 
size and scope through the second edition of 1535, and 
culminated in a kind of Summa Christianae Doctrinae in the 
final Latin edition of 1559." 
"The most complete gathering of Melanchthon's 
writings is to be found is the Corpus Reformatorum, 28 
vols., compiled by Carol Bretschneider, ed. Henry Bindsell 
(Brunswig and Halis: C. A. Schwetschke and Son, 
1842-1858). Melanchthon's Loci are found in vol. 21, which 
includes the first edition of 1521; fragmentary student 
13 
The two topics with which Melanchthon was most 
consistently occupied were those of justification and the 
Law. In his descriptions of both justification and the Law 
one notes a development in theological precision. Re-
garding justification, Melanchthon's theology evolved into 
the vocabulary of forensic justification found in later 
editions of the Loci (1535, 1559) and subsequently in the 
theology of confessional Lutheranism through the Epitome 
and Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord, Articles 
IV and V. With respect to the Law, Melanchthon in the 1535 
edition introduced a third function of the Law in addition 
to the civil and theological functions described in earlier 
writings, including the Augsburg Confession and its 
Apology.t2 This three part division of the functions of 
notes based on Melanchthon's lectures on the Loci, 
published in 1533; the second edition of 1535; and the 
third and final edition of 1559. The Corpus Reformatorum 
includes only the Latin editions. Hereafter it will be 
cited CR, with volume and page number. In this century 
Robert Stupperich has provided the closest thing to a 
critical edition of Melanchthon's works in his selected 
edition of Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl (Studienausgabe), 
7 vols. (presently), ed. Robert Stupperich (Guetersloh: 
Mohn and Co., 1953 through present). Melanchthon's Loci  
are reproduced in the Studienausgabe in the two part second 
volume, first (1521) and last (1559) editions, with 
footnote references to the 1535 edition. The 
Studienausgabe is commonly abbreviated St.A. and will be 
cited in this manner with volume and page number. 
"In the Ap Melanchthon describes the first use 
of the Law ("civil use") in these terms: "For God wants 
this civil discipline to restrain the unspiritual and to 
preserve it he has given laws, learning, teaching, 
governments and penalties." (Ap,IV,22) He speaks of the 
second use ("theological use") several paragraphs later. 
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the Law is reproduced in the Formula of Concord, article VI 
and has remained a part of Lutheran confessional vocabulary. 
Concomitant with Melanchthon's specification of 
the nature of justification and the instructional function 
of the Law is his concern to articulate precisely the 
psychology of the regenerate will as it freely chooses to 
know and to do God's will revealed in the Holy Scriptures. 
Through the vocabulary of•forensic justification 
Melanchthon maintains the sola gratia and sola fide of the 
Scriptures. Through the third use of the Law Melanchthon 
affirms the abiding validity of the Law as revealed in 
Scripture against both radical enthusiast opinions and 
scholastic Roman theology. Through the free choice 
(arbitrium)" of the regenerate will Melanchthon affirms 
"For the law always accuses and terrifies consciences. It 
does not justify, because a conscience terrified by the law 
flees before God's judgment" (Ap,IV,3E). The third 
function ("pedagogical use") of the law is summarized in 
the FC as follows: ". . . after they are reborn and 
although the flesh still inheres in them, [the law gives] 
them on that account a definite rule according to which 
they should pattern and regulate their entire life" 
(FC,Ep,VI,l). "Those who have been born anew through the 
Holy Spirit, who have been converted to the Lord and from 
whom the veil of Moses has been taken away, learn from the 
law to live and walk in the law" (FC,ED,VI,1). 
"For consistency arbitrium will be translated as 
"choice" and voluntas as "will." The distinction will be 
developed in chapters IV & V. Suffice it here that 
voluntas in the psychology of the mature Melanchthon 
described that faculty of man which is bound by the 
"affections" of sin and therefore is not free, and 
arbitrium described the free choice the regenerated 
Christian heart can make to obey the commandments of God, 
understanding at the same time that arbitrium is the 
consequence of grace worked in the human heart by the Holy 
Spirit mediated by Word and sacrament. 
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the individual's ability to act on the basis of the faith 
God gives by grace in living a life responsive to God and 
responsible to God. In consequence one notes in 
Melanchthon a continuing emphasis on the benefits of prayer 
and the necessity of good works. 
Overview of this Study 
The place of the Law in the context of the Christian 
life has remained a primary 
since Saint Paul penned his 
Galatia. In addressing the 
Law have in the life of the 
questions come to the fore.  
focus of Christian theology 
letter to the congregations of 
question, what function does the 
Christian, several attendant 
Since the distinctive witness 
of the Christian faith is to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, 
does the Mosaic Law have a continuing function for the 
regenerate? If the Law remains valid for the regenerate, 
how does it relate to that Gospel? Does it complete or 
perfect the Gospel? Is the Gospel a new Law? Is it the 
means by which the righteousness of the Law is attained? 
Does sin remain in the "justified?" Are Law and Gospel 
mutually exclusive messages of God whereby one's existence 
is either within the framework of Law or the framework of 
the Gospel? Does grace exclude all human efforts? Does the 
Gospel exclude the Law? Obviously the answer to these 
questions and others impinges on one's understanding of sin, 
grace, Law, Gospel, justification, sanctification, and 
righteousness. 
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Although Christian theologians have answered these 
questions in a variety of ways, for the ten centuries 
between the conversion of Saint Augustine and the Lutheran 
reformation, the Western Church recognized the priority of 
grace and the necessity of good works in the process of 
justification, whereby the sinner was made righteous before 
God. In making a man righteous, God infused within that man 
qualities of love which enabled him to keep the Law. Only a 
faith informed by loving obedience to the Law was viewed as 
salvific.  The painstaking work of Thomas Aquinas wed this 
western, Augustinian tradition to the dialectic of 
Aristotelian logic in a synthesis which by the time of the 
Council of Trent had become a theological norm for the 
Church of Rome." It was on the basis of this 
'4It would be anachronistic to say that the Roman 
church responded to the theology of Luther and Melanchthon 
in the 1520s, 30s and 40s on the basis of the Council of 
Trent, but it would be appropriate to say that the theology 
later canonized at Trent lay behind the Roman responses to 
the reformation in the first half of the sixteenth century. 
The Roman rejection of forensic justification has been cited 
above (footnote 11). Underlying this rejection of the sola 
fide and justification as the imputation of the righteous-
ness of Christ and the non-imputation of sin is the Roman 
understanding of sin itself. In the Decree concerning 
Original Sin it is affirmed, "If anyone denies, that by the 
grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in bap-
tism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, or even asserts 
that the whole of that which has the true and proper nature 
of sin is not taken away; but says that it is only erased, 
or not imputed; let him be anathema." The Canons and  
Decrees of the Sacred and Ecumenical Council of Trent, p. 
24. What remains in those born again is not sin ("as being 
truly and properly sin in those born again") but it is "of 
sin and inclines to sin." Ibid. The evangelical view of 
the reborn as "sinner-saint" is thus categorically rejected, 
as well as its implications for justification, the Law, and 
free will. 
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scholastic vocabulary that Roman theologians responded to 
the sola gratia and sola fide vocabulary of the 
evangelical reformation. In appealing to the Old 
Testament and to Pauline theology the evangelicals 
formulated their theology of justification in a way which 
radically departed from scholastic definitions and 
understandings." To understand this evangelical 
departure from traditional Augustinian theology, one must 
first appreciate the theological vocabulary the Western 
Church had inherited from those who represented themselves 
as holding to the Augustinian tradition. Therefore this 
study begins with a reprise of conservative Augustinian 
theology through the self-avowed Augustinian Thomas 
Aquinas, with particular reference to the topics of 
justification, the Law, and Christian obedience. This 
background is essential in understanding the early theol-
ogy of justification in both Luther and Melanchthon in the 
context of later formulations and in understanding why the 
early Luther is often contrasted with the forensic 
vocabulary of the later Melanchthon by those who see in 
"A helpful essay, positive in tone but written 
by a Roman theologian, underscores the evangelical 
departure from the scholastic synthesis of Law and Gospel, 
justification and works. The essay relates to Luther's 
later Galatians commentary but is equally applicable to 
Melanchthon. Peter Manns, "Absolute and Incarnate Faith 
-- Luther on Justification in the Galatians Commentary of 
1531-1535," in Catholic Scholars Dialogue with Luther, ed. 
Jared Wicks (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1970), pp. 
121-158. 
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Melanchthon a denigration of Luther's theology. It is the 
position of this writer that the mature Luther and 
Melanchthon both affirmed forensic justification and that 
many contemporary critics of Melanchthon's theology are in 
fact arguing for a western, Augustinian view of 
justification. 
Although this thesis is an investigation of the 
theology of Melanchthon, it is impossible to undertake 
such a study without reference to his mentor and colleague 
at *the University of Wittenberg, Martin Luther. For 
twenty-eight years mutual esteem for one another's work, a 
desire to remain faithful to Holy Scripture, and a shared 
responsibility to the evangelical church intertwined the 
lives and work of these two men. Differences of 
temperament, personality, education, background, roles and 
priorities might have isolated these men from one another, 
but mutual respect and a shared commitment to the Holy 
Scriptures and the preaching of the Gospel enabled these 
men to use their talents in tandem, mutually complementing 
one another in the explication of reformation theology. 
Reformation theology did not spring full flower in 
a moment of divine enlightenment. It developed slowly as 
Luther and Melanchthon sought to explicate the teaching of 
Scripture. It grew amidst controversy, both with theo-
logians of the Roman church-and with theologians within 
the evangelical movement itself. One is able to trace 
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this theological growth in the writings of both Luther and 
Melanchthon, particularly with reference to justification, 
the Law, and Christian obedience. In describing the 
mature position of Melanchthon regarding justification, 
the Law and Christian obedience; this study traces his 
theological growth throughout the 1520s, culminating in 
the Augsburg Confession and its Apology. 
Essential to this study is a recognition of the 
reformers' continuing need to define and refine 
terminology in order that their evangelical position might 
not be misunderstood by its opponents or misrepresented by 
deviant supporters. Especially with regard to the 
distinctive functions of Law and Gospel the aberrations of 
Agricola and his antinomian supporters are noted. This 
controversy, beginning in the late 1520s and culminating 
in Luther's antinomian Disputations in the late 1530s 
resulted in a more precise use of terms and in less 
ambiguity in doctrinal formulations. It is during this 
period of time that Melanchthon specifies his forensic 
description of justification, speaks of the Law's third 
use, and begins to speak of the function of the regenerate 
free will in obedience to the Word of God. 
In the areas of justification, the Law, and 
regenerate free will one finds little development or 
amplification of Melanchthon's theology after 1535. 
Despite continuing controversy and ongoing dialogue with 
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the theologians of Rome, the reformed, and among the evan-
gelicals themselves, Melanchthon's theology in his 
writings and in the subsequent editions of his Loci  
remains unchanged. Indeed, he often repeats himself 
verbatim." This would suggest that Luther knew and 
approved of the mature theology of Melanchthon, although 
Melanchthon's formulations were his own and often distinct 
from Luther's. 
This survey of Melanchthon's theological develop-
ment in his articulation of forensic justification, third 
use of the Law and regenerate free will would indicate 
that these emphases bear a close relationship to one 
another, not merely as controverted issues, but in the 
"That Melanchthon frequently quotes himself 
from one writing to another is evident to anyone having 
read his works. Peter Fraenkel remarks that "what we have 
elsewhere called the 'propositional' aspect of the Gospel, 
leads Melanchthon to think of the Church's continuity in 
terms of a repetition of statements." Melanchthon's 
contemporaries also noted this tendency, and "they used a 
conventional expression to voice their complaint: 
"Philippus canit eande cantilenam." Peter Fraenkel, 
Testimonia Patrum: The Function of the Patristic Argument  
in the Theology of Philip Melanchthon (Geneva: Librairie 
E. Droz, 1961), p. 145. As professor of theology and of 
the classics, one might suggest that Melanchthon was 
simply reaffirming the pedagogical maxim: "Repetition is 
the mother of study." But probably more germane to 
Melanchthon's concern was theological precision. A 
variety of ways of expressing the same truth may in fact 
confuse that truth. In this Melanchthon's style differs 
significantly from that of Luther, for whom paradox and 
seeming self-contradiction were aspects of his theological 
style. In consequence, one can cite Luther against Luther 
on a variety of topics. Melanchthon is internally very 
consistent. The problem for Melanchthon arises when one 
attempts to make his theological formulations fit the mold 
of Luther's theology. 
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focusing on Melanchthon's theology. Any one of these 
three emphases, viewed separately, might be misunderstood 
(and they were so viewed and in consequence thus 
misapplied -- by friend and foe alike). Forensic 
justification apart from the continuing validity of the 
Law might be abused as license for sin. Andreas 
Osiander's rejection of forensic justification may be 
viewed in this light. Certainly it was a continuing 
charge leveled against the evangelicals by the Roman 
party. The third function of the Law, viewed apart from 
forensic justification and the Holy Spirit's renewal of 
the regenerate will, might be misconstrued as a new 
legalism and as a displacement of the Gospel. The Formula 
of Concord, Article VI, is a commentary on such a concern 
which arose (and continues to arise) among Lutheran 
theologians. Emphasis on free choice apart from 
Melanchthon's strong accent on the necessity of 
justification prior to sanctification would appear 
synergistic. Although Melanchthon clearly indicated the 
priority of forensic justification to the renewal of the 
regenerate free will, his students were less clear and 
some of them taught a synergistic view condemned by 
Formula of Concord, Article II. 
Modern commentators often fault Melanchthon for 
separating sanctification from justification. In fact, 
through the vocabulary of forensic justification and the 
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third use of the Law Melanchthon carefully distinguished  
justification and sanctification. Distinguishing 
justification and sanctification was especially necessary 
pedagogically at a time when the Roman church and even 
some among the evangelicals (for example: Osiander) 
assumed the Western, Augustinian, "making righteous" 
(justificare) concept of justification. Like a tripod, 
forensic justification, third use of the Law, and 
regenerate free will provided the foundation of 
Melanchthon's Christian ethos, underscoring his humanist 
concern for Christian doctrine and piety." If any 
single leg of this tripod is emphasized disproportionate 
to the others, the structure of Melanchthon's theology 
tumbles into heterodoxy. 
This study would suggest that many of the 
detractors of Melanchthon as an evangelical apologist have 
failed to view his theology as an organic whole and in 
consequence have "put asunder" what Melanchthon had 
carefully "joined together." Often one learns more about 
the personal concerns of the critic or the theological 
concerns of his school of thought than one learns about 
Melanchthon. Moreover Melanchthon has suffered in 
"This theme is expanded by Robert Stupperich 
who writes of Melanchthon that "His whole life he devoted 
to the task of challenging men to pietas et doctrina." 
Robert Stupperich, "The Development of Melanchthon's 
Theological-Philosophical World View," Lutheran World, 
vol. 7 (September 1960): 171. 
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consequence to his close association with Luther. Luther 
himself appreciated the distinctive genius of Wittenberg's 
"Magister Philip" and recognized his gifts as pedagogue 
and ecumenical spokesman." He also recognized and on 
occasion criticised Melanchthon's natural timidity and his 
innate desire to achieve consensus among contending 
"Perhaps Luther's most famous comment is found 
is his table talks regarding Melanchthon, Erasmus, 
Karlstadt, and himself. "Res et verba Philippus; verba 
sine re Erasmus; res sine verbis, Lutherus; nec res nec 
verba Carolostadius" (WA, Ti, III, 460). Citations to 
Luther will be made to the Weimar Ausgabe, commonly 
abbreviated WA. D. Martin Luthers Werke, 94 vols., 
(Weimar: Herman Boehlaus Nachfolger, 1883-present). When 
an English translation is available, reference will be 
made to the American edition of Luther's Works, commonly 
abbreviated AE. Luther's Works, 55 vols., ed. Jaroslav 
Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann (St. Louis; Concordia 
Publishing House and Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1958-present). Translations by the author will be so 
noted. In his preface to Melanchthon's Commentary on  
Colossians Luther commends Melanchthon's exegesis and 
style (WA., XXX-2, 68-69). He reserved his highest 
commendation for the first edition of the Loci. In his 
Bondage of the Will Luther said the Loci deserved to be 
included in the canon of the church and that "You cannot 
find anywhere a book which treats the whole of theology so 
adequately as the Loci Communes do. . . . Next to Holy 
Scripture, there is no better book." (WA., Ti, V, 204-5). 
Above translation in Loci Communes Theologicae, trans. 
Lowell J. Satre, in Melanchthon and Bucer, ed. Wilhelm 
Pauck (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), p. 17. 
Hereafter cited as "1521 Loci" (Satre). For other 
positive expressions of appreciation for Melanchthon's 
work see the following: WA., Ti. XXX:460; WA., Ti. V:205; 
WA., Ti. V:435; WA. XXX, 2:68-69; WA. XVIII: 601. 
Luther's appreciation of Melanchthon's gifts was first 
expressed after Melanchthon's inaugural lecture at the 
University of Wittenberg when he wrote (August 31, 1518) 
"a man worthy of every honor" (WA., Br. I, 191-2) (AE., 
48:76-80). When Luther received a copy of the AC he 
wrote, "Philip's Apologia . . . pleases me very much." 
His additional comment, "I cannot step so quietly or 
softly," has been interpreted both as praise and as 
criticism (WA., Br. V:319-20, AE. 49:295-99). 
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parties." It is ironic that this aversion to conflict 
and desire for unity should have repeatedly embroiled 
Melanchthon in theological controversy in the fourteen 
years he outlived Luther. Melanchthon lacked the staunch 
courage of Luther. He optimistically supposed those 
holding divergent or deviant positions could be reconciled 
to the truth on the basis of the revealed Word. 
As a pedagogue and systematician he avoided the 
paradoxical vocabulary of Luther's theology. As 
classicist he couched evangelical theology in Aristotelian 
dialectic.2° As ecumenist he respected and researched 
the worthier opinions of the church fathers." As 
"Luther was critical of Melanchthon's spiritual 
and personal timidity at Augsburg and warned him against 
an accommodating spirit (WA., BR. V:405-407; AE. 49: 
326-333). 
20Quirinius Breen questions whether Melanchthon 
understood Aristotle. "It is true that he so favored 
Aristotle because he considered him the ace of 
dialecticians and a rhetorician, in fact, something of a 
'Ciceronian.' Had he not so looked on him I doubt if he 
would have defended him." Quirinius Breen, "The Terms 
'Loci Communes' and 'Loci' in Melanchthon," Church 
History 16 (December 1947): 205. Peter Petersen in his 
Geschichte der Aristotelischen Philosophie im 
Protestantischen Deutchland (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1921), 
p. 101, terms Melanchthon a philosophic eclectic. By this 
Petersen does not mean that Melanchthon is not basically 
Aristotelian. Petersen affirms, however, that for 
Melanchthon, Aristotelianism was the clearest philosophy, 
especially in its gift of dialectic; and that Melanchthon 
appreciated Aristotle for his practical uses, but he was 
selective in his use. 
"Peter Fraenkel's Testimonia Patrum is the 
definitive treatment of Melanchthon's positive and 
negative evaluation of the Greek and Latin fathers. 
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humanist and philologist he worked out of a background 
decidedly differing from Luther's. It is not surprising 
then that as pedagogue, humanist, classicist, philologist 
and ecumenist, the structure of his theology should differ 
from that of Luther. That his pedantic style of theology 
suffers in comparison to the vivid, pastoral and 
expressive theology of Luther is to be expected. But 
Luther frequently praised Melanchthon's doctrinal 
formulations.22 Perhaps Luther knew Melanchthon better 
than his subsequent detractors. Certainly Luther knew 
that his own personal charisma and prophetic utterances 
would not sustain the church of the reformation -- only 
pure doctrine and Christian piety could do that.23  
Fraenkel treats of Melanchthon's criticism of the doctrine 
of justification in the fathers and of his selective use 
of the doctrine of justification in Augustine, pp. 292-306. 
22Even critics of Melanchthon acknowledge this 
(sometimes with seeming amazement). Despite the variety 
of heresies laid at Melanchthon's door by Lutherans of the 
second generation and generations following, there is no 
evidence in Luther's works of any severe criticism of 
Melanchthon's doctrinal formulations, even in those areas 
later in controversy among Lutherans. Whatever other 
questions might arise, two things seem certain. Luther 
knew Melanchthon's mature theology and Luther was not 
reluctant to criticize doctrinal aberrations. Might it be 
that some of the criticism of Melanchthon's theology is 
anachronistic, filtered through the strife theologically, 
politically, and geographically which followed Luther's 
death and was only resolved with the publication of the 
Book of Concord, 1580? 
23 
 In his last sermon preached at Wittenberg, 
Luther said, "I foresee that, if God does not give us 
faithful ministers, the devil will tear our church apart 
through the sectarians and he will never cease until he has 
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This is not to make Melanchthon immune from 
criticism. Melanchthon admitted his handling of the 
Leipzig (1548) interim to have been a mistake.24 In 
seeking consensus Melanchthon on occasion resorted to 
theological ambiguity, as in the 1541 Variata of the 
Augsburg Confession.25 By temperament, personality, 
accomplished it. In a word, that is simply what he has in 
mind. If he cannot do it through the pope and emperor, he 
will accomplish it through those who are still in accord 
with us in doctrine." (WA. LI:131-32. AE. 51:378). 
24C.R. VIII, 841. For a summary of 
Melanchthon's political and theological difficulties 
during this period see Robert Kolb, "Historical Background 
of the Formula of Concord," in A Contemporary Look at the  
Formula of Concord, ed. Robert D. Preus and Wilbert H. 
Rosin (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1978), pp. 
12-87. This balanced presentation goes a long way in 
correcting the distortions found in Gerhard Friedrich 
Bente's "Historical Introductions to the Lutheran 
Symbols," in Triglot Concordia: The Symbolical Books of  
the Evangelical Lutheran Church (St. Louis, Concordia 
Publishing House, 1922), pp. 1-266. Lowell C. Green notes 
regarding the Bente "Introduction": "Bente was dependent 
on Franz Hermann Reinhold Frank, who was also excessively 
biased against Melanchthon in his great work, Die 
Theologie der Concordienformel, 4 vols. (Erlangen: 
Theodore Blaesing, 1858-65), in A Contemporary Look at the 
Formula of Concord. p. 306, footnote 7. The number of 
citations in Bente to Frank and a cursory reading of Frank 
would substantiate this evaluation. 
25Melanchthon was seldom satisfied with the 
original edition of any of his writings, and this included 
the Augsburg Confession. Certainly he may be criticised 
for treating as a personal document one that had been sub-
scribed by the evangelical church. In 1541 he revised the 
Augsburg Confession, bringing the article on the Lord's 
Supper into conformity with the expressions of the 
Wittenberg Concord (1537), and also the articles con-
cerning free will, justification, and new obedience were 
revised. However, these changes were not noted among the 
evangelicals until the Roman party first criticized these 
revisions as having changed the evangelical position. In 
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predilection he was not equipped to pick up Luther's 
mantle in 1546 nor was he later able to bring consensus to 
the diverging opinions of the evangelicals following 
Luther's death." But these are areas beyond the scope 
of this study. No one at that time or since has accused 
Melanchthon of accomodation either to Rome or to other 
evangelical theologians in the areas of forensic 
justification, third use of the Law, or the role of the 
fact the changes in the Variata do represent a hardening 
of the evangelical position against the theology of Rome 
and a softening toward those parties participating in the 
Wittenberg Concord. In relation to the subject of this 
dissertation Seeberg writes: "Faith apprehends the purely 
forensic decree of justification. And because this oc-
curs, the Spirit is also granted to the individual for his 
regeneration. The inseparable connection which is in 
Luther always maintained between regeneration, justifi-
cation, and sanctification is thus broken. These are the 
ideas which underlie the thorough going revision of the 
Articles IV and V in the Variata Edition of the Augsburg 
Confession." Reinhold Seeberg, Textbook of The History of  
Doctrines, 2 vols, trans. Charles E. Hay (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Book House, 1952) 2: 360. One should note that 
between the presentation of the AC and the revision of the 
Variata the controversy with John Agricola had brought 
about a tightening of vocabulary regarding justification, 
not only in Melanchthon but also in Luther, see chapter 
III of this dissertation. In a footnote to his comments 
about Melanchthon's theology in the Variata, Seeberg 
remarks, "If the Augsburg Confession is to be interpreted 
in accordance with the Apology, then the prevalent formula 
of the Lutheran doctrine of justification finds its sym-
bolical support in the Variata!" (Ibid.) It seems that it 
could be argued that the more the evangelicals specified 
their doctrine of justification in relation to the Roman 
doctrine of justification, the more the vocabulary of 
forensic justification gained priority. 
"Melanchthon's role in the polemics within the 
Lutheran party following Luther's death has been treated 
helpfully in Robert Kolb's "Historical Background of the 
Formula of Concord," pp. 13-87. 
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regenerate will in sanctification. Indeed, in these areas 
(particularly forensic justification and third use of the 
Law) Melanchthon found himself aligned with the conser-
vative, "gnesio-Lutheran" party. 
The present investigation will therefore restrict 
itself to Melanchthon's relation of Law and Gospel 
justification and sanctification in the context of 
forensic justification, third use of the Law, and 
regenerate free will. Melanchthon's pragmatic and 
humanistic concern for the Christian in his living 
relationship with God focused on justification as the 
divine proclamation of forgiveness for the sake of Christ 
and its necessary implications for Christian living. "To 
know Christ, is to know his benefits."27 It is in this 
context that justification is identified with the 
forgiveness of sins and faith is emphasized as confidence 
(fiducia) in that imputed forgiveness. 
The subsequent renewal of the Christian worked by 
the Holy Spirit through the revealed Word creates within 
the Christian heart a new will to please God. This 
regenerate will is enabled freely to choose to do the will 
of God. However, while the forensic decree of God has 
imputed the Christian righteous by grace, through faith, 
for Christ's sake, the renewal of the Christian is 
27St.A. II,I, p. 7. "1521 Loci," (Satre), p. 21. 
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incomplete, and the Christian must seek the guidance of 
God in his Word to know what works are pleasing to God. 
The Christian is free from the Law in that it no longer 
condemns him, but he carries within him in this mortal 
life weakness and sin. Therefore the Christian must avail 
himself of the Word by which is revealed the will of God. 
The Law thus remains necessary as a testimony to the works 
which please God. Far from separating justification from 
sanctification, Melanchthon intends to stress the impli-
cations of God's forensic decree for the life of the 
redeemed sinner-saint. In distinguishing forensic 
justification from Christian renewal, Melanchthon empha-
sized the central doctrine of the evangelical church, the 
sola gratia, sola fide, soli per Christum of justification. 
Melanchthon clearly affirms that this forensic 
decree necessarily effects a change in man's heart so that 
he seeks to know and to do the will of God. But man's 
relationship to God is not based on his continuing renewal 
or his good works either prior to or following the gift of 
God's grace. That relationship depends entirely on the 
divine imputation of Christ's righteousness and the 
non-imputation of sin. Therefore the doctrine of forensic 
justification emphasizes the monergism of divine grace 
while the renewal of the heart with its ability freely to 
choose the will of God revealed in the Word, emphasizes 
Christian responsibility. 
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As indicated above, pure doctrine and Christian 
piety characterize Melanchthon's theological concern for 
the church. This concern to epitomize doctrine in 
theological propositions has caused Rome to see in 
Melanchthon the beginnings of later Lutheran orthodoxy and 
the stagnation of evangelical theology in a scholastic 
mold. These same scholars have charged that Melanchthon's 
distinction of justification and sanctification, even if 
for pedagogical purposes, resulted in the separation of 
justification and sanctification in later orthodoxy. 
Evaluation of this position is beyond the scope of this 
study, but recognizing these positions as they relate to 
an interpretation of Melanchthon's theology is vital. 
Jaroslav Pelikan represents this position concisely when 
he writes, 
Is is interesting as well as significant that those who 
most strenuously opposed Melancthonian theology continued 
to do so in terms of Melanchthonian philosophy and 
Melanchthonian psychology. . . . One of the major 
conclusions to which the researches of Karl Holl have led 
is the thesis that much Lutheranism after Luther is not 
really Lutheran, but Melanchthonian, and that later 
Lutheranism filled Luther's words with Melanchthon's 
meanings and then put Luther's words into Melanchthon's 
categories. . . . Contemporary research in the theology 
of Luther has taken it as its aim to get behind 
Melanchthon to the real Luther and to rediscover Luther's 
relevance for the present theological crisis.28  
Does Melanchthon misrepresent Luther in his doctrine of 
forensic justification, third use of the Law, and 
28Jarosoav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard 
(St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1963), p. 26. 
31 
regenerate free will? It is the conclusion of this thesis 
that he does not. 
In a study that involves the topics of 
justification, the Law, and Christian renewal, it is 
essential that parameters be set. The focus of this study 
is on the continuing validity of the Law for the regenerate 
in the context of Roman theology of the sixteenth century, 
Luther's theology, evangelical controversies of that time 
and the essential harmony of forensic justification, third 
use of the Law, and regenerate free will in explicating the 
basis of Christian ethics. What was the understanding of 
justification, the Law, and Christian obedience that 
informed Melanchthon's Roman opponents? How did Melanchthon 
come to his mature position in these theological areas? 
What are these mature positions and how do they relate to 
one another? Is Melanchthon's position in these areas 
consistent with Luther's teaching? Is it consistent with 
Confessional Lutheran theology in the Formula of Concord? 
Does Melanchthon's understanding of forensic justification, 
third use of the Law, and Christian obedience have relevance 
to contemporary Lutheran theological discussions? An 
emphasis will be placed on utilizing Melanchthon's own 
writings rather that those of his contemporary detractors or 
his subsequent commentators. Secondary literature will be 
noted as it contributes to the subject at hand, but the 
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priority will be that Melanchthon speak for himself in 
developing the interdependencies of his theology. 
Thomas Aquinas is utilized as a representative 
spokesman for the Augustinian tradition as it developed in 
the Roman church of the sixteenth century. There is no 
evidence to suggest that either Luther or Melancthon had any 
deep acquaintance with Thomas' writings. Why then Thomas as 
spokesman? First, Thomas, Luther, and Melanchthon each 
shared a high respect for Augustine's theology. Secondly, 
the Augustinian tradition as mediated by Thomas had achieved 
a formative position in Roman theology, as evidenced by the 
formulations of the decrees at the Council of Trent.29 It 
was Cardinal Cajetan, before whom Luther was summoned at 
Augsburg in 1518, whose conservative commentary on Thomas' 
Summa began the great revival of Thomism in the sixteenth 
century." Thirdly, both Luther and Melanchthon perceived 
themselves as teaching a doctrine of justification, the Law, 
and Christian good works at variance with the fides formata, 
fides informata, and fides infusa expressed in "the new law 
of the gospel" of Thomistic theology. The distinction of 
29The manifold and recurring influence of 
Augustine at the deliberations of the Council of Trent is 
stressed by Jedin. Specifically Jedin notes the common 
appeal of Luther, Thomas and theologians at Trent to 
Augustine regarding the future of sin (pp. 145-8) and 
regarding justification (pp. 166-68, 185-88, 258-9, et al.). 
""Cajetan, Thomas De Vio," in The Oxford  
Dictionary of the Christian Church, ed. F. L. Cross (London: 
Oxford University, 1961), p. 216. 
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Law and Gospel, the differentiation of justification and 
renewal, the affirmation of the sola 9ratia, sola fide, 
forensic justification, and the discussion of the nature and 
place of good works all represent a thrust of evangelical 
theology at variance with Thomism. Thus it is precisely in 
the interrelation of forensic justification, third use of 
the Law, and Christian obedience that Melanchthon 
articulates the distinctive evangelical emphases in 
theology. Fourthly, Thomas' formulations in his Summa and 
Melanchthon's Confessional writings and Loci played 
significant roles in the continuing dialogue of Roman and 
Lutheran theologians of the late sixteenth century and 
throughout the period of orthodoxy. 
Some attention is given to the formulations of 
evangelical theology regarding justification, the Law, 
repentance and new obedience prior to 1530. This emphasis 
is necessitated by several factors. First, it underscored 
the conservative and evolving theology of both Luther and 
Melanchthon in these central areas of evangelical theology. 
It becomes clear that the articulation of forensic 
justification, the careful distinction of justification and 
sanctification, Law and Gospel, and the instructional 
function of the Law in relation to its theological function 
emerged gradually during this period. Secondly, in this 
period one sees Melanchthon and Luther doing theology not as 
an abstraction, but as a habitus practicus focusing on the 
34 
needs of the evangelical Christians and of the evangelical 
church. Thus in Luther's catechisms and Melanchthon's 
"Visitation Articles" one finds a formulation of evangelical 
theology written for the care and nurturing of the 
Christian, accenting the power of the Gospel and the 
continuing validity of the Law. Thirdly, in the controversy 
with Agricola one touches on issues at the heart of this 
study: the understanding of justification, the role of Law 
and Gospel in the salvific plan of God, the continuing 
validity of the Law for the regenerate. The controversy 
began with Agricola's attack on Melanchthon's insistence on 
the preaching of the Law prior to repentance. It culminated 
in Luther's Antinomian Disputations, where Luther clearly 
articulates (as will be shown) a theology of forensic 
justification and of the continuing validity of the Law 
which parallels that of the mature Melanchthon.31  
In the years between the Romans Commentary (1532) 
and the second edition of the Loci (1535) Melanchthon 
achieved his mature position regarding forensic 
justification, the instructional function of the Law, and 
regenerate free will. Attention will be focused on the 
31This position will be documented is chapter III 
& VI both with reference to the controversy whether Luther's 
theology of the Law in its theological function also in-
cludes a pedagogical function and whether the pedagogical 
function of the Law in Luther is in harmony with Melanch-
thon's third use of the Law, and with reference to the 
"analytic" (made righteous) -- "synthetic" (declared 
righteous) debate precipitated by Karl Holl at the beginning 
of this century. 
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Romans Commentary because of its clear development of 
forensic justification. The 1535 edition of the Loci 
introduces the term "third use of the Law" and Melanchthon's 
juxtaposition of the Holy Spirit, the Word, and the human 
will in the life of the regenerate. The Saxon Confession  
(1551), Examen Ordinandorum (1553) and writings against 
Flacius and Osiander provide continuing witness to the 
stability of this mature position culminating in the 1559 
Latin edition of the Loci, which appeared only one year 
prior to Melanchthon's death. 
In the final chapter the implications of this study 
will be addressed. Did Melanchthon ossify and pervert 
Luther's theology of justification with his forensic 
vocabulary? Did Melanchthon replace the Gospel emphasis in 
Luther with a legalistic ethic in his affirmation of the 
third use of the Law? Did Melanchthon detract from the 
theological function of the Law (second use) in his 
affirmation of a positive function for the Law in the life 
of the regenerate? Does Melanchthon's emphasis on free will 
in the content of the Word and the Holy Spirit deny the 
divine monergism of justification or rather express the 
necessity of Christian choice in the process of renewal? Do 
his formulations properly distinguish justification and 
sanctification, or does he unduly separate justification 
from sanctification? Is it accurate to distinguish Luther 
as teaching an "effective" or "analytic" doctrine of 
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justification and Melanchthon a "forensic" or "synthetic" 
form? Finally, did Luther teach a function of the Law 
paralleling Melanchthon's third use? 
Such questions have been raised by modern 
theologians. It is the purpose of this study to put these 
questions in historical and theological perspective, and in 
so doing to come to a better understanding of Melanchthon's 
legacy to the church of the Augsburg Confession. It was the 
prayer of Melanchthon that he might be spared the ravings of 
theologians. It is the intention of this study to heed that 
prayer and to study Melanchthon in view of his positive 
contributions to evangelical theology, especially expressed 
in the Formula of Concord, Articles IV, V and VI. 
CHAPTER II 
THOMAS AQUINAS ON JUSTIFICATION 
AND THE NEW LAW OF THE GOSPEL 
Justification 
Thomas was an Augustinian and understanding Thomas 
on justification requires recognizing his continuity with-
in the Augustinian tradition. Like Augustine, Thomas 
interprets justificare etymologically as ustum facere, to 
make righteous or just.' Therefore, while justifica- 
`Augustine writes: "For what else does the 
phrase 'being justified' signify than 'being made 
righteous,' by Him, of course, who justifies the ungodly 
man, that he may become a godly one instead?" Aurelius 
Augustine, "On the Spirit and the Letter," in A Select  
Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the  
Christian Church, first series, 14 vols, ed. Philipp 
Schaff, trans. Peter Holms, vol. 5: "Saint Augustine's 
Anti-Pelagian Works" (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1971), chapter 45, p. 102. The Nicene  
and Post-Nicene Fathers will be cited hereafter NPNF with 
the title of the specific work, translator, chapter and 
page number. 
Augustine spoke of justification in two ways: (1) 
being made righteous (as in citation above) and (2) the 
forgiveness of sins (as in Enchiridion). In the 
Enchiridion Augustine writes, "The death of Christ 
crucified is nothing other than the likeness of the for-
giveness of sins -- so that in the very same sense in 
which the death is real, so also is the forgiveness of our 
sins real, and in the same sense in which His resurrection 
is real, so also in us there is authentic justification." 
Aurelius Augustine, Enchiridion, in Augustine: Confessions  
and Enchiridion, trans. and ed. Albert C. Outler 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, n.d.), chapter 14, p. 
369. This twofold understanding is also to be found in 
37 
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tion is the remission of sins, it is primarily the 
creation of a just man who is united with God2 as his 
final end3 and his highest good.4 In the instant of 
justification God moves a man from serving sin to 
St. Thomas, as indicated in the text. Augustine stresses 
the "made righteous" understanding of justification, which 
at that point is synonymous with renewal. In "On Grace 
and Free Will," he writes: "Thus it is necessary for a man 
that he should be not only justified when unrighteous by 
the grace of God -- that is, be changed from unholiness to 
righteousness -- then he is requited with good for his 
evil; but that, even after he has become justified by 
faith, grace should accompany him on his way, and he 
should lean upon it, lest he fall." Aurelius Augustine, 
"On Grace and Free Will," in NPNF, vol. 5: "Saint 
Augustine's Anti-Pelagian Works," chapter 13, p. 449. 
Augustine reiterates this view in The City of God. "For 
He, abiding unchangeable, took upon Him our nature, that 
thereby he might take us to Himself; and holding fast his 
own divinity, He became partaker of our infirmity, that 
we, being changed into some better thing, might, by 
participating in His righteousness and immortality, lose 
our own properties of sin and mortality, and preserve 
whatever good quality He had implanted in our nature, 
perfected now by sharing in the goodness of His nature." 
Aurelius Augustine, City of God, in NPNF, trans. Marcus 
Dods, vol. 2 "St. Augustine's City of God and Christian 
Doctrine," Book 21, chapter 15, p. 465. 
2Summa, I-II, 111.1. English translations will 
be from Thomas Aquinas, The 'Summa Theologia', trans. by 
the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: 
Burns Oates and Wasbourne, 1923). The "Blackfriars" 
edition provides the Latin text with English translation 
and includes notes, appendices, glossaries and 
introductions. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 60 vols., 
edited and translated by the members of the Blackfriars, 
O.P. (New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1963-1974). For ease 
in reference to various editions, citations will be made 
not by page number but by part, question, article and 
reply. 
3lbid., I-II, 111.5. 
4lbid., I-II, 1112.4. 
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justice. The justification of the ungodly is a miracles 
and the greatest work of God.6  
Justification begins with the infusion of habitual 
grace,' which is an operative grace, for God is the sole 
mover.8  By this infusion of grace, habitual grace 
becomes an accidental quality of the human soul. This 
infusion results in a transformation of man by which his 
higher faculties are placed in subordination to God and 
his lower faculties are placed in subordination to 
reason.9 Bernard Lonergan describes Thomas' theology of 
justification as a "shift" from "servitude to sin" to the 
"liberty of the sons of God," "a change from one 
spontaneity to another, a straightening out of man," which 
"naturally gives rise to acts of free will, acts of faith 
and repentance, that both acknowledge this change in 
attitude and result from it."'°  
Justification is a work of God and not an 
accomplishment of man himself. Man is passive. However, 
sIbid., I-II, 113.10. 
6lbid., I-II, 113.9. 
'Ibid., I-II, 110.2, 111.2 
8 Ibid., I-II, 111.2. 
9lbid., I-II, 113.1. 
'°Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 
Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. 
J. Patout Burns (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), pp. 
57-58. 
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in moving a man to justice God acts in accordance with the 
condition of human nature; therefore, the will must be 
free and the mind must turn toward God in faith." The 
infusion of habitual grace results not only in a change in 
what man is but also in what man does. The infusion of 
grace is evidenced, therefore, by a faith formed and 
perfected in love." 
Thomas distinguishes between operative grace (by 
which God loves man to himself) and co-operative grace (by 
which the soul is not only loved, but is itself a mover). 
Justified man is enabled to co-operative grace and the 
activity of his free will to perform acts of faith and 
repentance pleasing to God.13 Through these acts of 
faith and repentance man fulfills the will of God. 
Ultimately the function of justification is the 
fulfillment of the Law because the justification of the 
sinner enables and empowers him to fulfill the Law in love 
and obedience. Grace inclines the will to love the 
fulfillment of the Law. Justification thus creates a man 
of justice pleasing to God," who is just in his action 
and just in his disposition." Sin is remitted because 
Summa, I-II, 113.3. 
"Ibid., I-II, 110.3. 
1 3 
-Ibid., I-II, 111.2. 
t4Ibid., I-II, 111.1. 
s 
-Ibid., I-II, 113.1. 
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God is pacified toward the sinner and by grace has infused 
his divine love. The mind and will are turned toward 
God." The infusion of grace is effective in creating a 
righteousness so that the soul is healed and enabled to 
will what is good and pleasing to God. Moreover the soul 
is empowered to carry out what it wills and to persevere 
in good so that it finally attains to glory." The 
transformation of the man, the acquisition of justice, 
unites man with his highest good. 
Citing Romans 8:30 Thomas affirms that, "the 
remission of sins is justification."" In the 
subsequent articles of Question 113 he describes the 
process of justification which includes not only the 
forgiveness of sins, but the renewal of man and the 
acquisition of justice. "The remission of sin would be 
meaningless if there were no infusion of grace," because, 
although "the love of God is eternal, the effect of that 
forgiveness is intermittent, because it is sometimes lost 
and never regained."" That God does not impute sin is 
an expression of his love, but the non-imputation of sin 
also implies that grace has had some effect on the man 
"Ibid., I-II, 113.3. 
"Ibid., I-II, 111.3. 
"Ibid., I-II, 113.1. 
"Ibid., I-II, 113.2. 
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whose sin is not imputed. The first stage of 
justification is thus the infusion of habitual grace which 
makes it possible for man to do what previously was 
impossible, that is, to love God. In the second stage, 
Thomas addresses the question of free will. 
Since God moves a man to justice in a manner which 
accords with the condition of his human nature, and it 
is proper to the nature of man that his will should be 
free . . . God never moves him to justice without the 
use of his free will. With all who are capable of 
being so moved God infuses the gift of justifying faith 
in such wise that he also moves the free will to accept it.20 
This movement of the free will is also a movement of faith. 
Justification requires the movement of the mind by 
which it turns to God. But the mind turns to God in 
the first instance by faith . . . . A movement of 
faith is therefore required for the justification of 
the ungodly.21 
However, this movement of faith "is not perfect unless it 
is formed by charity."22 To understand why faith must 
be perfected by love, one must understand the true nature 
of faith. 
Under Question two, Article nine, "the Act of 
Faith," Thomas defines faith. 
To believe is the act of the intellect as it assents to 
divine truth at the command of the will as loved by God 
through grace . . . . Faith is related to charity as a 
disposition is related to the ultimate form which it 
precedes. Now it is obvious that a subject or matter 
cannot act except by the power of its form. Neither 
2°Ibid., I-II, 113.3. 
"Ibid., I-II, 113.4 
22Ibid. 
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can a preceding disposition alike act by the power of 
the form, and the form is the main principle of action. 
. . . Thus, without charity, neither nature nor faith 
can produce a meritorious action. But when charity 
supervenes, the act of faith becomes meritorious 
through charity." 
In making the Aristotelian distinction between "form" and 
"matter" Thomas is enabled to describe faith as the 
"subject or matter" which is incapable of action without 
its "form." Love is the form, the formative principle, 
which gives faith its power to act. Thus faith is 
informed, perfected, by love.24 Faith itself is an 
intellectual assent of the mind to divine truth 
by the command and will of God through grace. The will 
moves the intellect to assent to God's testimony of him-
self in his revealing Word. Faith comprehends the first 
truth of God, that he has dealt with mankind in history 
through Jesus Christ. This is what Thomas means when he 
affirms that "an act of faith is required in the 
justification of the ungodly to this extent, that a man 
believe that God is the justifier of man through the 
mystery of Christ."25 The truthfulness of that faith is 
guaranteed by the truthfulness of God." Man is not 
"Ibid., II-II, 2.9. 
24Charles P. Carlson, Jr., Justification in 
Earlier Medieval Theology (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 
p. 120, footnote 33. 
25 
 Summa, I-II, 113.4. 
"Stephen Pfurtner, Luther and Aquinas on 
Salvation, trans. Edward Quinn (New York: Sheed and Ward, 
1964), pp. 68-72. 
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justified only by faith and man cannot please God only by 
faith, but "justification by faith" means justification by 
faith as intellectual assent perfected by love. Man is 
justified and pleases God ultimately not merely by his 
intellectual assent to God as first truth, but by his love 
through which he fulfills the law of God. 
The third stage in the process of justification is 
contrition. 
The justification of the ungodly thus requires a 
twofold covenant of the free will. It must yearn for 
the justice which is of God. It must also abhor sin. 
. . . It is thus by charity that we delight in God 
and by charity also that we abhor the sins which 
separate us from God.27  
Justice and sin cannot co-exist in man; one cannot be 
both transformed and not transformed. 
The fourth stage is the remission of sins. "Now 
the remission of sins is the end in the justification of 
the ungodly. . The remission of sins should not 
therefore be omitted in the enumeration of things 
required for the justification of the ungodly." The 
remission of sins and the infusion of grace are 
identical, "as referring to the substance of the act, 
since God bestows grace and forgives guilt by one and 
the same act."28 Remission of sins is the 
consummation of the process of justification, but the 
"Summa,  I-II, 113.5. 
28Ibid., I-II, 113.6. 
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whole process "is necessary for the justification of the 
ungodly -- an infusion of grace, a movement of the free 
will toward God in faith, a movement of the free will in 
recoil from sin, and the remission of sin."29 In this 
way Thomas protects his theology from the charge of 
Pelagianism, and yet also insists on the free will and 
intellectual assent of man in faith and in the Christian 
abhorance of sin. 
Thomas is concerned that this process of 
justification not be interpreted in a temporal 
sequence. The infusion of grace and justification of 
the ungodly are instantaneous. The four stages 
necessary for salvation occur simultaneously in time. 
But the infusion of grace is first, the movement of the 
free will toward God is second, its recoil from sin is 
third, and the remission of guilt is last. Only from a 
human point of view does freedom of guilt precede the 
reception of justifying grace. Ultimately, "grace is 
the cause both of the remission of guilt and the 
acquisition of justice."3°  
The New Law of the Gospel  
All law has its source in the Creator. Thus the 
one who has established all law and the one who justi- 
29 Ibid. 
30Ibid., I-II, 113.8. 
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fies are the same, and both justification and the Law have 
the same end: making a man righteous in order that he 
might accomplish his created end: unity and blessedness 
with God. Revealed Law and justification by grace through 
faith in Christ therefore are complementary. The 
fulfillment of justification is the life lived in the Holy 
Spirit through the new Law of the Gospel. When a man is 
justified, that is, made righteous, he is enabled by the 
Spirit to love God above all things and his neighbor as 
himself. This is faith working through love. 
The old Law prescribed precepts set forth in the 
natural Law which continue to be valid and binding on all 
men for all time. However, the old Law also contained 
precepts binding only on the Jews.31 This old Law was 
given for two purposes: to restrain the hard hearted and 
proud and to instruct the good who desire to do the will 
of God. It is most appropriate that the old Law was given 
as an intermediary between the natural Law and the new Law 
of the Gospel: 
With regard to good men the law was given to them as a 
help; which was most needed by the people at the time 
when the natural law began to be obscured on account of 
the exuberance of sin: for it is fitting that this help 
should be bestowed on men in an orderly fashion so that 
they might be led from perfection to perfection, 
wherefore it was becoming that the old law should be 
given between the law of nature and the law of 
grace.32  
31Ibid., I-II, 98.5. 
32Ibid., I-II, 98.6. 
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The final purpose of the old Law is to establish the 
commandment of charity, that is, to establish friendship 
between God and man and man and man. The necessity of the 
old Law is located in man's sinful habitus which has 
impeded man's natural reason. Ideally man's reason should 
not have needed any additional revelation other than that 
which was given in natural law, but human reason having 
become "habituated to sin" began to obscure the will of 
God. It was necessary that God through his divine Law 
therefore rescue man from the evil of his impeded reason. 
Because of this impediment, human kind has judged things 
to be lawful that are in fact evil. Thus the old Law 
belongs to the articles of faith, not as are the doctrines 
of the Trinity and the incarnation because man's reason 
cannot comprehend such mysteries, but because through sin 
man's reason has become liable to manifold errors and must 
be corrected. If all men had right reason the implication 
is that the old Law would have been unnecessary.33  
The old Law has the teleological function of 
directing mankind to God; as opposed to human law, which 
is given to direct men in their relations to one another. 
Within the old Law are to be found three kinds of 
precepts: moral, ceremonial, and judicial. The moral 
precepts are binding on all men and are equivalent to the 
33Ibid., I-II, 99.2. 
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precepts of natural Law.34 But in addition to 
instructing man in moral righteousness, the old Law also 
directs men to the coming of Christ, "as the imperfect 
disposes to the perfect, wherefore it was given to a 
people as yet imperfect in comparison to the perfection 
which was to result from Christ's coming. . . •“35  The 
old Law thus consists of abiding commandments and of 
divine promise. 
The new Law is addressed to those who live in the 
perfection of Christ's coming, the promise fulfilled. Its 
efficacy is based on the grace of the Holy Spirit which is 
given through faith in Christ.36 "Consequently, the new 
Law is chiefly the grace itself of the Holy Ghost which is 
given to those who believe in Christ."37 In this the 
new Law differs from the old Law, being internal, within 
the heart, whereas the old Law was an external precept. 
But the new Law also contains (though this is of secondary 
importance) precepts by which the faithful are instructed 
in what they should believe and what they should do. 
"Consequently we must say that the new Law is in the first 
place a Law that is inscribed on our hearts, but that 
34Ibid., I-II, 99.4. 
3sIbid., I-II, 99.6. 
36Ib1d., I-II, 106.1. 
37Ibid., I-II, 106.1. 
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secondarily it is a written Law."38 It is according to 
the inward grace bestowed by the Holy Spirit that the new 
Law justifies. But it is as written Law that the new life 
instructs in the teaching of the faith and in the 
commandment of God which are to direct human affections 
and human actions." 
Saint Thomas gives three reasons why the old Law 
was necessary and which explain why it was not appropriate 
that the new Law was given at the beginning of time. 
First, since the new Law consists chiefly of grace through 
the Holy Spirit, it was not possible that it should be 
given prior to the redemption of human kind through Jesus 
Christ. Secondly, since the new Law is the Law of 
perfection, it was appropriate that, "Because a thing is 
not brought to perfection at once from the outlet, but 
through an orderly succession of time . . ." that the new 
Law was not given originally. Thirdly, 
the new law is the law of grace wherefore it behooved 
man first of all to be left to himself under the state 
of the old law so that through falling into sin, he 
might realize his weakness, and acknowledge his need for 
grace." 
The old Law and the new Law share the same end, namely, 
man's subjection to God. They differ in how they 
function. The old Law is like a pedagogue for children 
38Ibid., I-II, 106.2. 
39Ibid., I-II, 106.3. 
"Ibid., I-II, 107.1. 
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(Gal. 3:24) whereas the new Law is "the law of perfec-
tion" since it is the Law of charity (Col. 3:14).4' Thus 
the new Law may be compared to the old Law as the perfect 
is compared to the imperfect. That which is perfect 
fulfills that which is lacking in the imperfect. 
Accordingly the new Law fulfills the old Law by supplying 
that which was lacking in the old Law. 
What was lacking in the old Law was the capacity to 
justify mankind. Because it is the purpose of every law to 
make mankind righteous and because the old Law could 
accomplish this end only in promise but not in fact, the 
new Law was necessary in order that men might be justified 
before God. The new Law fulfills the promise of the old 
Law by justifying men through the power of Christ's passion 
(Rom. 8:3,4). Because the new Law gives what the old Law 
promised (2 Cor. 1:20; Col. 2:17), it is called the Law of 
"reality" whereas the old Law is called the Law of "shadow 
or of figure."42  
Christ fulfilled the precepts of the old Law both 
in his works and in his doctrine. By his willingness to be 
circumcised and to fulfill the other legal observances 
binding under the old Law he did the works of the Law (Gal. 
4:4). In his doctrine he fulfilled the old Law in three 
ways: (1) by explaining the true sense of the Law; (2) by 
"Ibid., I-II, 107.2. 
42Ibid., I-II, 107.4. 
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"prescribing the safest way of complying with the statutes 
of the old Law," and (3) by adding to the old Law his own 
counsels of perfection (as for example, in his address to 
the young lawyer, "If you would be perfect, go and sell all 
that you have. . Matt. 19:21). Thus while the old Law 
placed on mankind the burden of external works, the new Law 
relates to the interior motivations for virtue and 
righteousness. For the virtuous man, virtuous acts are not 
difficult. In this respect, then, the precepts of the new 
Law are less burdensome for the righteous and more 
burdensome for those who are not righteous, "Because the 
new Law prohibits certain interior movements of the 
soul which are not expressly forbidden in the old Law in 
all cases. . • • .43 Accordingly, for the righteous man 
the new Law is not burdensome, for John writes, "His 
commandments are not heavy" (1 John, 5:3). 
Righteousness is dependent on the gracious gifts of 
the Holy Spirit by whom men become receivers of grace 
through the incarnation of the Son of God. From the 
Spirit's gracious gifts works of two kinds ensue. First, 
there are the works which lead to grace in some way, such 
as the sacramental acts instituted by the new Law in Holy 
Baptism and in the Holy Eucharist. Secondly, there are 
external acts which ensue as a result of grace. These are 
of two kinds. There are those acts which necessarily 
43Ibid., I-II, 108.1. 
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contribute to or detract from a faith working in love. 
These are the works prescribed or proscribed by the new 
man. Secondly, there are those works which are not 
necessarily opposed to or in keeping with a faith working 
through love, but have been left by the new Law to the 
discretion of each individual. In these areas one is free 
either to choose to act or to refrain from acting. This is 
why the new Law is also described as the Law of liberty. 
In this the new Law differs from the old Law which "decided 
many points and left few to man to decide as he chose."44  
Accordingly the new law is called the law of liberty in 
two respects. First because it does not bind us to do 
or to avoid certain things, except such as are of 
themselves necessary or opposed to salvation, and come 
under the prescription or prohibition of the law. 
Secondly, because it also makes us comply freely with 
these precepts and prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so 
through the promptings of grace. It is for these two 
reasons that the new law is called the law of perfect 
liberty (James 1:25).45  
Grace is not by one's own efforts, but comes 
through Christ alone who instituted the seven sacraments 
whereby men receive grace. The right use of grace is 
found in doing works of charity. Insofar as these works 
of charity are essential to virtue and pertain to the 
moral precepts, which is also part of the old Law, the new 
Law adds nothing. But through grace Christ orders the 
Christian's interior movements both as they relate to 
44 Ibid. 
4sIbid., I-II, 108.4. 
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himself and as they relate to the neighbor. Grace 
impinges then on both man's will and his intentions. 
Man's will consequently refrains from both those acts 
which are overtly proscribed by the Law and those works 
and internal acts which might give occasion to evil 
deeds. Christ by grace also directs man's intentions, 
teaching that in our good works we should not seek human 
praise or worldly riches but the good of the neighbor. 
The Sermon on the Mount provides these words of 
instruction from the Lord. 
He mentions three works, to which all others may be 
reduced, since whatever a man does in order to curb his 
desires, comes under the head of fasting, and whatever 
a man does for the love of the neighbor comes under the 
head of alms-deeds; and whatever a man does for the 
worship of God, comes under the head of prayer." 
Revealed Law is necessitated by human sin. Even 
among the upright "the light of man's natural reason [is] 
clouded somewhat by the impulses of sinful desire."" 
Sin is the disposition by which one sets one's heart on 
earthly goods and chooses to ignore God. Therefore a 
meritorious act consists in setting aside "the attraction 
of creatures and holding fast to God. .48 It is by faith 
that the Christian is enabled to acknowledge God as the 
"Ibid., II-II, 22.1. 
"Ibid., II-II, 104.3. 
48Ibid., II-II, 22.1. 
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author of the Law and as the one to whom submission in 
life is due.49  
Therefore, because of sin, the new Law admonishes 
men to withdraw as much as possible from temporal oc-
cupations, even though these are not against the Law per  
se, but which nevertheless distract the soul and impede 
the movement of the heart toward God. It is only in 
loving God with all one's heart that the Law is ful-
filled. In reality the blessed in heaven alone are able 
to love God at all times. For the Christian it is enough 
that his heart is habitually directed toward God so that 
it will never entertain anything that is against the love 
of God. In this "perfection" is to be found the way to 
heaven. Thomas notes in this regard that "venial" sin is 
not contrary to the habitus of loving God, but only 
hinders it in exercising itself." It is the new Law 
that frees man's mind from its preoccupation with worldly 
matters." 
Man is motivated to obey divine Law in two ways: 
through fear of punishment ("servile fear") and through 
love of God ("filial fear"). It is this filial fear based 
on one's reverence for God which serves as the source for 
all other practices by which God is revered. The filial 
49Ibid., II-II, 44.4. 
"Ibid., II-II, 95.3. 
"Ibid., II-II, 22.2. 
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fear of God, arising from love of God, is consequently the 
motivating factor in the good works of charity which are 
to characterize the Christian life." The change that 
love works in a man's heart is threefold. First, there is 
a rebirth to new life. Secondly, there is a reforming of 
the life that has been ruined by sin. Thirdly, there is a 
change toward living a more holy life.53 Thus merit 
from obedience to God's will originates in reverence to 
God and results in a hierarchy of moral virtues. "The 
nobler the good the Christian foregoes for the sake of 
God, the higher is the virtue." Least important is the 
giving up of external possessions. Next is the offering 
of one's physical well being. Above all is the sacrifice 
of the will. In consequence the virtue of obedience is 
more praiseworthy than any other moral virtue, "seeing 
that by obedience a person gives up his own will for God's 
sake. • • • vs 5 4 
The aim and end of the spiritual life is that man 
is united to God. That union is achieved through love; 
consequently everything else is subordinate. The 
commandment to love, therefore, is the greatest of all 
commandments. Indeed, all Ten Commandments are directed 
to the love of God and the neighbor and are not 
s2 
-Ibid., III, 90.4. 
sa 
-Ibid., II-II, 104.3. 
s4Ibid., II-II, 44.1. 
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dispensable. The commandment to love virtually includes 
the commands about all other Christian acts." The 
Christian's will which is therefore the principle of all 
spiritual movement and which culminates in charity is that 
which moves the intellect (mind), the desires (soul), and 
the acting power (strength) whereby love is expressed. 
When the Lord therefore commands in the great commandment 
that one is to love God with all one's heart, mind, soul, 
and strength, he is commanding, 
that our full intent be on God; with all your heart, 
that our intellect be subject to God, with all your  
mind; that our appetite be ruled by God, with all your  
soul; and that our exterior action be obedient to God, 
with all your strength or power or might." 
Likewise one is to love the neighbor in the manner 
that he loves himself according to the Second Commandment. 
First, "in respect to the end: he will love his neighbor 
for God just as he loves himself for God," and thus his 
neighbor-love is holy. Secondly, he will not yield to his 
neighbor in things which might be harmful to the neighbor, 
but only in those areas which work to his good. Therefore 
his neighbor-love is just. Thirdly, he will not love his 
neighbor merely to his own advantage or to please himself, 
but he will love his neighbor for his own sake. Thus his 
neighbor-love is true." 
55Ibid., II-II, 44.4. 
"Ibid., II-II, 44.6 (italics in the original). 
"Ibid., II-II, 44.8. 
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Analysis of Thomas  
Although Thomas is very careful to underscore the 
primacy of grace in the regeneration of the Christian, 
there are several ingredients in his theology which tend to 
undercut divine monergism: his understanding of the nature 
and function of the Law, his understanding of faith as 
intellectual assent until formed by love, and his posi-
tive appreciation for the human will as it chooses what the 
intellect offers. Analysis of Thomas on justification and 
the new Law will therefore center in questions relating to 
these areas. 
One's understanding of the Law of God is reflective 
of one's understanding of the nature of human sin, and 
one's understanding of sin focuses attention on one's 
understanding of the human condition. Sin for Thomas is an 
"impediment to natural reason." The idea that the Law is 
an accusing force that unremittingly convicts humankind, 
regenerate and unregerate, of sin against God, is foreign 
to Thomas. Although the old Law brings to man an awareness 
of "weakness" and the new Law instructs a man in what he 
should do through the promptings of grace, Thomas is not 
able to share the pain of Saint Paul in Romans 7:12-25. 
Thomas might agree that man's free will is in captivity 
through sin,58 but he would nonetheless affirm that free 
58Philip Watson, "Erasmus, Luther, and Aquinas," 
Concordia Theological Monthly, 40 (December 1969):755. 
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will remains and that man continues to have the capacity to 
resist sin. It is a matter of the disposition or ends to 
which the will has inclined itself. Man's problem with sin 
is his ungodly (not "God-ward") desire and in consequence 
his defection from the will of God in the Law.59  
Original sin and human concupiscence are related by Thomas 
in such a way as to make sin a depraved tendency rather 
than a description of a condition of utter depravity.6 0  
It is at this point that one feels most strongly 
the Aristotelian influence on Thomas' theology. Justi-
fication is not the declaration of righteousness by which 
God imputes the sinner righteous and holy by grace through 
faith for the sake of Christ (Ephesians 2). Justi-
fication is perceived rather in classical ethical terms as 
that which leads to the highest good through the remaking 
of a man. It is this ethical presupposition which brings 
about the diminution of sin and the emphasis on free will. 
Secondly, Thomas describes justification as a trans-
formation by which one is made righteous, "justifacere," 
rather than justification understood as the gracious 
activity of God by which the sinner receives the 
righteousness of Christ apart from works. In this Thomas 
59Frederick Copleston, Thomas Aquinas (New York, 
Barnes and Noble, 1955), p. 235. 
"Carlson, p. 118. 
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is clearly following the conventional scholastic scheme of 
processus justification. 
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For Paul, faith is essentially trust in the mercy 
of God apart from the Law. For Thomas, faith culminates in 
charity, the new Law. It is faith forced by charity which 
justifies. The gospel is "a new Law" by which faith 
expresses itself. There is a natural progression in 
Thomas' thought which leads from "Law of grace" to "formed 
faith" to "new Law" to "Law of liberty" which comprehends 
the withdrawal of the Christian from the world and his 
uniting with God in blessedness. Compare this to Saint 
Paul in Galatians where Law is contrasted to Gospel and 
God's activity in making the sinner just is clearly 
distinguished from the sanctified activities of the 
regenerate. The Gospel in Paul does not complete the Law 
but overcomes its accusations in order that the Christian 
may do, without the prompting of the Law, what the will of 
God requires. For Paul the Law is fulfilled, not through 
withdrawal from the world, but in service to the neighbor, 
where the neighbor is to be found according to his needs 
(Phil. 1:19-26; Rom. 13:8-10). This is not to imply that 
Thomas is not concerned with the need of the neighbor, but 
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 Joseph Pohl, Grace: Actual and Habitual, 
adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss (St. Louis: B. Herder 
Book Company, 1934), pp. 274-76. Pohl-Preuss specifies the 
Lutheran errors in the doctrine of justification and of 
sola fide from a Thomistic point of view with many 
citations from the Summa. 
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his emphasis seems to be on the non-worldliness of the 
cloister. 
Ultimately then for Thomas, faith is not fiducia  
but intellectual assent informed by love, a theological 
virtue." Significantly, Thomas distinguishes 
theological virtues from natural virtues in the gracious 
activity of God. Like natural virtue, theological virtues 
are also good habits or dispositions of the mind by which 
one chooses to live righteously. But these theological 
virtues do not derive from man's natural aptitude. Terence 
Penelhum defines Thomas' understanding of theological 
virtue as "a good disposition of the mind by which we live 
righteously, of which no one can make bad use and which God 
works in us without us."" But such faith is only a 
first virtue. It must be interconnected with hope and with 
charity. 
Just as moral virtues can only exist imperfectly in a 
man if isolated from one another, or in the absence of 
prudence, so faith and hope can exist without charity 
but not have the 'perfect character of virtue' without 
it. Charity, on the other hand, is 'quite impossible' 
without faith and hope. Charity, which is a friendship 
of man with God, cannot exist unless men believe in God 
and aspire to such fellowship with him.64  
This distinction Thomas makes using the terms "formed" 
and "unformed" faith. Formed faith is a "living faith that 
"Terence Penelhum, "The Analysis of Faith in St. 
Thomas Aquinas," Religious Studies, 13 (June 1977):135. 
"Ibid. 
"Ibid., p. 142. 
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is found in the ongoing, sustained Christian life." 
Unformed faith is "a mere intellectual assent which is 
not, because of sin, pervaded by charity and does not bear 
fruit in the Christian life." Both formed and unformed 
faith come from the same disposition, but only one is a 
virtue; only formed faith is a living faith. Formed faith 
may be described as "justifying faith" but only because it 
comprehends charity through the new Law of the Gospel. 
Faith alone is dead. It is merely intellectual assent." 
Although one follows the reasoning of Thomas here, 
it is difficult to understand how this description of 
faith accords with Saint Paul in Romans 5. "Therefore 
since we are justified through faith we have peace with 
God through our Lord Jesus Christ." Saint Thomas is re-
flecting the formula of Saint Augustine, "Credere est cum 
assensione cogitare,"" but in this manner faith has 
been reduced to an epistemological element in 
Christianity, a function of the intellect, but not of the 
heart. 
Since the justification of the sinner and the 
sanctified Christian life which follows are viewed as one 
entity in the concept of "formed faith" (that is, unformed 
faith informed by charity), Thomas makes no distinction 
"Carlson, p. 119. 
"cited in Tad W. Guzie, "The Act of Faith 
According to St. Thomas," The Thomist 29 (July 1965):261. 
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between justification and sanctification. Indeed, there 
is no locus on sanctification in the Summa. Sancti-
fication is spoken of rather in the context of the 
sacramental life of the church. Justification and 
sanctification are subsumed and combined in "the new Law 
of the Gospel." This provides opportunity for 
misunderstanding. Charles Carlson writes in his 
Justification in Earlier Medieval Theology, 
Elsewhere (Summa Theol. III, q. 56, art. 2 and 4), 
Thomas gives a more extended definition: ". . . quod in 
justificatione animarum duo concurrunt: scilicet 
remission culpae, et novitas per gratiam." He does not 
elucidate the second part of this definition in any 
other place (it does occur in his doctrine of the 
atonement, but only incidentally in an obscure 
responsio); this 'renewal by grace' was, however, the 
definition taken up at the Council of Trent and was 
given currency as the classic Thomist definition of 
justification." 
Because Thomas affirms that the human will moves 
the mind and the desires (soul) and the acting power of 
man toward its beatific end, he may be misinterpreted to 
imply that this act of will also moves man initially into 
his relationship with God. This is the position Scotus 
was to take. Thomas denies this, but the confusion of Law 
and Gospel in "the new law of the gospel," the combination 
of justification and sanctification in "formed faith," the 
emphasis on the will in the attainment of blessedness with 
God, all contribute to the possibility that the position 
of Thomas may be misunderstood as advocating the 
"Carlson, p. 119, footnote 29. 
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synergistic position that man is a co-worker with God in 
the accomplishment of his salvation. Thomas specifically 
denies this, but his theology has failed to do justice to 
Paul's penetrating insight in Romans 3:21-31, that man is 
saved apart from his own efforts at keeping the Law. 
For Thomas, "it is appropriate" that the Gospel 
and the new Law be intimately related. Together they 
reflect the new commandment of the Lord "that you love one 
another as I have loved you" (John 15:12). In recounting 
the significance of Christ's obedience to the Law, Thomas 
affirms that by his obedience Christ showed his approval 
of the old Law and perfected it so that he might "free men 
from subjection to the Law."'" As one imputed righteous 
by grace through faith, Paul would affirm this 
understanding in part, but would add that such an 
understanding is not descriptive of the condition of sin 
in which the redeemed continue to find themselves (Romans 
7:13-24). 
The basis of this problem would seem to lie in 
Thomas' confidence in the power of human reason." Man 
as a rational being, Thomas maintains, is able to act for 
or against the natural law, having in himself the in-
clination to do good." In this, reason is hindered by 
"Summa,  III, 40.4. 
"Lee, p. 435. 
"Summa,  I-II, 94.6. 
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concupiscence71 and it is necessary that God reveal 
moral concepts through the Ten Commandments. It is the 
function of the old Law thus to provide through revela-
tion the knowledge of God's will which is obscured by sin. 
Through the new Law and the power of the Holy Spirit the 
will of God is written upon the human heart in order that 
man may know and choose the will of God. The assumption 
here is that the human will, knowing the will of God, will 
choose that will as its highest good. 
But what of the sin of origin which remains in the 
human heart? What of the ungodly desires (concupiscence) 
which continue to draw away from God and into man him-
self? Are these eliminated in the regenerate? Thomas 
recognized the necessity of repentance and contrition, but 
he seems to affirm that by the power of the will these 
desires directing one away from God can be conquered 
through redemption by the greater love of Christ. The 
evangelicals found the answers of Thomas and other 
scholastics inadequate precisely at this point. In Paul 
they found another answer, the answer of a righteousness 
which is given to man from outside man, the righteousness 
of another, the righteousness of Jesus Christ. 
7lIbid., I-II, 94.6. 
CHAPTER III 
JUSTIFICATION, SANCTIFICATION, AND THE FUNCTION 
OF THE LAW IN LUTHER (1519-1535) 
Early Luther (1519-24)  
Martin Luther's two commentaries on Galatians 
provide opportunity to compare the early Luther of 1519 
with the mature Luther of 1535. With its emphasis on 
Saint Paul's understanding of Law and Gospel, Galatians 
provides an ideal context in which to develop Lutheran on 
Law, Gospel, justification, sanctification and good works 
over the period of fifteen years at the heart of the 
evangelical Reformation. As a result of controversy with 
the theologians of Rome, and the antinomianism of John 
Agricola, in the context of sharing in the evangelical 
formulations produced at Schwabach (1529), Marburg (1529) 
and Torgau (1530), in constant dialogue with Melanchthon 
in the preparation of the Augsburg Confession, one finds 
in Luther's later Galatians Commentary a sharpening of 
theological vocabulary. This development culminated in 
the Smalcald Articles and the Antinomian Disputations in 
the second half of the 1530's. The "making righteous" 
(effici) terminology and "being pronounced righteous" 
(reputari) terminology which are used interchangeably in 
65 
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the early Luther are more clearly distinguished in the 
mature Luther as the distinctions between Law and Gospel, 
justification and sanctification, are defined.' 
In his 1519 Galatians Commentary Luther develops 
the theses of Law and Gospel, not viewed in a Thomistic 
framework as complementary revelations by which justi-
fication may be described as "the new Law of the Gospel", 
but as two different addresses to man from God having two 
entirely different purposes. The Law increases sin, for 
'It is beyond the scope of this study to do more 
than indicate the process of definition whereby both 
Luther and Melanchthon became increasingly precise in 
their specification of the nature of justification, 
sanctification, and the continuing validity of the Law for 
the regenerate. Adolf Koeberle provides a helpful summary 
of Luther's development with regard to the relationship of 
justification as forgiveness and sanctification as 
renewal. "A closer examination will further be able to 
distinguish three periods in Luther's development, each 
having a different emphasis in the treatment of the 
constituent parts of this relationship. There is a first 
period in which he so strongly emphasizes the effici  
alongside of the reputari that he interchanges them 
without any scruple or even speaks of a magis et magis  
justificari. . . . Then, however, the emphasis begins to 
fall ever more strongly on the Christus pro nobis. Here 
(say in the commentary on Galatians of 1522-35 [sic.]) is 
the real climax of Luther's creative activity. In the 
later part of his life, as a result of his experiences he 
approaches closer to the attitude of Melanchthon. The 
justitia aliens which we already find clearly indicated in 
the writings of 1520-21 is more and more placed in 
contrast to renewal. It is certain, however, that Luther 
at all times, though with varying degrees of emphasis, 
held fast to the essential connection of justification and 
sanctification, while at the same time marking clearly the 
theological difference between the two conceptions." 
Adolf Koeberle, The Quest for Holiness, trans. John C. 
Mattes (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1982), p. 
93, footnote 12: Excursus. 
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the man who is a slave to the law is a slave to sin.2  
Only Christ can free man from the accusations of the Law. 
As in Augustine, Luther emphasizes the effect of justifi-
cation in actualizing a change in man by which he is 
enabled to overcome the power of sin. Freedom from the 
Law, in Christ, occurs spiritually, not in the manner of 
human righteousness, by which the Law is changed, "but it 
is Christian freedom when men are changed without changing 
the law."3 Through the preserving power of the Holy 
Spirit and for the sake of the vicarious satisfaction of 
Christ, "the same law that was formerly hateful to the 
free will becomes delightful, since love is poured into 
our hearts through the Holy Spirit."4 It is Christ who 
has overcome the Law and who gives to Christians his Holy 
Spirit by which he makes them righteous and lovers of the 
Law, "not because of their own works, but freely, because 
it is freely bestowed by Christ."5  
Nevertheless, the function of the Law remains one 
of bringing the Christian to an awareness of sin. 
zMartin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke, 94 
vols. (Weimar: Herman Boehlaus Nachfolger, 1883-present), 
2:560. Hereafter this work will be cited as WA. Luther's  
Works, 55 vols., gen. eds. Helmut Lehmann and Jaroslav 
Pelikan (Philadelphia: Fortress Press/St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1955-present), 27:325. Hereafter this 
work will be cited as AE. 
3WA 2:560; AE 27:326. 
4Ibid. 
5lbid. 
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Therefore, when under the guidance of the Law, you have 
come to the knowledge of your sins, beware lest before 
all else you presume henceforth to satisfy the Law as 
one who intends to live a better life. But despair 
altogether of your past and future life, and trust 
boldly in Christ.6  
Just as the sinner seeks to justify himself before God on 
the basis of the law without reference to the grace of 
Christ, so too the Christian is tempted to presume that he 
can live a life pleasing to God apart from the grace of 
Christ and according to the formulations of the Law. 
Luther admonishes the Christian to pray to Christ, "that 
sin may be destroyed also in your flesh and that the Law 
may be fulfilled there too, just as it has been already 
fulfilled in your heart through faith."' It is only 
through faith that, after "receiving love, we keep the 
Law, not under compulsion or because we are attracted for 
a time, but freely and steadfastly."8 Since the Law has 
not been changed, but the Christian man has been changed, 
he is free from that Law only insofar as he is in Christ. 
When the Christian man makes use of his flesh as a pretext 
for evil (Luther here cites 1 Peter 2:16) he is no longer 
free of the Law's indictment. Freedom from the Law 
therefore does not mean that the Law has been nullified or 
that it is no longer powerful in the accusation of sin. 
Freedom means that, "we do what is good, not from com- 
6WA 2:562; AE 27:328. 
'Ibid. 
8WA 2:574; AE 27:346. 
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pulsion, but gladly and with no ulterior motive."9  
Servitude to sin has been replaced by servanthood in 
Christ, expressed in service and in love to the neigh-
bor. Luther concludes, 
Therefore what was said before is correct, namely, that 
the servitude of the spirit and freedom from sin or 
from the Law are identical with freedom from right-
eousness, or from righteousness and the Spirit. A 
person goes from servitude to servitude, from freedom 
to freedom, that is, from sin to grace, from fear of 
punishment to the love of righteousness, from the law 
to fulfillment of the law.'°  
Luther's insights in this first Galatians  
Commentary became a touchstone of the evangelical movement 
through the publication and distribution of his The  
Freedom of the Christian one year later. At the center of 
the evangelical movement stands the relationship of Law 
and Gospel in the justification and sanctification of the 
Christian. 
The treatise on The Freedom of the Christian  
(1520), begins with a paradox. "A Christian is a 
perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. A Christian 
is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all.silt 
This paradoxical truth concerning the temporal estate of 
the Christian man is a reflection of the Christian's 
twofold nature, spiritual and bodily. 
9WA 2:575; AE 27:347. 
'°WA 2:576; AE 27:349. 
"WA 7:49; AE 31:344. 
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According to the spiritual nature, which men refer to 
as the soul, he is called a spiritual, inner, or new 
man. According to the bodily nature, which men refer 
to as flesh, he is called a carnal, outward or old 
man. 12  
The spiritual man is a creation of the Holy Spirit, not 
the product of his own works. 
Wherefore it ought to be first the concern of every 
Christian to lay aside all confidence in works and 
increasingly to strengthen faith alone and through 
faith to grow in the knowledge, not of works, but of 
Jesus Christ." 
Luther distinguishes between the Law and the promises. 
ThroUgh the Commandments a man learns to recognize his 
helplessness before the Law, which demands perfect 
obedience. He finds nothing whereby he may be justified. 
Here the second part of Scripture comes to his aid. 
namely, the promises of God which declare the glory of 
God saying, "If you wish to fulfill the law . . . come 
believe in Christ in whom grace, righteousness, peace, 
liberty and all things are promised you. . . ." That 
which is impossible for you to accomplish by trying to 
fulfill all the works of the law . . . you will ac-
complish quickly and easily through faith. . . . The 
promises of God give what the commandments of God 
demand and fulfill what the law prescribes so that all 
things may be God's alone, both the commandments and 
the fulfilling of the commandments." 
Luther reasons that: 
A Christian has all he needs in faith and needs no 
works to justify him, and if he has no need of works, 
he has no need of the law, and if he has no need of the 
law, surely he is free from the law." 
"WA 7:50; AE 31:344. 
"WA 7:52; AE 31:347. 
"WA 7:53; AE 31:348-9. 
"WA 7:53; AE 31:349. 
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He therefore concludes, 
This is that Christian liberty, our faith, which does 
not induce us to live in idleness or wickedness, but 
makes the law and works unnecessary for any man's 
righteousness and salvation." 
Luther is speaking in the context of the freedom of the 
Christian man; his conclusion concerns the Christian's 
relationship to the Law. The Christian faith makes the Law 
unnecessary because faith, not the Law, gives God what 
belongs to him." Luther repeatedly affirms that faith 
fulfills the Law without works." The First Commandment 
of the Decalogue is fulfilled through faith alone. Thus he 
concludes, the whole of the Decalogue is fulfilled by 
faith." 
What then of good works? Luther asks this ques-
tion recognizing the inherent temptation for man to 
conclude that if "faith does all this and is alone 
sufficient unto righteousness . . . we will take our ease 
and do no more work and be content with faith."2° This 
danger is the impetus for Luther's important distinction 
between what is ideally the case and what is in fact the 
case. In this focus Luther distinguishes his theology from 
"WA 7:53; AE 31:349-50. 
"WA 7:53-54; AE 31:348-51. 
"WA 7:55-58; AE 31:353-56. 
"WA 7:55-56; AE 31:353. 
20WA 7:59; AE 31:358. 
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both Augustine and the subsequent Augustinian tradition (as 
found in Thomas) through his realistic understanding of the 
abiding validity of sin in the regenerate and the 
impossibility of perfection in one who remains both flesh 
and spirit. If Christian men were "wholly inner and 
perfectly spiritual men" they would be free from all 
works. But they are not, and so they are yet servants of 
the Law. 
As long as we live in the flesh, we only begin to make 
some progress in that which shall be perfected in the 
future life. . . . Insofar as [a Christian] is free 
he does no works, but insofar as he is a servant, he 
does all kinds of works.21  
Luther recognizes that in the Christian there is a 
paradoxical duality. He is justified, and so free. He is 
not perfect, but insofar as he is a servant, he does all 
kinds of good works. 
Luther concludes that it is true that, "good works 
do not make a good man, but a good man does good works; 
evil works do not make a wicked man, but a wicked man does 
evil works."22 The Christian needs no good works for 
his righteousness and salvation, but does good works so 
that he may serve and benefit others in all he does, 
"considering nothing except the need and advantage of his 
neighbor."22  
21WA 7:59; AE 31:358. 
22WA 7:61; AE 31:361. 
22WA 7:64; AE 31:365. 
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Although the Christian is free from all works, by 
faith he finds a model for his new life in the life of 
Jesus Christ. 
he ought in this liberty to empty himself, take upon 
himself the form of a servant, be made in the likeness 
of men, be found in human form, and to serve, help and 
in every way deal with his neighbor as he sees that God 
through Christ has dealt with and still deals with 
him.24  
This is the Christian motive for good works; not the 
demand of the Law, but the free Spirit of God. 
I will therefore give myself as a Christ to my 
neighbor, just as Christ offered himself for me; I will 
do nothing in this life except as I see is necessary, 
profitable, and salutary to my neighbor, since through 
faith I have an abundance of all good things in 
Christ." 
Christians are to pray against the temptation of 
thinking that "when laws are prescribed, that 
righteousness must be obtained through laws and works," 
but rather pray that Christ might "write his law in our 
hearts. . so 2 6 
Luther encountered a different problem in the 
excessive zeal of Andreas Karlstadt. In his Letter to the 
Christians at Strassburg, Luther argued against Karlstadt 
on two fronts: (1) Karlstadt's deprecating of the Law of 
God into a code of external formalities, and (2) 
24WA 7:65; AE 31:366. 
25WA 7:66; AE 31:367. 
26WA 7:73; AE 31:376. 
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Karlstadt's misuse of freedom to undercut the integrity of 
the Gospel. Luther refuses to tolerate "anyone 
imprisoning Christian freedom by laws and laying a snare 
for consciences "27 By no means does Luther intend by 
this to be understood as abrogating the Law. In his 
Against the Heavenly Prophets he numbers the Law as the 
first of the articles "everyone" is to pay attention to 
and hold fast. 
The first is the law of God, which is to be preached so 
that one thereby reveals and teaches how to recognize 
sin (Romans 3:20 and 7:7), as we have often shown in 
our writings. However these prophets do not understand 
this correctly, for this means a truly spiritual 
preaching of the law, as Paul says in Rom. 7:14 and a 
right use of the law, as he says in 1 Tim. 1:8.28  
Karlstadt has chosen to make a law of external 
things in which God gives freedom, making a commandment of 
that which God neither commands nor forbids. Luther warns 
in his treatise that "these prophets must not be allowed 
to force you and forbid you."29 Luther maintains that 
he would rather be a monk and return to the cloister than 
resubmit to the bondage of humanly instituted rules.3°  
Luther indeed refuses to distinguish between the Decalogue 
and the ceremonial and judicial laws of the Pentateuch, 
27WA 15:395; AE 40:69. 
28WA 18:65; AE 40:82. 
29WA 18:142; AE 40:152. 
30WA 18:116; AE 40:134. 
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affirming that the whole Law of Moses has been 
abrogated." "Why does one then keep and teach the Ten 
Commandments? Answer, because the natural Laws were never 
so orderly and well written as by Moses."32 The basis 
of the Law is the natural Law written in the heart. 
"Where then the Mosaic law and the natural law are one, 
there the Law remains and is not abrogated externally, 
but only through faith, spiritually, which is nothing 
else than the fulfilling of the Law (Rom. 3)."33  
Luther's conclusion: whatever "goes beyond the natural law 
. . . is free, null, and void. . . . ., 3 4 The Law must be 
preached, but not the law of Phariseeism. Rather, it must 
be the Law which condemns sin. This is vital, for only 
through the proclamation of the Law can hearts be prepared 
to hear the Gospel. Luther continues: 
Second, when now sin is recognized and the law is so 
preached that the conscience is alarmed and humbled 
before God's wrath, we are then to preach the 
comforting word of the gospel and the forgiveness of 
sins so that the conscience again may be comforted and 
established in the grace of God, etc.35  
One finds thus in the writings of Luther in the early and 
mid-twenties a strong accent on the accusing function of 
the Law and a continuing celebration of the freedom of the 
"WA 18:76; AE 40:93. 
32WA 18:81; AE 40:98. 
33WA 18:81; AE 40:97. 
34Ibid. 
35WA 18:82; AE 40:82. 
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Gospel. He very clearly expresses the necessity of the 
Law for the conviction of sin in order that the Gospel 
might be heard as the divine answer to the fallenness of 
man's predicament, but the role of the Law for the 
regenerate is less clearly defined. Luther finds in the 
theology of Rome and the radicalism of Karlstadt this in 
common -- that both would obscure the Gospel by making the 
Gospel merely the basis of a new legalism. For Luther the 
fulfillment of the Law in not found in the works of men, 
but in faith, which comes in Christ. Luther's position 
was to be largely distorted by the antinomianism of John 
Agricola. 
Agricola's Objection to the "Visitation Articles"  
Concerned for the spiritual condition of the 
evangelical churches, Luther, Melanchthon, and others with 
the consent of the Elector began a program of visitation 
in 1527. Melanchthon was asked to draw up a doctrinal 
formulation to be used in these visitations. Luther wrote 
its preface." 
In the first article, "Concerning Doctrine," 
Melanchthon expressed the following concerning repentance: 
Many now talk only about the forgiveness of sins and 
say little or nothing about repentance. There neither 
"Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther in Mid-Career  
(1521-1530), ed. Karin Bornkamm, trans. E. Theodore 
Bachmann (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), pp. 491-494. 
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is forgiveness of sins without repentance nor can 
forgiveness of sins be understood without repentance. 
But some hold that nothing should be taught to precede 
faith and that repentance follows from and after faith, 
in order that our opponents might not be able to say 
that we have recanted our former teaching. One ought 
to remember that repentance and law belong to the 
common faith. For one must of course first believe 
that God is the one who threatens, commands, and 
frightens, etc. So it is best for the unschooled, 
common people, that such phrases of the faith retain 
the name of repentance, commandment, fear, law, etc., 
so that they may better distinguish and understand the 
faith in Christ which the apostles call justifying 
faith, i.e., which makes righteous and takes away 
sin." 
Since this position was certainly that of Luther and of 
the evangelical party, Melanchthon would not have expected 
it to have become the source of controversy. However, 
John Agricola, a student of Luther, saw in Melancthon's 
formulation cause for concern that the evangelical party 
was yielding to points of Roman theology through 
Melanchthon's emphasis on the Law and repentance. In the 
moment of conversion, Agricola asked, is conversion the 
result of the Law's indictment of sin or the reality of 
the Gospel's proclamation of forgiveness? Agricola argued 
that the Law itself could only result in a misbegotten 
search for God. The Gospel alone could complete what the 
Law could not do. The human heart is conquered through 
the confession of sin and faith. Therefore it is not the 
37WA 26:202-3; AE 40:274-75; Robert Stupperich, 
ed., Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl (Studienausgabe), 7 
vols. (Guetersloh: Mohn and Co., 1953-present), 1:222-23. 
Hereafter this work will be cited as St.A. 
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terrors of the Law but the love of God which is given for 
sinners which must be the true and holy preaching of 
repentance. It is not the fear of punishment, but the 
love of righteousness which is the root of all good. Love 
is awakened only through love. Only through the preaching 
of the mercy of God are hearts won. Agricola thus turned 
the relationship of Law and Gospel around. First came 
grace and the justification of the sinner, then the Law by 
which one accomplished the will of God. Agricola did not 
at this point deny the possibility for a function of the 
Law in the life of the regenerate. Rather, his concern 
was whether the Law should be preached prior to 
conversion.38  
Melanchthon wrote to Luther complaining of 
Agricola's criticism and Luther responded in a letter 
dated October 27, 1528. 
You write that somebody is chastising you because you 
have taught in your Visitation Articles that penitence 
begins with fear of God. Agricola has written me 
almost the same thing, but I think little of this war 
of words, especially as it affects the common people. 
For the difference between fear of penalty and fear of 
God is easier to put in syllables and letters than to 
recognize in actual fact and in the state of one's own 
heart. . . . When we teach the fear of God, then, I 
believe we are doing just what we do when we teach the 
freedom of the Spirit. There are some who distort the 
latter into security of the flesh, and so there are 
38Wilfried Joest, Gesetz Und Freiheit (Goettingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968, pp. 46-47. 
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some who distort the former into despair, that is, into 
fear of penalty. Who can prevent them." 
In the second article of the Visitation Articles  
Melanchthon had been very clear that the preaching of the 
Law must precede that of the Gospel. 
The people are thus to be urged and exhorted to fear 
God, to repent and show contrition, lest their ease and 
life of false security be punished. Therefore Paul 
says in Rom. 3:20: "Through the law comes (only) 
knowledge of sin." True repentance is nothing but an 
acknowledgement of sin. 
Then it is important that faith be preached. 
Whoever experiences grief and contrition over his sins 
should believe that his sins are forgiven, not on 
account of his merits, but on account of Christ. When 
the contrite and fearful conscience experiences peace, 
comfort, and joy on hearing that his sins are forgiven 
because of Christ, then faith is present -- the faith 
that makes him righteous before God.4°  
Luther brought Melanchthon and Agricola together 
in conference at Torgau (November 26-28, 1528) to seek 
agreement on their views concerning the relationship of 
repentance and on their views regarding the relationship 
of repentance and faith." Seeming agreement was 
reached by distinguishing between faith in a general sense 
(fides generalis) which anticipated repentance and the 
"justifying faith" Melanchthon had spoken of in Article 1 
of the Visitation Articles, which grasps the righteousness 
"Martin Luther, Luther's Correspondence, 2 
vols. trans. and ed. Preserved Smith and Charles Jacobs 
(Philadelphia: The Lutheran Publication Society, 1918) 
2:418-19. WA BR 4:271-273. 
40WA 2:203; AE 40:276; St.A. I, 223. 
"Bornkamm, Luther in Mid-Career, pp. 493-497. 
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of God and the forgiveness of sin by grace for the sake of 
Christ. This apparent agreement was not to last. 
Agricola maintained his position that repentance, 
consciousness of sin, and fear of God were to be based on 
the Gospel and not on the Law.42  
Melanchthon in the "Apology" and the  
Loci on the Law 
Although the distinction between "general faith" 
and "justifying faith" had brought about a seeming 
reconciliation of the conflict between Agricola and the 
theology of Luther and Melanchthon, the term "Gospel" 
continued to be used both in a broad and narrow sense 
often with no indication as to which sense was intended. 
In the Apology to the Augsburg Confession, under the title 
"Faith in Christ Justifies," Melanchthon uses "Gospel" in 
a broad sense. "The Gospel declares that all men are 
under sin and are worthy of eternal wrath and death."43  
In a formulation regarding penitence Melanchthon speaks of 
the Gospel in a way which must have been heartening to 
Agricola. 
We say that contrition is the genuine terror of a 
conscience that feels God's wrath against sin and is 
sorry that it has sinned. This contrition takes place 
when the Word of God denounces sin, to offer the 
forgiveness of sins and righteousness for Christ's sake, 
42Kawerau, G. "Antinomian Controversies," The 
New Schaff-Herzog Religious Encyclopedia, 1:199. 
43Ap IV, 62. 
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to grant the Holy Spirit and eternal life, and to lead 
us as regenerated men to do good.44  
On the other hand, "Gospel" is also used by Melanchthon in 
the Apology according to its narrow, or proper, or strict 
sense (that is, as that by which a man is justified by 
grace through faith). An example is to be found in the 
same article on "penitence" where Melanchthon questions: 
What need is there of Christ if by our work we achieve the 
forgiveness of sins? We, on the contrary, call men's 
consciences away from the law to the gospel, away from 
trust in their own works to trust in the promise and in 
Christ; for the gospel shows us Christ and promises the 
forgiveness of sins freely for his sake.45 Against the 
Roman assertion of works that justify, Melanchthon is very 
careful to distinguish the work of the Law and the work of 
the Gospel. 
This is a teaching of the Law and not of the gospel, to 
imagine that a man is justified by the law before being 
reconciled to God through Christ. . . . Paul on the 
contrary, contends that we cannot keep the law without 
Christ. Therefore we must accept his promise that by 
faith we are reconciled to God before we keep the law.46 
Thus in the Apology, "Gospel" is used in a wide sense as 
including the entire revelation of God, both Law and 
44Ap XII, 29. 
4sAp XII, 76. 
46Ap XII, 85-86. 
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Gospel, and at other times it is used in a narrow sense to 
distinguish God's act of salvation in Jesus Christ 
(Gospel) from God's requirements of man (Law). 
Luther had conceded to Agricola at Torgau that 
Gospel in the wide sense may be understood as preceding 
the preaching of the Law, insofar as apart from faith, the 
only effect of the Law is to effect either work 
righteousness or despair. However, in dialogue with the 
Roman church, the evangelical party would speak in the 
1530s less frequently of the Gospel in its wide sense, 
restricting the use of the word "Gospel" generally to the 
narrow sense in which Melanchthon had employed it in the 
Apology when he wrote: 
These are the two chief works of God in men, to terrify 
and to justify and quicken the terrified. One or the 
other of these works is spoken of throughout 
Scripture. One part is the law which reveals, 
denounces, and condemns sin. The other part is the 
gospel, that is, the promise of grace granted in 
Christ." 
Perhaps as a consequence of the conflict with Agricola in 
1527, and certainly in opposition to the scholastic mixing 
of Law and Gospel, there was a gradual restricting of 
terminology regarding the use of the word "Gospel" so that 
it began to be used more and more only in its narrow sense 
and in distinction from the Law (properly understood as 
the accusation against sin). 
"Ap XII, 53. 
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The accusatory function of the Law was not in dis-
pute between the evangelicals and Agricola. Agricola did 
not object to Melanchthon's assertion in Article IV of the 
Apology, that "the law always accuses and terrifies 
consciences. It does not justify. . u 4 8 . . As has been 
seen, the question he raised was whether this accusatory 
function of the Law had any relation to the salvific 
function of the Gospel in justification. Agricola 
contended that it did not. By extension the question now 
was raised whether the Law had any function in the life of 
the regenerate? Was the Christian under obligation to 
keep the Law? Should the Law be preached at all, or 
should only the Gospel (broad sense) be preached to bring 
about sorrow over sin, contrition, repentance, and 
forgiveness? 
The evangelical position is explained in a section 
of the Apology entitled "Love and the Keeping of the 
Law." Although directed to the theologians of the Roman  
Confutation against the Augsburg Confession, it is also 
applicable to the questions Agricola had raised concerning 
the Law.49 Melanchthon had maintained that the Law 
always accuses and terrifies consciences -- it does not 
48Ap IV, 38. 
49Johann Michael Reu, The Augsburg Confession: A  
Collection of Sources (Chicago: Wartburg Publishing House, 
1930), part II, pp. 348-383. 
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justify," now, therefore, he continues, "It is 
impossible to keep the law without Christ; it is 
impossible to keep the law without the Holy Spirit."5' 
Emphasis on the activity of the Holy Spirit in the life of 
the Christian man pervades this section. Melanchthon 
counters the charge that the evangelicals do not require 
good works with the contention that "we not only require 
them, but show how they can be done."52 Human strength 
cannot keep the Law, "nothing else than Christ's power is 
needed for our conflict with the devil."53 Christians 
therefore keep the Law, "not because we live up to it, but 
because we are in Christ."54 One cannot separate faith 
and love; neither may one invert the order, faith --
love. Love is a consequence of faith. 
Melanchthon is concerned with countering the 
contention that love justifies. "Selecting love, which is 
only one of these effects of faith, our opponents teach 
that love justifies. From this it is clear that they 
teach only the law."55 Melanchthon's reasoning is 
straightforward. 
50Ap IV, 38. 
51Ap IV, 126. 
52Ap IV, 136. 
53Ap IV, 139. 
54Ap IV, 140. 
55Ap IV, 145. 
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If someone believes that he obtains the forgiveness of 
sins because he loves, he insults Christ and in God's 
judgment he will discover that this trust in his own 
righteousness was wicked and empty. 56  
Melanchthon acknowledges that "love is the keeping of the 
Law and obedience to the Law certainly is righteous-
ness,"57 but he distinguishes between a righteousness of 
the Law and the righteousness of faith. 
When this keeping of the Law and obedience to the Law 
is perfect, it is indeed righteousness, but in us it is 
weak and impure. Therefore it does not please God for 
its own sake and it is not acceptable for its own 
sake.58  
One misunderstands the Gospel if he contends that 
by faith Christians are justified, but that Christ ceases 
to be the mediator following Christian renewal. "It is an 
error to suppose that he merely merited 'initial grace' 
and that afterward we please God and merit eternal life by 
our keeping of the law."59 The Christian must return to 
the promise and firmly believe that "we are accounted 
righteous on account of Christ. . . If 60 The Law cannot 
be satisfied even by the Christian.'' "Therefore even 
in good works he requires our faith that for Christ's sake 
56Ap IV, 150. 
57Ap IV, 159. 
58Ap IV, 160. 
59Ap IV, 162. 
"Ap IV, 165. 
"Ap IV, 172. 
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we please God and that the works in themselves do not have 
the value to please God."62 In this connection 
Melanchthon cites Jerome. "Our righteousness does not 
consist in our own merit, but in God's mercy."63  
Although the Christian is still far from perfection in the 
Law, yet in Christ the Law cannot condemn him. 
Melanchthon sums up his position thus, 
Good works should be done because God has commanded 
them and in order to exercise our faith, to give 
testimony and to render thanks. For these reasons good 
works must necessarily be done. They take place in a 
flesh that is partly unregenerate and hinders what the 
Holy Spirit motivates, fouling it with its impurity. 
Because of faith, they are nevertheless holy and divine 
works, sacrifices, and the reign of Christ whereby he 
shows his rule before the world.64  
This citation summarizes the evangelical 
understanding of faith and 
position as exemplified in 
commanded by God. In this 
far from the vocabulary of 
works, in contrast to the Roman 
Thomas Aquinas. Good works are 
formulation Melanchthon is not 
the 1535 Loci where he first 
   
articulated the terminology of the third use of the Law. 
Good works are an exercise of faith, not to complete faith 
as in Thomas, but in consequence of faith, which is 
complete in itself. Good works are necessary as a witness 
to faith and in obedience to the command of God, but not 
as completing justification or as contributing to 
62Ibid. 
63Ap IV, 173. 
64Ap IV, 189-90. 
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salvation. In a schema incomprehensible to Aquinas, 
Melanchthon affirms with Luther that the Christian, 
although justified before God, remains only "partly 
regenerate." His flesh hinders his renewal, a reality 
that becomes a significant factor in explaining the 
instructional function of the Law in 1535. While the 
flesh hinders the renewal of the regenerate, the Spirit 
motivates the Christian to do good works, working through 
the Gospel (faith) and not through the Law (coercion). 
The "good" of good works describes not an inherent quality 
of the work itself but the faith in Christ for whose sake 
it is accounted good. Both justification and good works 
reflect the grace of God, given not in response to human 
merit or effort, but solely from divine love. The 
Christian in response does good works, not to witness to 
his own goodness, but to witness to the reign of Christ in 
the world through his people. 
Law and Gospel in Luther  
(1532--1537)  
Luther's writings in the period between the 
Augsburg Confession and the antinomian controversy of 1537 
reflect his continuing concern with the proper distinction 
between Law and Gospel. Five works will be briefly 
surveyed here to develop Luther's understanding of Law, of 
Gospel, and of their relationship: The Commentary on Psalm 
88 
51 (delivered in lecture June through August, 1532), the 
Lectures on the first chapters of Genesis (1536), the 
Lectures on Galatians (1535), the Disputation regarding  
Justification (1536) and the Smalcald Articles (1537). 
In his Commentary on Psalm 51, Luther 
distinguishes between two kinds of sinners: (1) sinners 
who do not consider themselves to be sinners and therefore 
seek to justify themselves, persecuting the Word of God; 
(2) sinners who feel their sins and the wrath of God and 
are afraid before the face of God." It is the latter 
group which is of interest to the purposes of this study. 
According to Luther true theology teaches that those who 
are terrified in conscience have truly felt the effects of 
divine Law. 
then one part of theology is finished, the part that 
uses the Law and its threats. . . . We must not stop 
here, but go on to the knowledge of the other part of 
theology, that part that fulfills the whole of 
theological knowledge: that God gives grace to the 
humble (1 Peter 5:5).66 
Although the power of sin is done away with through divine 
mercy, sin itself nevertheless remains. "Wherefore both 
statements are true: 'No Christian has sin; and every 
Christian has sin.'"" With every Christian moreover 
there remains two kinds of sin, "sin that is forgiven," 
65WA 40-2:333-34; AE 12:315-16. 
"WA 40-2:334; AE 12:316-17. 
"WA 40-2:352; AE 12:328. 
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and "sin that remains."" "Once a Christian is 
righteous by faith and has accepted the forgiveness of 
sins, he should not be so smug as though he were pure of 
all sins." He is righteous only by an "alien righteous-
ness. 
Those who presume perfection are led from the Word 
and its gracious pronouncement of forgiveness for Christ's 
sake into ungodliness. If one minimizes the remnants of 
sin, he is likely to minimize the Spirit who cleanses him, 
and his gift of healing. Luther consequently describes 
justification as having two parts. Although regeneration 
and renewal are both subsumed under the topic of justi-
fication, one notes the distinction between justification 
(in the narrow sense) and subsequent sanctification. 
The first is grace revealed through Christ, that 
through Christ we have a gracious God, so that sin can 
no longer accuse us, but our conscience has found peace 
through trust in the mercy of God. The second part is 
the conferring of the Holy Spirit with his gifts, who 
enlightens us against the defilements of spirit and 
flesh (2 Cor. 7:1).7°  
Indeed, there is only one cause for justification, 
the merits of Christ. But, "if someone wants to, he may 
list the acknowledgement of sin as a second cause or as 
the learned say, a causa sine qua non."71 The Gospel is 
"Ibid. 
"Ibid. 
70WA 40-2:357-58; AE 12:331. 
71WA 40-2:358-59; AE 12:332. 
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primary, but the conviction of sin is necessary. "If the 
Law has frightened and whipped a heart until it has been 
lead to a feeling of sin, let Christ come according to his 
promise and let him console and lift up such a frightened 
one again."'" The teaching of the Law is necessary for 
both the regenerate and the unregenerate. 
For the forgiveness of sins therefore this confession 
or knowledge is necessary, that we believe and confess 
that we are sinners and that the whole world is under 
the wrath of God.73  
Both Law and Gospel are the Word of God and are given that 
Christians might know that they are sinners and are saved 
by grace alone. 
In the later Galatians Commentary Luther carefully 
delineates the proper relationship between the Law and the 
Gospel. Luther here defines two uses of the Law: 
political and theological. "The first (political) is to 
restrain those who are uncivilized and wicked."'" The 
theological use is its spiritual use. True believers, 
those justified by faith, do not rely on the Law for their 
relationship with God, but on the merits of Christ alone. 
A man cannot be a doer of the Law, unless he is first 
justified "before and without the law, through 
72WA 40-2:364; AE 12:336. 
73WA 40-2:370; AE 12:340. 
74WA 40-1:429; AE 26:274. 
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faith."" Nevertheless the Law has a continuing and 
abiding function, "to reveal to man his sin, blindness, 
misery, wickedness, ignorance, hate, and contempt for God, 
death, hell, judgment, and the well deserved wrath of 
God."'" This function of the Law is not understood by 
hypocrites and sophists who presume their own 
righteousness. Because men are by nature legalists 
(especially men who try to keep the Law to vindicate 
themselves), "God cannot soften and humble this man or 
make him acknowledge his misery and damnation in any other 
way than by the law."" Luther summarizes his position 
most clearly, "But the true use of the Law is this, that I 
know that by the Law I am being brought to an acknow-
ledgment of sin, and am being humbled, so that I may come 
to Christ and be justified by faith."'" 
This is the proper function of the Law. . . . The 
sinner should know that the Law does not disclose sins 
and humble him to make him despair, but that the Law 
was instituted by God so that by its accusation and 
crushing it might drive him to Christ. . . ."79  
Although the Law kills, "God still uses this effect of the 
Law, this death, for a good use, namely, for life."'" 
"WA 40-1:430; AE 26:275. 
76WA 40-1:481; AE 26:309. 
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"WA 40-1:533; AE 26:348. 
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The regenerate sinner finds himself "divided this way into 
two times." 
To the extent that he is flesh, he is under the Law; to 
the extent that he is spirit, he is under the Gospel. 
To his flesh there always clings lust, greed, ambition, 
pride, etc. So do ignorance and contempt for God, 
impatience, grumbling, and wrath against God because it 
obstructs our plans and efforts." 
Luther counters the position of Agricola and the 
Antinomians with a very specific question. "Why, then, the 
Law?" He answers, ". . . When reason hears that 
righteousness or the blessing is obtained on the basis of 
grace and the promise, it immediately draws the in-
ference, 'Then the Law is worthless."'82  Luther also 
contests the position of Karlstadt and the radical right. 
The matter of the Law must be considered carefully, 
both as to what and as to how we ought to think about 
the Law; otherwise we shall either reject it 
altogether, after the fashion of the fanatical spirits 
who prompted the peasant's revolt a decade ago by 
saying the freedom of the Law absolves men from all 
laws, or we shall attribute to the Law the power to 
justify." 
Luther's own position is this: 
Both groups sin against the Law: those on the right who 
want to be justified through the Law, and those on the 
left, who want to be altogether freed of the Law. 
Therefore we must travel the royal road, so that we 
neither reject the Law altogether nor attribute to it 
more than we should.84  
81WA 40-1:526; AE 
82WA 40-1:527; AE 
83WA 40-1:527-28; 
84WA 40-1:528; AE 
26:342. 
26:343. 
AE 26:343. 
26:343. 
93 
Luther expresses the dual nature of a Christian 
as flesh (and therefore under the Law) and spirit (and 
therefore under the Gospel). The abiding validity of the 
Law (against "fanatical spirits") is not that it justifies 
(over against Roman scholastic theology) but that it 
accuses sin. As sinners, the regenerate remain under the 
Law. As those justified in Christ, the regenerate have no 
need of the Law. Luther would not reject the Law, for it 
has a continuing function for the regenerate "to the 
extent he is still flesh," nor would he attribute to the 
Law more than one should (for, "to the extent he is 
Spirit, he is under the Gospel"). It is precisely in 
these terms that the Formula of Concord, Article VII, "the 
Third Use of the Law," articulates the paradoxical reality 
of the regenerate sinner-saint.85 Luther at this point, 
however, does not draw the conclusion found in the Formula: 
"Believers, furthermore, require the teaching of the 
law so that they will not be thrown back on their own 
holiness and piety, and under the pretext of the Holy 
Spirit's guidance set up a self-elected service of God 
without his Word and command." 
In commenting on Genesis 3:15 in his 1536 
Commentary Luther might be mistaken for an antinomian 
himself. "If sin in abolished, then also the law."87  
85FC,SD,VI:17-21. 
86FC,SD,VI:20. 
87WA 42:146; AE 1:196. 
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The catch of course is that sin has not been abolished. 
Luther's point is that the Law was given after sin.88  
There are two kinds of promises: the promise of the Law 
(with threats attached for disobedience), and the promise 
of grace (which has no threats added to it).89 In his 
Disputation regarding Justification of the same year, 
Luther specifically articulates his simul Justus et 
peccator paradox, and underscores the need for the Law. 
Thesis # 23: For we perceive that a man who is 
justified is not yet a righteous man, but is in the 
very movement or journey toward righteousness. 
Thesis # 24: Therefore, whoever is justified is still a 
sinner and yet he is considered fully and perfectly 
righteous by God who pardons and is merciful.9°  
Contrition is necessary for forgiveness, but it does not 
provide forgiveness." One cannot desire forgiveness 
unless one confesses his sin.92 In the disputation on 
Argument X, Luther responds to the assertion that, 
"Righteousness depends on a condition of penitence. 
Therefore it is the cause of justification."" His 
response acknowledges that contrition is necessary for 
faith, but also recognizes that true contrition cannot be 
88WA 42:103; AE 1:138. 
89WA 42:224; AE 1:304. 
90WA 39-1:83; AE 34:152-53. 
91WA 39-1:102; AE 34:171. 
92WA 39-1:108; AE 34:177. 
93WA 39-1:123; AE 34:192. 
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made unless mercy and grace are present. One hears here 
overtones of the conversation Luther, Melanchthon, and 
Agricola shared at Torgau in 1527 on the nature of 
repentance. Law must precede Gospel; contrition must 
precede forgiveness, and yet for true contrition, there 
must already be an expectation of forgiveness, or that 
contrition will result in despair or work righteousness. 
Much of what has been written above is summarized 
succinctly by Luther in the Smalcald Articles.94 The 
Law was given to restrain sin but man in his sin ignored 
the Law or presumptuously thought he could keep the 
Law.95 However, "the chief function or power of the Law 
is to make original sin manifest and to show man to what 
utter depths his nature has fallen and how corrupt he has 
become."96 Luther is sensitive to the spiritual need of 
man to be restored, having been crushed by the Law, and in 
his article on "Repentance," Luther explains the dynamics 
of true contrition over sin. The Law destroys human pride 
with its unremitting judgment. "To this office of the Law 
the new Testament immediately adds the consoling promise 
of grace in the Gospel." Where the Law exercises its 
office alone, there is only death and despair, but God 
94SA III,IV: "The Law." 
95SA 111,11:1-3. 
96SA 111,11:4. 
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offers forgiveness in many ways, and with God there is 
plenteous redemption (Psalm 130:7).97 In Article III, 
Part IV, Luther articulates the means by which the Gospel 
comes to the repentant sinful Christian: the spoken Word, 
Holy Baptism, the Keys, and the "mutual conversation and 
consolation of the brethren."98 It is noteworthy that 
John Agricola attached his name to these Smalcald Articles  
as one of the signatories. Later that same year, however, 
Agricola and the antinomian question again became the 
center of focus in Luther's theological concern. 
The Writings Against Antinomianism 
Agricola's primary concern rested in the question 
of whether the Law played a part in the repentance of the 
sinner prior to his justification. His answer was that it 
did not. Luther on the other hand maintained that the 
question of the Law's relevance for the initial conversion 
of the sinner also impinged on the Law's usefulness in the 
ongoing life of Christian sanctification. If the Law had 
no role in accusing man of sin prior to conversion, could 
it have a role following conversion? The controversy in 
the Lutheran church following Luther's death and 
culminating in the Concord established through the 
Formula, Articles V and VI, is evidence of the prophetic 
nature of Luther's concern. 
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In his Propositions of 1537, Agricola does not 
treat of the role of the Law in the regenerate, but of its 
role in bringing the unregenerate to the point of 
acknowledging the need for a savior from sin. At this 
point it is important to recall that both Luther and 
Melanchthon had used the term "Gospel" in a wide and 
narrow sense. In its broad sense Luther recognized that 
"Gospel" is used in Scripture with reference to the whole 
body of Christian truth. In its narrow or proper sense, 
however, Luther insisted that Gospel be understood in the 
sense of promise, that is, the gracious gift of 
forgiveness by grace, through faith, for the sake of 
Christ. Law in its proper sense he insisted must be 
distinguished from Gospel in its proper sense as God's 
demand for perfect righteousness, and the expression of 
his wrath against sin must be distinguished from the 
promise of grace and new life in Christ. 
Agricola cited with approval those writings where 
Luther had used the term Gospel in its wide sense, but 
condemned the use of Gospel in its proper or narrow 
sense. The effect was not so much to deny God's wrath 
over sin, but to subsume it into a category of the 
Gospel. Effectively, Agricola would have ended the 
distinction between Law and Gospel, and in that process 
would have returned the evangelical church to the basic 
error of the Roman church -- the confusion of Law and 
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Gospel.99 Yet it was Agricola's contention that he was 
saving the evangelical party from alleged Romanizing 
tendencies of Luther and Melanchthon, both of whom 
insisted on the necessity of the Law's proclamation prior 
to the justification of the sinner through the Gospel. 
Agricola's Positions Circulated Among Brethren was 
circulated anonymously and later printed by Luther with 
his Disputations of 1537. Agricola maintains that 
repentance must not be taught on the basis of the 
Decalogue, but on the basis of the Gospel. This is in 
accordance with Christ's words in Luke 24:26; 46-47 and 
John 16:8, and Mark 16:15 and Saint Paul in Philippians 
2:5 and 12. . . Repentance must be taught from the 
remembrance of Christ, not the Law" (#5). Since men are 
justified without the Law, solely through the Gospel, 
Agricola concludes that the Law is unnecessary and should 
not be taught "for the beginning, the middle, or the end 
of justification" (#9). Against Luther and Melanchthon 
Agricola concludes, "Thus for the preservation of purity 
of doctrine those must be resisted who teach that the 
Gospel is not to be preached unless the soul is first 
shaken and made contrite by the Law" (#13). Agricola 
defines the activity of the Law in a way that might well 
have come from the pen of Luther or Melanchthon. "The Law 
99 
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justification as "the new Law of the gospel." See chapter 
II above. 
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only accuses against sin, and indeed without the Holy 
Spirit, therefore it accuses to condemnation" (#16). 
Agricola argued that since the Law cannot save, it has no 
place in the preparation of the sinner for justification. 
And since the Gospel is the power of salvation, Agricola 
contends that any message apart from the Gospel is 
irrelevant to justification. 
Thesis # 17: However it is the task of teaching that it 
not only condemn with great efficacy, but also that it 
save at the same time. However, this is the Gospel 
which teaches repentance in connection with the 
forgiveness of sins. 
Thesis # 18: For the Gospel of Christ teaches the wrath 
of God and heaven, and at the same time the 
righteousness of God, Romans 1. For this is a 
preaching of repentance in connection with the promises 
which reason cannot hold to naturally, but through 
divine revelation.'" 
Franz Pieper insightfully writes of this argument, 
Agricola wants contrition or repentance taught from the 
Gospel and not from the Law, because a contrition or 
repentance from love of God can come only from the 
Gospel. The last part of this sentence is true of 
course. . . . [But] he is actually making trust in 
God, or faith, in the remission of sins follow on 
contrition which proceeds from love of God, hence 
dependent on renewal and sanctification.'°' 
In so doing he has denied the function of the Law and put 
the teaching of the Gospel in uncertainty, for the 
►0OWA 39-1:342-345. The Antinomian Disputations  
are not translated in the AE. Translations are the 
author's own. For ease in reference, individual thesis 
numbers will be cited in the main body of the text using 
parentheses. 
'°'Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 4 vols. 
trans. and ed. Theodore Engelder (St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1950-57), 3:227, emphasis added. 
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"Gospel" that reveals sin is not the "Gospel" that 
forgives sin -- and the sinner is left without any Gospel 
at all. Luther and Melanchthon would certainly agree with 
Agricola that the Law accuses of sin and that only the 
Gospel justifies, but they would contend that only the one 
who has an awareness of his wretchedness before God as 
sinner can acknowledge his need for the savior who 
forgives sin, when the Gospel is proclaimed to him. Apart 
from the Law's accusation, there is no need for the Gospel. 
In order that he might document his position 
Agricola cites writings of both Luther and Melanchthon to 
seek to show that these reformers have departed from their 
initial position in their affirmations of a continuing 
need for the Law both in the justification and in the new 
life of the Christian. The "pure" statements of Luther 
and Melanchthon which Agricola cites, upon reading, are 
those statements where the reformers were stressing the 
Gospel as that which enables Christian freedom and the 
love of God and of the neighbor -- situations in which 
they were using justification in the context of renewal 
and the term "Gospel" in its broad sense. The "impure" 
statements Luther and Melanchthon are accused of making 
relate to the distinction of the Law and Gospel and the 
continuing need for the Law in order that man as sinner 
might acknowledge his sin. Luther adds to this series 
fourteen propositions of his own which characterize the 
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antinomian position or draw out implications of that 
position. 
The First Disputation Against Antinomianism was 
set for December 18, 1537.102 Agricola was not 
present. The arguments of this first Disputation provide 
in themselves an excellent summary of Luther's understand-
ing of the relationship between Law and Gospel. 
Repentance consists of two parts, sorrow over sin and 
resolution to live a better life (#1). Repentance, 
understood as sorrow over sin, is the work of the Law 
(properly understood) (#4). The resolution to live a 
better life is the work of the Gospel (in its narrow 
sense). "Therefore to the Law must be added the promise 
(that is, the Gospel), which comforts and encourages the 
terrified conscience, so that a man can propose to do 
good" (#7). Sorrow over sin is only partial repentance 
and when one perseveres only in this part of repentance, 
the result is despair and destruction (#8-9). Although 
scholastic theologians understood repentance as con-
sisting of sorrow over sin and resolution to live the 
better life, they imagined that such sorrow over sin came 
as the result of man's own efforts and free will (#10-16), 
and that the resolution to live a better life flowed from 
human choice and powers (#17). 
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In Theses 18-22 Luther gives his own position: 
that sorrow over sin comes from the Law and that the 
resolution to do good is a gift of the Holy Spirit through 
the Gospel. Luther also rejects those who "perniciously 
teach that the Law must be abolished from the church," 
because "the whole Scripture teaches that repentance is 
begun from the Law. . . • " (#24-25). The remainder of the 
first Disputation consists of illustrations from Scripture 
and from the lives of Adam, David, Paul and Christ 
himself, underscoring that "sin and death do not come 
through the word of grace and comfort, but must 
necessarily be shown through the Law" (#31). 
In the second Disputation"3 Luther begins with 
statements which of themselves might be misinterpreted as 
antinomian. 
Thesis # 1: The Law is not only unnecessary for 
justification but is entirely useless and utterly 
impossible. 
Thesis # 8: In summary, the Law must be separated from 
justification as far as heaven in distant from earth. 
But his purpose is to distinguish Law as entirely impotent 
in justification from the grace of Christ which declares 
sinners to be saints. "And nothing should be taught, 
said, or thought concerning justification unless it 
exhibits only the Word of the grace of Christ" (Thesis 
#9). But these opening theses dare not be misunderstood. 
""WA 39-1:347-350. 
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Luther is just as firm as always that the Law remains a 
necessity in the church. "However, it does not follow 
from these things that the Law must be abolished and 
removed from the teaching of the church" (#10). Why? 
Because man in his pride must be brought to see his 
unrighteousness and humiliation before God (#11-14). If 
this is not done, man in his presumption of innocence will 
condemn himself (#13-16). Therefore the Law is "greatly 
necessary and useful" (#17) and "whatever points out sin, 
wrath, or death, performs the work of the Law, whether it 
is in the Old Testament or in the New Testament" (#18). 
This statement underscores the dynamic concept Luther has 
of divine Law. The Law is not merely a code or a rule; it 
is the means by which God addresses each man in his sin 
and condemns him. 
The Law is to be proclaimed to the secure, those 
without repentance. The Gospel is to be announced to 
those who sorrow over sin in repentance. Luther 
continues, "For to reveal sin is not, and cannot be, 
anything other than the Law or the effect and most proper 
power of the Law" (#19). Without the Law, sin is not 
revealed (#20-24) and if sin is not revealed, there is no 
need for forgiveness and no need for a savior (#25-29). 
Because the Law too is a Word from God the Holy Spirit, to 
forbid. the Law is to forbid the truth of God (#38). The 
statements of Agricola and others are thus destructive to 
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the Law, the Gospel, and salvation. Luther summarizes his 
position with these words: "For as the Law was before 
Christ, it certainly accuses us, but it is placated under 
Christ by the forgiveness of sins and henceforth fulfilled 
through the Spirit" (#45). 
Luther underscores the theme of the third 
Disputation104 with his seventh thesis, almost a 
verbatim citation of the first of the 95 Theses (1517): 
"When Christ rightly says to all his own 'Repent,' he 
intends that the entire life of the believer should be 
repentant." The Christian does not choose to commit sin, 
but nevertheless does sin and must plead for the mercy of 
God (#16). In demonstration of the continuing validity of 
the Law, Luther cites the Lord's Prayer as a prayer of 
repentance. The name of God is not made holy by us, nor 
is the kingdom brought by us, nor is God's will done by us 
of our own accord, but only in mercy (#18-21). What the 
Christian prays for in the Lord's Prayer is what the Law 
commands (#22-25). Although the church is holy, it is 
also sinful and must continually repent. 
On this account even the Lord's Prayer itself teaches 
that the Law is before, during, and after the Gospel 
and for this reason repentance must begin with the Law 
itself. (#27) 
Therefore, if the Antinomians would abolish the Law, they 
must also abolish most of the preaching of Christ himself 
104 WA 39-1:350-352. 
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from the Gospel (#31). Christ does more than merely 
repeat the Decalogue, he perfects it. "He also repeatedly 
accuses, rebukes, threatens, terrifies, and exercises 
similar duties of the Law of the Gospel" (#34). 
It is interesting to note that Luther uses at this 
point the phrase, "Law of the Gospel," delineating Gospel 
in its wide sense. This phrase is used by Thomas Aquinas 
to describe how Christ perfects the Law of the Decalogue 
and to underscore the continuing validity of the Law for 
Christians. However, Saint Thomas does not connect the 
"Law of the Gospel" with Law as that which accuses, 
rebukes, threatens and terrifies, but only as that Law 
which in the New Testament completes the Law given in the 
Old Testament.'" Luther concludes his third 
Disputation by denying the antinomian proposal that sin 
can be known from somewhere other than the Law (#37). One 
may abolish the Decalogue, but one cannot abolish the Law 
of God written on the human heart (#40). 
Luther begins the fourth Disputation"s warning 
against the Roman error by which it is taught that one 
cannot be certain of the forgiveness of sins, for the 
Gospel is denied and man is thrown back on his own good 
works rather than on the death of Christ on behalf of 
"sSumma, I-II, 107. 
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sinners (#1-13). But this error is not as severe as the 
error of those who would completely deny the Law and leave 
no room for repentance (#14-15). The effect of this 
antinomian contention, that the Law of Moses is 
unnecessary and should not be taught at the beginning, the 
end, or the middle of justification would mean a denial of 
Paul, a dishonoring of parents and those who govern, in 
short, the end of God's structure for both the Kingdom of 
heaven and the kingdom of this world (#16-23). Against 
this Luther maintains with Saint Paul, "that all men are 
sinners (that is the task of the Law), and . . . they must 
be justified in Christ" (#24). Man is not convicted as a 
sinner except by the Law (#25) and the Law requires that 
the entire debt of disobedience be paid (#26-31). The Law 
must be taught until it is fulfilled by Christ (#24). 
Only faith justifies, fulfills the Law, accents the 
forgiveness of sins and does works freely in love 
(#35-36). This it does without the Law (#37-38) and in 
fulfillment of the Law (#39). Thus the Law is not 
abolished, for apart from the Law, the Gospel has no 
meaning or purpose. Indeed, Christ restored the Law and 
improved the Law (#41). 
The fifth Disputation continues the argument with 
which the fourth Disputation concluded."' The Law 
""WA 39-1:354-357. 
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rules as long as sinful man lives. To be free of the Law 
unregenerate man must die. This is because sin rules in 
man as long as he lives and the Law is the power of sin 
(#1-9). Only in Christ is the Law fulfilled, sin 
eliminated, and death destroyed. Therefore, insofar as 
the Christian is in Christ, he is no longer under the Law, 
but insofar as he is a sinner, outside Christ, he is under 
Law, sin and death (#12). To abolish the Law, therefore, 
one must first abolish sin and death (#17). If the Law is 
necessary for those who are Christians, how much more is 
it not necessary for the ungodly (#27-29). Denial of this 
is the insanity and ignorance of the antinomians (#30), 
who would deny the preaching of the Law prior to 
justification and as it relates to the life of Christian 
renewal. As for Christians: 
In this life they are always both just, living in the 
flesh, and also evil, combined with the just in greater 
numbers. Therefore since the Law is established, it 
can hardly be doubted that it should be taught, not 
abolished, for by it they came to know sin and death, 
that is, the wrath of God. (#33-34) 
Thus the law must be taught to the pious and the godless 
(#42). 
To the godless, that being terrified they may be shown 
their sin, death, and the inevitable wrath of God. . . 
. To the pious, that they may be admonished to crucify 
their flesh with its concupiscence and vices, and not 
become secure. (#43-44) 
Only in relation to God's declaration of forgiveness has 
the Law been removed, not as a result of some formal or 
substantial principle. Again, Luther reiterates, 
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What the Law does, it does by terrifying and killing, 
that it may drive one back to himself, that is, 
knowledge of himself. (#59) 
For if the Law is abolished it is not known what Christ 
is or did, that he fulfilled the Law for us. (#61) 
Therefore the teaching of the Law is necessary in the 
church and should be entirely retained, for Christ 
cannot be retained without the Law. (#66) 
Finally, the Law is fulfilled . . . in Christ, but it 
is not possible to teach this unless you teach that the 
Law is unfulfilled in us. (#68) 
In summary, to abolish the Law but leave sin and death 
is to obscure the disease of sin and death to the 
destruction of men. (#69) 
These theses affirm Luther's mature position and provide a 
precise understanding of the relative functions of Law and 
Gospel, functions in which they are essential to each 
other and yet must be carefully distinguished from one 
another. 
In the sixth Disputation l " Luther underscores 
the consequences of the antinomian position: no sin, 
therefore no punishment or forgiveness; no punishment or 
forgiveness, therefore, no wrath or grace; no wrath or 
grace, therefore, no divine or human government; no divine 
or human government, therefore, no God and no man; neither 
God nor man, therefore there is nothing, "except perhaps 
the devil" (#1-6). Luther is not impressed that the 
antinomians consider themselves excellent teachers of God, 
Christ, grace, and the Law, for in Luther's mind 
their doctrine has only taken God's name in vain, as does 
""WA 39-1:358. 
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the teaching of the false demons and false prophets 
(#7-11). Law has no function, politically or 
theologicaly, apart from its accusation of sin, thus all 
the antinomian fine words about the Gospel mean nothing, 
leading to the very most "pestilent villany." They are 
not the servants of Christ, but serve themselves and 
expect to be served by others, seeking the glory of man in 
this life (#20). 
Agricola was not present for the first of the 
public Disputations (December 18, 1537) but he was present 
for the second Disputation (January 12, 1538) after which 
he recanted.'" In spite of the public reconciliation 
between Luther and Agricola there were rumors of 
insincerity on Agricola's part. Agricola was again absent 
from the third Disputation (September 6, 1538). In 
December of that year Agricola sought reconciliation with 
Luther, asking that Luther prepare the text of a 
recantation that he would sign. Luther's treatise Against 
the Antinomians contained this retraction. 
Master John Eisleben wishes to withdraw what he taught 
and wrote against the law or the Ten Commandments and 
to stand with us here in Wittenberg as the Confession 
and Apology did before the Emperor at Augsburg; and if 
he should later depart from this or teach otherwise, it 
will be worthless and stand condemned."°  
In the treatise Luther expresses his bewilderment that 
1°9AE 47:103. 
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anyone should think that he himself was antinomian, citing 
his exposition of the Ten Commandments in both the Large 
and Small Catechisms. Antinomianism is untenable, he 
asserts, for "whoever abolishes the law must 
simultaneously abolish sin. If he permits sin to stand, 
he must most certainly permit the law to stand. . • .' 
Moreover, if there is no sin, then Christ is nothing. Why 
should he die if there were no sin or Law for which he 
must die?'" 
Luther connects the necessity of the Law and the 
necessity of the atonement; indeed, Luther's understanding 
of the atonement informs his understanding of the Law, and 
vice-versa. The two are correlative, and each expresses 
the sinner's relationship to God, the Law in terms of the 
sinner's own righteousness (with the consequence that he 
is condemned), and the Gospel in terms of Christ's 
righteousness (with the consequence that the sinner is 
declared righteous through faith). 
Even if we did not require the law for ourselves, or if 
we could tear it out of our hearts (which is 
impossible) we would have to preach it for Christ's 
sake, as is done and has to be done, so that we might 
know what he did and suffered for us. . . . For the 
law terrifies me more when I hear that Christ, the Son 
of God, had to fulfill it for me than it would were it 
preached without mention of Christ and of such great 
torment suffered by God's Son, but were accompanied 
only by threats.'" 
"'WA 50:471; AE 47:110. 
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The problem the Antinomians have is that their 
"new method" by which they "preach grace first then the 
revelation of wrath"'" in actuality makes grace of no 
consequence. In effect, what they want to do is to 
eliminate the Law yet teach the wrath of God, which is the 
function only of the Law. "Thus they merely discard the 
few letters that compose the word 'law' meanwhile 
affirming the wrath of God. . , • .0114 Luther 
sarcastically characterizes the antinomian position as one 
in which it is contended, 
"We are sheer spirit, we have taken captive our own 
flesh together with the devil, so that all our thoughts 
and ideas are surely and certainly inspired by the Holy 
Spirit, and how can it be found wanting." 15  
In this Luther approaches the concern of the third 
function of the Law (as described by Melanchthon), that it 
is necessary for the regenerate (because they are 
spiritually weak) to be instructed by the Word in those 
works which please God, and not rely on their own 
opinions, good intentions, supposed spirituality or 
spiritual intuitions. The third use of the Law thus 
affirms the Scriptures as the means by which the Holy 
Spirit teaches, reproves, corrects, and trains in 
righteousness (2 Timothy 3:16). 
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At this same time Luther also expressed his 
concerns about the antinomians in his treatise on the 
Councils and the Church (1539). Although the antinomians 
preach with real sincerity about the forgiveness of sins 
and the doctrine of redemption, "they flee as it were the 
very devil the consequences that they should tell the 
people about the third article, about sanctification, that 
is, of the new life in Christ.41116 In this writing 
Luther's concern is not related directly to the function 
of the Law in the accusation of sin, so that the sinner 
might be prepared to hear the gracious message of the 
Gospel, but rather with the effects of antinomian teaching 
on the life-style of the regenerate. 
They think one should not frighten or trouble the 
people but rather always preach comfortingly about 
grace and the forgiveness of sins in Christ. . . . 
You want to be a Christian and at the same time remain 
an adulterer, a usurer, envious, vindictive, malicious, 
etc.! Instead they say, though you are a whoremonger, 
a miser, or other kind of sinner, if you but believe, 
you are saved, and you need not fear the law. Christ 
has fulfilled it all.''' 
Luther's conclusion: "They may be very fine Easter 
preachers, but they are very poor Pentecost preachers, for 
they do not preach de sanctificatione et vivificatione  
Spiritus Sancti. .
• 
." 118 The antinomians are not only 
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invalidating the work of Christ by despising the Law, but 
they are also making of no avail the ministry of the Holy 
Spirit, "because they propose to let the people continue 
in their old ways and still pronounce them saved."'" 
In discussing the nature of the church, Luther 
again criticizes the antinomians for their disregard of 
sanctification. Christians are holy people, "not only 
through the forgiveness of sin acquired for them by Christ 
(as the antinomians foolishly believe), but also through 
the abolition, the purging, and the mortification of sins 
on the basis of which they are called a holy 
people..120 In consequence the antinomians only 
strengthen those who remain in their sins, failing to 
teach them of the errors of sin, since they are all 
removed by Christ."' Preaching Christ, they destroy 
Him through their teaching. One cannot affirm the first 
great table of the law ("about comfort, grace, and 
forgiveness of sins") and not also give heed to the works 
of the Spirit in the second table.'22  
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Forensic Justification in Luther  
Agricola had argued that the Law had no validity 
in the conversion of man because only the Gospel could 
awaken a love for God. This argumentation was valid only 
if justification were understood effectively as the making 
righteous of the unrighteous. In arguing for the neces-
sity of the proclamation of the Law prior to the con-
version of the unregenerate, Luther was inevitably placing 
justification in its forensic setting, as the non-
imputation of sin and the imputation of the righteous-
ness of Christ. In carefully distinguishing Law and 
Gospel, Luther was also distinguishing justification as 
the declaration of Christ's righteousness from renewal as 
the effective consequence of man's new relationship with 
God. 
One is not surprised then to note that, although 
Luther speaks of justification in an effective sense prior 
to the antinomian controversy, as an infusion of 
righteousness by which the unrighteous become righteous, 
following the controversy Luther tends toward the language 
of forensic justification, stressing the non-imputation of 
sin and the imputation of Christ's rightousness. Since 
the Large Catechism is written at the beginning of this 
controversy (indeed, one notes many similarities between 
the Visitation Articles and Luther's two Catechisms) one 
finds there a theology of justification which speaks in 
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effective terms. The Smalcald Articles on the other hand 
were written near the end of the controversy with 
Agricola, and reflect a forensic understanding of 
justification. 
In the Large Catechism one notes a certain degree 
of ambiguity with regard to the distinction between 
justification and sanctification. Speaking of the 
activity of the Holy Spirit in the third article Luther 
writes, "Therefore to sanctify is nothing else than to 
bring us to the Lord Jesus Christ to receive these 
blessings which we could not obtain by ourselves."`23  
Employ the word "justify" in place of the word "sanctify" 
and the sentence does not change meaning. This 
understanding is confirmed in Luther, 
The Holy Spirit reveals and preaches that Word and by 
it he illumines and kindles hearts so that they grasp 
and accept it, cling to it, and persevere in it.124  
Justification as acceptance and sanctification as 
perseverence are not distinguished but viewed in a con-
tinuum of regeneration. The Holy Spirit must "awaken 
understanding in the heart" and "make us acceptable to the 
Father."'" "Forgiveness is needed constantly,'1126 
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for without forgiveness there can be no holiness.'" 
Meanwhile, since holiness has begun and is growing 
daily, we await the time when our flesh will be put to 
death, will be buried with all its uncleanness and will 
come forth gloriously and arise to complete and perfect 
holiness in a new, eternal life. Now we are only 
halfway pure and holy.'" 
Throughout the Christian life the Spirit continues to work 
through the Word until the day of resurrection when 
forgiveness is no longer necessary. Luther's vocabulary is 
unmistakably Augustinian ("justum facere"), and he 
describes justification and sanctification similarly in the 
fourth section of the Large Catechism, concerning the power 
and effect of Baptism, 
which is simply the slaying of the old Adam and the 
resurrection of the new man, both of which actions must 
continue in us our whole life long. Thus a Christian 
life is nothing else than a daily baptism, once begun 
and ever continued.'" 
One immediately notes a difference in vocabulary in 
the Smalcald Articles with the extensive citation of the 
forensic vocabulary of Saint Paul in Romans 3. 
Moreover, "All have sinned," and "they are justified by 
his grace as a gift, through the redemption which is in 
Christ Jesus, by his blood" (Rom. 3:23-25). . . . 
Inasmuch as this must be believed and cannot be obtained 
or apprehended by any work, law, or merit, it is clear 
and certain that such faith alone justifies us, as St. 
Paul says in Romans 3, "For we hold that a man is 
justified by faith apart from works of law" (Romans 
127LC 11:56. 
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3:28), and again, "that he [God] himself is righteous 
and that he justifies him who has faith in Jesus" 
(Romans 3:26).'" 
In Part III, section XIII, Luther describes justification 
in clearly forensic terms. 
by faith . . . we get a new and clean heart and . . . 
God will and does account us altogether righteous and 
holy for the sake of Christ, our mediator. Although the 
sin in our flesh has not been completely renewed or 
eradicated he will not count or consider it.131  
Not only is the Christian initially accounted righteous but 
even in the renewal which follows, his works are good only 
by the imputation of Christ's righteousness. 
Good works follow such faith, renewal, and for-
giveness. Whatever is still sinful and imperfect in 
these works will not be reckoned as sin or defect for 
the sake of the same Christ. The whole man, in respect 
both of his person and of his works, shall be accounted 
and shall be righteous and holy through the pure grace 
and mercy which has been poured out upon us so 
abundantly in Christ.'32  
The Galatians Commentary (1535) and the Disputation on  
Justification (1536) signal a similar change in vocabulary. 
A helpful digest of the mature Luther's doctrine 
of justification is found in his 1535 Commentary on 
Galatians 2:16. "Yet you know that a man is not justified 
by works of the law but through faith in Jesus Christ." 
True Christian repentance and righteousness is in the 
Christ, "who is grasped by faith and lives in the heart," 
130SA 11:1-4. 
131SA III,XIII:1. 
132SA III,XIII:2. 
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and "on account of which God counts us righteous and 
grants us eternal life."'" This faith which grasps 
Christ "is counted for righteousness...134 
Here it is to be noted that these three things are 
joined together: faith, Christ, and acceptance or 
imputation. Faith takes hold of Christ and has Him 
present, enclosing Him as the ring encloses the gem. 
And whoever is found having this faith in Christ, who 
is grasped in the heart, him God accounts as righteous. 
This is the means and merit by which we obtain the 
forgiveness of sins and righteousness . . . . Thus God 
accepts you or accounts you righteous, only on account 
of Christ in whom you believe.'" 
The imputation of Christ's righteousness is necessary not 
only in the initial conversion of the sinner, but also in 
the ongoing life of sanctification. "Now acceptance is 
extremely necessary, first, because we are not yet purely 
righteous, but sin is still clinging to our flesh during 
this life. God cleanses this remnant of sin in our 
flesh."'36 With Christ as the mediator between God and 
man by faith, "all our sins are sins no longer."37 But 
without Christ there is 
imputation and condemnation 
no forgiveness, only the "sheer 
of sins.1.136 
133WA 40-1:229; AE 26:130. 
134WA 40-1:233; AE 26:132. 
135Ibid. 
136WA 40-1:233; AE 26:132-33. 
137WA 40-1:133; AE 26:133. 
136Ibid. 
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The non-imputation of sin and the imputation of 
the righteousness of Christ do not mean a passivity in 
Christian love. "Because you have taken hold of Christ by 
faith through whom you are righteous, you should now go 
and love God and your neighbor."'" This the Christian 
can easily do for he has been "liberated from the burden 
and sting of sin," and consequently, "because everything 
is sweet and pleasant within, he willingly does and 
suffers everything.H140  
A Christian is not someone who has no sin and feels no 
sin; he is someone to whom, because of his faith in 
Christ, God does not impute his sin . . . . It is not 
in vain, therefore, that so often and so diligently we 
inculcate the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins and 
the imputation of righteousness for the sake of 
Christ.`"`  
The Christian is above the Law and sin because in his 
heart Christ is present. When the Law accuses him he 
looks to Christ and has him present within him, the victor 
over the law, sin, death, and the devil.'42 Se  . . . Sin 
is forgiven and righteousness is imputed to him who 
believes in Christ." This makes him "a son and heir of 
God." "Through faith in Christ . . . everything is 
"'Ibid. 
"'WA 40-1:235; AE 26:133. 
'42WA 40-1:235; AE 26:134. 
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granted to us -- grace, peace, the forgiveness of sins, 
salvation, and eternal life."'" 
Commenting on the second half of Galatians 2:16 
("Even we have believed in Christ Jesus, in order to be 
justified by faith in Christ and not by works of the Law") 
Luther strictly distinguishes between justification and 
sanctification. "Since we are now dealing with the topic 
of justification we reject and condemn works, for this 
topic of justification will not allow any discussion of 
good works.li144 His definition of justification is a 
classic forensic description. "We are pronounced 
righteous solely by faith in Christ, not by the works of 
the law or by love."'45  
Luther's understanding of "flesh" plays a part in 
this understanding of justification. . 'Flesh' means 
the entire nature of man, with reason and all his powers. 
This flesh . . . is not justified by works, not even by 
those of the law."'" Luther is not speaking here only 
of sins against the Law, but is maintaining that "flesh" 
is not justified by works done in accordance with the Law 
"works that are good."'" Justification is thus not a 
143WA 40-1:236; AE 26:134-35. 
` 44WA 40-1:240; AE 26:137. 
14sIbid. 
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process of renewal because even the good works of man are 
of the flesh and consequently of no merit. II • • . 'Flesh' 
means the highest righteousness, wisdom, worship, 
religion, understanding and will of which the world is 
capable.„148  The papists, Zwinglians, Anabaptists and 
all those who either do not know about the 
righteousness of Christ or do not believe correctly 
about it . . . [teach]: "Faith in Christ does indeed 
justify, but at the same time observance of the 
Commandments of God is necessary. . . ." Here 
immediately Christ is denied and faith is abolished, 
because what belongs to Christ alone is attributed to 
the Commandments of God or to the Law."'49  
Later, in his commentary on verse 2:20, Luther 
sums up his position. "In short, this life is not the 
life of the flesh although it is a life in the flesh; but 
it is the life of Christ, the Son of God, whom the 
Christian possesses by faith."'" The Christian and his 
Lord share a union through faith by which life itself is 
shared; whatever belongs to Christ ("grace, righteousness, 
life, peace, and salvation") now belongs to the Christian. 
"I must be so closely attached that He lives in me and I 
in him."'" All this is the Christian's possession "by 
14sIbid. 
'49WA 40-1:249; AE 26:143. 
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the cementing and attachment that are through faith, by 
which we become as one body in the Spirit."'" 
The imputation of the righteousness of Christ is 
no static exoneration of a guilty man, but an intimate 
union by which the Christian and his Lord share a common 
life. Anyone who seeks a righteousness apart from faith in 
Christ "is nullifying the grace of God and despising the 
death of Christ, even though he may speak otherwise with 
his mouth."'" How does one reconcile this vocabulary 
with the vocabulary of the earlier Luther and the imagery 
of the Catechisms? Luther offers help in this regard in 
his Disputation on Justification (1536), in which he 
clearly articulates a forensic theology of justification. 
though sin remains, He [God] considers us to be 
righteous and pure, and that a man is so absolved as if 
he had no sin, for Christ's sake. We truly thank God 
because his imputation is greater than our impurity. 
And sin which in substance is not being removed, shall 
be imputed as having been removed and shall be absorbed 
by the goodness of God who conceals it on account of 
Christ who overshadows it, although it remains in 
nature and substance. 
The adversaries do not want to admit this. 
Therefore they laugh when we say that faith justifies 
yet sin remains. For they do not believe that 
incredible magnitude of God's power and mercy beyond 
all mercy. He who is righteous is willing to concede 
this, but he who is not righteous wants to consider 
himself righteous. This imputation is not something of 
no consequence, but is greater than the whole world and 
the holy angels. Reason does not see this for there is 
a kind of neglect of the Word of God. But we should 
give thanks to God, I say, because we have such a 
I52WA 40-1:284; AE 26:167-68. 
'53WA 40-1:308; AE 26:185. 
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Savior who is able to cover us and to count our sin as 
nothing. For God's mercy is pardoning and love is 
meanwhile forgiving, and God really takes sin in such a 
way that it does not remain sin, because he begins 
materially to purge and to forgive completely. On no 
condition is sin a passing phase, but we are justified 
by the unmerited fprgiveness of sins and by the 
justification of God's mercy. Sin remains, then, 
perpetually in this life, until the hour of the last 
judgment comes and then at last we shall be made 
perfectly righteous. For this is not a game or 
delusion, that we say, 'Sins are forgiven by faith and 
only cling to us, because that newness of life has 
miraculously begun.' In short, the term 'to be 
justified' means that a man is considered 
righteous.'" 
Here is a clear description of Luther's understanding of 
the non-imputation of sin and the imputation of the 
righteousness of Christ. And yet, remarkably, in the 
citation immediately before the above quotation, Luther 
writes in a manner which initially seems completely at 
odds with a forensic view of justification. "I reply to 
the argument, then, that our obedience is necessary for 
salvation. It is therefore, a partial cause of our 
justification."'" Luther clarifies what he means when 
he writes, "Works are necessary to salvation, but they do 
not cause salvation because faith alone gives life. On 
account of the hypocrites we must say that good works are 
necessary to salvation."'" Works save outwardly; that 
is, they show evidence that the Christian is righteous and 
I54WA 39-1:97-98; AE 34:166-67. 
'55WA 39-1:96; AE 34:165. 
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that there is faith in the Christian that saves inwardly. 
It is as Paul says, "Man believes with his heart and so is 
justified, and he confesses with his lips and so is 
saved."'" Luther has made a distinction between two 
kinds of righteousness: the inward rightousness of faith 
and the outward righteousness of works. However he uses 
the word "justification" to describe both inward and 
outward righteousness. 
Luther explains the distinction and the necessity 
of the affirmation of two kinds of righteousness. 
For the Christian shows his life and that he has been 
made a Christian by love and good works and flees all 
vices. . . . Love merits forgiveness of sins, that is, 
love reveals that his sins have been forgiven. 
Christ is there speaking of both kinds of 
righteousness, first because above all we should know 
that by faith in Christ our sins are forgiven in the 
sight of God, and this is called inward righteousness. 
Next, after the forgiveness of sins, love ought to 
follow. This love shows all men that we have the 
remission of sins and that we have been pronounced 
righteous by God, and this is called outward 
righteousness. This righteousness follows, the former 
precedes, since the order is a priori, that is, from 
the efficient cause of justification  
Spiritual justification then is twofold in nature. 
Where justification is between God and man, this is 
from the efficient cause. The other is corporal and 
outward, which takes place between man and man; this is 
from the effect. Before God, faith is necessary, not 
works. Before man, works and love are necessary, which 
reveal us to be righteous in our own eyes and before 
the world. We concede then that man justifies himself, 
as to the effective cause, but not with respect to the 
efficient cause. For this cause is from God alone and 
without works, by faith alone in Christ. . . .158  
'"Ibid. 
158WA 39-1:92-93; AE 34:161-62. 
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As one reads through the extensive Disputation on 
Justification one is immediately impressed how this 
distinction between inward and outward righteousness 
clarifies the ambiguities which otherwise seem so 
contradictory within Luther. Although Luther uses the 
word "justification" to cover both kinds of righteousness, 
he is sharply distinguishing between justification as the 
imputation of the righteousness of Christ (an "alien 
righteousness" which is "outside us and foreign to us" and 
"cannot be laid hold of by our works)"159 and 
sanctification which justifies before men ("because it is 
necessary for us to be as certain before man through the 
evidence of our faith, as we are certain before 
God"). 160 Luther is using "justification" both to 
describe man's relationship to God in the inwardness of 
faith (justification in its narrow sense) and to describe 
man's relationship to man in the outwardness of works 
(justification in its broad sense). 
Luther maintains that the two doctrines, "promise 
and the law," are correlatives. "Law has works. Promise 
has faith." Faith alone justifies, "but we should give 
evidence of it and show it through works, because fruits . 
. and works testify that perfect faith is present in 
"161 us. Justification is a continuing activity, not in 
159WA 39-1:83; AE 34:153. 
160wA 39-1:121; AE 34:189. 
161WA 39-1:121; AE 34:190. 
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the sense of a progress in renewal, but in a recurring 
imputation of the righteousness of Christ and a continuing 
non-imputation of sin. 
Summary: Luther on Justification and the Law 
Does Luther teach a third use of the Law? It is 
clear that he does not use third use of the Law 
vocabulary. Werner Elert has convincingly demonstrated 
that the single reference to a three part division of the 
Law in Luther's Antinomian Disputations'62 is in fact an 
interpolation from Melanchthon's 1535 Loci (second 
edition).163 Granted then that Luther does not use the 
phrase "third use of the Law" and nowhere divides the Law 
into three functions (civil, theological, and 
instructional), does this mean as Elert and others would 
contend, that Luther does not teach an instructional 
function of the Law?164 A yes or no answer in Luther is 
not easy to establish. 
162WA 39-1:485. Werner Elert, Law and Gospel, 
trans. Edward H. Schroeder (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1967), pp. 33-40. 
163CR 21:406. 
164The position of Elert and others who deny 
that there is a legitimate third function of the law in 
Lutheran theology will be discussed in chapter VI. The 
question at this point is whether Luther describes a 
pedagogical function of the law as in any sense distinct 
from the theological function of the law which always 
condemns the sinners even in its instruction. 
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Luther functions with a very dynamic understanding 
of the Law in relation to man, both man as unregenerate 
sinner and man as regenerate sinner-saint. For Luther the 
Law is never merely a code or a rule; it is a part of the 
fabric of creation. The written Law of Moses possessed 
its authority because it is the divine explication of the 
natural Law God has written in human hearts. The question 
of an instructional function of the Law does not arise of 
course in a discussion of the Law in relation to the 
unregenerate. Here Luther affirms only the accusatory 
function of the Law, with the result that the unregenerate 
ignore the Law, modify the Law, or despair of the Law and 
are confirmed by the Law in their sin. With regard to the 
regenerate Luther recognizes the existential duality of 
the Christian who is simulteneously saint and sinner, 
totally saint, totally sinner. As saint, the Christian is 
in the Law by grace and has no need of the Law. As 
sinner, the Christian is under the Law and feels the 
weight of its constant accusation. However, the 
accusation of the Law has a different effect in the 
regenerate. While in the unregenerate the Law's 
accusation results in either legalism or despair, in the 
Christian the accusation of the Law brings the believer to 
his knees before Christ, seeking in faith the forgiveness 
only Christ can give. Thus the Law is fulfilled for 
Luther, not in works, but by faith, alone. Good works are 
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not the effect of the Law, but the fruits of the Holy 
Spirit who motivates the Christian to have the mind of 
Christ and to live according to his new commandment, 
loving others as he has been loved by Christ himself (John 
15:12). But being motivated by the Holy Spirit to seek to 
do the will of God and knowing what that will is are two 
different things. 
In his duality as sinner-saint the Christian in 
his desire to know the will of God is constantly 
frustrated by his own sinful nature. Luther explains this 
existential reality in which the Christian finds himself 
with the simple words of the Small Catechism regarding the 
ongoing significance of baptism. 
What does such baptizing with water signify? 
Answer: It signifies that the old Adam in us together 
with all sins and evil lusts, should be drowned by 
daily sorrow and repentance and be put to death, and 
that the new man should come forth daily and rise up, 
cleansed and righteous, to live forever in God's 
presence.165  
The drowning of the old Adam is a function of the Law as 
it accuses sin. What function, if any, does the Law have 
for the "new man" who desires to live "cleansed and 
righteous . . . in God's presence?" 
Perhaps nowhere does Luther give his answer more 
clearly than in his explanation to the Decalogue in his 
two Catechisms and in his explanations for the first three 
165SC IV:11-12. 
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petitions of the Lord's Prayer (which as has been seen are 
closely associated in Luther's mind). With the exception 
of the First Commandment, Luther explains each commandment 
in three parts. First, Luther affirms the relationship 
that exists between God and man by grace through faith: 
"We should fear and love God. . . ." Second, Luther 
describes what the commandment proscribes (". . . that we 
may not . . ."). Third, Luther affirms what God wills for 
his people (". . . but rather . . ."). Certainly the 
proscription (". . . that we may not . . .") of the 
commandment is an accusation of sin for everyone doing 
such things, and the affirmation of what God requires 
(". . . but rather . . .") condemns those who have not 
sought to do this will of God. In both cases the sinner 
has failed to keep the First Commandment, that he should 
"fear, love, and trust in God above all things.0 1 6 6 But  
if the fulfillment of the First Commandment is faith, and 
the Christian in faith seeks the will of God, then 
Luther's positive affirmation of God's will ("• . . but 
rather . .") is not an imperative, but an indicative. 
Having the righteousness of Christ and the forgiveness of 
sins, the believer seeks the will of God revealed in his 
Word. The Law for the believer not only proscribes sin 
but describes God's immutable will. 
'66AC 1:2. 
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It is in this second part of the explanation (". 
. but rather . . .") that Luther is connecting the 
teaching of the Decalogue with the Natural Law written in 
the human heart. If mankind were not perverted by sin and 
man would naturally seek those things which are of God, 
there would be no need for the proscription of the Law 
(". . . that we may not . . .") and man would happily do 
what God desires (". . . but rather . . ."). Since the 
fall, however, only those in Christ can choose to do what 
Gdd wills. When Luther writes in the Large Catechism that 
faith is the fulfillment of the first commandment and of 
the whole Law,167 he is describing this positive 
function of the Decalogue in which God testifies to his 
will for his people. It is in the Preface to the Large  
Catechism that Luther writes, "This much is certain, 
anyone who knows the Ten Commandments perfectly knows the 
entire Scriptures."168 Luther's insight in this regard 
is supported by the Hebrew text, in which the "ten words" 
of the Law are written not in the imperative but in the 
indicative. Because you are my people, God says, you will 
live thus . . . (Exodus 20:3-17). 
Luther's explanation to the Third Commandment may 
be used as an example of this emphasis. He does not 
167LC 1:13-15. 
168LC Preface:17. 
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understand this commandment to require a particular day 
for worship or to require particular activities to 
sanctify the day. Again, locating the commandment in the 
creation and stressing its origin in the divine rest the 
seventh day, Luther focuses in his explanation on the 
divine Word. What defines the Sabbath is not its location 
on the calendar but it is that time set apart for the 
people of God to hear the Word. Every day is a sabbath 
when the people of God hear the Word, hold it as holy and 
gladly learn it.169 Certainly Luther held the 
assembling of the saints for worship as important, but the 
accent in his explanation is on the need of the Christian 
to live (every day) in the Word of God. This emphasis on 
hearing and learning the Word accords with his positive 
view of the Law as describing what the saints of God will 
seek to do in their desire to live according to the 
creative and re-creative will of God. In the Word alone  
that will of God is to be found. 
The same emphasis on the Scriptures as the Word 
which reveals the will of God is present in Luther's 
explanations for the first three petitions of the Lord's 
prayer. When Christians pray that God's name would be 
holy among them, they are praying that the Word of God 
might be taught clearly and purely, so that they might 
169SC 1:6; LC 1:78-93. 
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live holy lives in accordance with it.'" One could 
hardly hope to find a more specific reference to the 
instruction or pedagogical function of the Word of God in 
relation to Christian living. If a Christian would keep 
the Second Commandment, he must learn to pray the first 
petition of the Lord's Prayer, for God's name is hallowed 
only when God's Word is taught clearly and purely and 
Christians live lives in accordance with it. 
When Christians pray that the kingdom of God might 
come, they are praying for the coming of the Spirit of God 
so that "by his grace we may believe his holy Word and 
live a godly life. . . ."171 God's kingdom comes 
through the Word empowered by the Spirit. The Spirit uses 
means, and if the Christian would participate in the 
coming of the kingdom, he must utilize the means the 
Spirit gives. God's will is not to be found apart from 
the Word he has given. The will of God is mediated 
through that Word, and not by private illumination or 
through the fanaticism of those who set themselves up as 
above the Word (Karlstadt, Muenzer, and the Zwickau 
prophets, for example). The Spirit works through His Word 
to create faith and to empower the Christian for godly 
living. One cannot keep the Third Commandment, gladly to 
' 70sc III:11. 
"`SC 111:8. 
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hear and learn the Word, without praying the Second 
Petition of the Lord's Prayer, that through the Spirit of 
God mediated in the Word he might believe the gospel and 
live a Christian life. 
Similarly, the Third Petition of the Lord's Prayer 
centers in the will of God, revealed in the Word of God. 
The Law accuses sin, "when God curbs and destroys every 
evil counsel and purpose of the devil, of the world, and 
of our flesh which would hinder us from hallowing his name 
and prevent the coming of his kingdom. . Of • • But through 
the Gospel the Holy Spirit "strengthens us and keeps us 
steadfast in the Word and in faith. . 1,172 • • The basis 
of these petitions is the relationship that already exists 
between God and his people, who believe "that he is truly 
our Father and we are truly his children. . ,, 1 7 3 
Just as the basis of the Commandments is to be found in 
faith, "We should fear, love and trust in God above all 
things."0174 For the regenerate, this filial fear of God 
is joined with faith which consoles the anxious heart. It 
is not the "servile fear" of the unbeliever who has no 
faith and can find no comfort in the Word."' For those 
172SC III:11. 
173SC 111:2. 
174SC 1:2. 
"'Thomas makes the distinction between "filial 
fear" and "servile fear" in the Summa, see above, chapter 
II. Melanchthon also makes this distinction in Ap X11:38. 
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who love God as sons and daughters by faith, the Law does 
not condemn, but instructs in the Word of God as an 
instrument of the Holy Spirit. 
With Luther's dynamic concept of the Law, the Law 
is not merely a code, but the revealed will of God which 
the Christian sinner-saint will seek with all his heart. 
Both Law and Gospel express the will of God. That which 
affirms God's expectation of man is the Law. That which 
conveys God's promise of salvation by grace through faith 
in Christ Jesus is the Gospel. Only the Christian can 
keep the Law because only the Christian lives by grace 
through faith in the imputed righteousness of Jesus 
Christ. The Law of God is immutable. There is no change 
in the Law. But through the Gospel there is a change in 
man so that his will is no longer turned against God but 
is turned in faith toward God. Regenerated by grace 
through faith, he seeks what the Law commands, not by 
coercion, but in loving obedience. With this change in 
the heart of man the Law serves a positive, instructional 
function in revealing God's will so that believers may 
know with certainty how they may please God. The Law has 
accused these sinner-saints in their sin. Now, forgiven 
in Christ these sinner-saints find in that same Law, not 
condemnation, but the revelation of God's will. Their 
response is not one of despair or work righteousness but 
rather one of thanksgiving, praise and love. As those who 
135 
are already God's people the Law instructs them in the 
righteousness of God, so that they are not dependent on 
private opinion. In this Luther is reflective of the Old 
Testament concept of Torah as embracing both command and 
promise. Luther's understanding of the Law for the 
regenerate is that of the Psalmist who, as one who loves 
God, meditates on God's Law day and night (Psalm 1:2). 
Nothing is so effectual against the devil, the world, 
the flesh, and all evil thoughts as to occupy oneself 
with the Word of God, talk about it, meditate on it. 
Psalm 1 calls those blessed who "meditate on God's Law 
day and night." You will never offer up any incense or 
other savor more potent against the devil than to 
occupy yourself with God's commandments and words and 
to speak, sing, and meditate on them. This indeed, is 
the true holy water, the sign which routs the devil and 
puts him to flight.'76  
The Law has nothing to do with justifying the 
sinner. Only the Gospel can do that. The Law does not 
motivate obedience, only the Gospel can do that. The Law 
does not make the works of the Christian good. Only the 
imputation of the righteousness of Christ by grace through 
faith can do that. But the Law does testify to the 
Christian of those works which God desires and in love the 
Christian seeks to do God's will according to both tables 
of the Decalogue. Thus Luther can speak in his Antinomian 
Disputations of "the new Law of the Gospel" -- not as did 
Thomas who denied the sola fide (in an evangelical sense) 
-- in accordance with Saint Paul when he wrote to the 
176LC Preface:10. 
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Philippians, "And I am sure that he who began a good work 
in you will bring it to completion at the day of Jesus 
Christ" (Philippians 1:6). Being "partakers . . . of 
grace" (Philippians 1:7), Paul can pray for his Christian 
friends 
that your love may abound more and more, with knowledge 
and all discernment, so that you may approve what is 
excellent and may be pure and blameless for the day of 
Christ, filled with the fruits of righteousness which 
come through Jesus Christ, to the glory and praise of 
God. (Philippians 1:8-11) 
Knowledge and discernment come through the Scriptures as 
Paul pointedly reminds the young pastor Timothy, "All 
Scripture is inspired by God and profitable for teaching, 
for reproof, for correction, and for training in 
righteousness, that the man of God may be complete, 
equipped for every good work" (II Timothy 3:16). 
With this understanding of the relationship of 
faith and works, Luther refuses to separate grace in 
Christ (by which a man is declared righteous before God) 
from grace in works (the external righteousness of love's 
response). Righteousness is descriptive of man only by 
grace through faith. This is true not only of the inward 
righteousness of the Christian heart, but also of external 
righteousness expressed in the subsequent good works of 
the Christian. The Christian is good before God by grace 
through faith; so also his works are good before God by 
grace through faith. God gives what God requires. 
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Therefore, for Luther, justification may be described in 
its narrow sense as the inward righteousness of the 
regenerate in relation to God or justification may be 
understood in its wider sense as the external 
righteousness embracing both regeneration and renewal, 
expressed in a life of loving God and the neighbor. Both 
internal and external righteousness, regeneration and 
renewal, are by grace alone, through faith alone. Man's 
efforts neither change his relationship with God nor make 
his works good. 
In summary, three aspects of Luther's theology 
impinge on his understanding of justification, 
sanctification and the continuing validity of the Law for 
the regenerate. First, Luther uses "justification" in a 
broad and narrow sense. Second, Luther often does not 
carefully distinguish between justification (in the narrow 
sense) and sanctification as renewal, since all is by the 
grace of God, alone. Third, Luther uses the Augustinian 
"make righteous" effective vocabulary of justification in 
a very non-Augustinian way. Justification is descriptive 
of what God's grace does in both regeneration and renewal: 
it makes people holy before God and it makes their works 
holy before God through faith. Grace is not an infused 
quality that transforms man and enables him to do good 
works. Grace is rather the gift of God which transforms 
the relationship between God and man so that God accounts 
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the man and his works as good, for Christ's sake. Adolf 
Koeberle writes of Luther: 
With Luther the primary question was likewise not that 
of making holy but of being accounted holy. The 
communion with God that has been interrupted by guilt 
can only be again restored through the removal of guilt. 
. . . Besides the idea of the imputation of the 
righteousness of God we always find associated with it 
in Luther's ideas the belief in the commencement and 
continuation of a progressive renewal in life, but with 
the righteousness of faith ranking above the renewal. . 
. . He wanted to distinguish between "external" 
righteousness and "inner" sanctification but without 
separating them from each other. His linking together 
of the two while at the same time maintaining their 
correct inner sequence will always remain the ideal 
solution to the problem. So, and only so, will 
justification be preserved from the danger of quietism 
and sanctification from the danger of perfectionism."' 
The instructional function of the Law in Luther as 
a result is reflective of Luther's understanding of the 
grace of God in Christ Jesus and the reality of the 
Christian condition as one who is a sinner-saint. Aquinas 
describes grace as an infused quality which transforms man 
so that he is no longer a sinner but is holy, having by 
grace a habitus by which he is able to do works which are 
holy in themselves. Luther denies that grace is a habitus  
or that faith infused by love is a virtue of the Christian 
himself. Rather, Luther sees grace as descriptive of the 
ongoing relationship of forgiveness imputed by God, who 
continues to restore the sinner-saint to himself and who 
"'Koeberle, Quest for Holiness, p. 92, footnote 
12:Excursus. 
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accords the works of that man as good, not because of an 
inherent goodness in the man himself or in his works, but 
because he is imputed righteous by grace and his works 
done in faith are accounted good by God's gracious 
acceptance. 
In all of this Luther remains governed, not by 
humanistic or scholastic presuppositions, but by his 
abiding concern to be faithful to the Scriptures. He 
strongly denounces (1) the enthusiasm of "fanatical 
spirits" who esteem their private revelations and 
understandings as above that of Scripture; (2) the 
antinomianism of Agricola who denies the Scriptures when 
he denies the continuing validity of the Law for the 
regenerate; (3) the Romanists, who distort the clear 
teachings of Scripture by their scholastic and 
Aristotelian presuppositions; and (4) "those lazy bellies 
and presumptuous saints" who think they are learned 
theologians and do not know the biblically based teachings 
of the Catechism."$ The Decalogue has abiding validity 
for the Christian because it remains the Word of God and 
the will of God. 
It is no small task to synthesize Luther's 
prophetic insights into an effective format for the 
instruction of the church. How does one structure 
178LC Preface:9. 
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Luther's theology against those who disproportionately 
emphasize one aspect of his teaching over another or 
against others who play off one statement against 
another. It was Melanchthon's often avowed intention to 
remain faithful to God's Word and Luther's teaching as he 
created a dogmatic synthesis that would preserve the 
Scriptural insights of the reformation and refute the 
distortions of its theology by other evangelicals and by 
its opponents. Whether he was successful in the 
implementation of this intention remains the focus of this 
study. His synthesis in the Loci and other writings 
regarding forensic justification, the third use of the 
Law, and regenerate free will becomes the next topic of 
study. 
CHAPTER IV 
FORENSIC JUSTIFICATION, THIRD USE OF THE LAW, 
AND REGENERATE FREE WILL 
IN MELANCHTHON (1532-1535) 
The relationship of faith to love, justification 
to good works, stood at the heart of the controversy 
between the evangelicals and Rome. That relationship 
received classical formulation in the Confession made at 
Augsburg (1530) and in its Apology (1531). Article IV, 
"On Justification," follows immediately brief articles on 
the Holy Trinity, original sin, and the person and work of 
Jesus Christ. Summarizing who God is, what man has 
become, and what Christ has done for mankind, Melanchthon 
follows immediately with a description of how man is 
restored to God by grace, through faith, for the sake of 
Christ. Men cannot be justified before God, "by their own 
strength, merits or works," but "are freely justified for 
Christ's sake, through faith. . e.1 "This faith God 
imputes for righteousness in his sight."2 The 
righteousness God requires of man is the righteousness God 
`AC, IV, 1-2. 
2AC, IV, 3. 
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imputes to man through faith in Jesus Christ. The verb 
imputare stresses the "otherness" of the righteousness 
which now characterizes regenerate man. It is not his 
own. It is not from works. It is the righteousness of 
another who is himself righteous and has acted on behalf 
of mankind. 
Although imputare had been used previously by 
Melanchthon in the negative with reference to the 
"non-imputation of sin," the positive use of imputare in 
the Augsburg Confession would be expanded in the Apology 
and especially in the Romans Commentary to emphasize the 
forensic nature of justification and the imputation of the 
righteousness of Christ. In the Augsburg Confession, 
however, it is faith in Christ which is imputed (imputare) 
for righteousness, a use of imputare which does not differ 
from the use of reputare (to repute or account righteous) 
which had been commonly used prior to this time. Man is 
accounted or reputed righteous for Christ's sake through 
faith. 
Righteousness before God is a gift. God is 
active; man is passive. The faith which passively accepts 
the righteousness of God in Christ, however, actively 
seeks to do God's will. Faith "is bound to bring forth 
good works, . . . it is necessary to do good works 
commanded by God."3 Faith acting in love to the 
3AC, VI, 1. 
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neighbor is a necessary consequence to faith which depends 
upon the righteousness of Christ. Good works do not merit 
justification before God, "for forgiveness of sins and 
justification are apprehended by faith. . . ."4 One 
notes that faith (fides) here is used in opposition to 
works to underscore the divine monergism of justification, 
and not primarily to express the nature of faith as that 
which trusts (fiducia) in the righteousness of Christ. As 
Melanchthon in the Apology and in the Romans Commentary 
begins to utilize imputare to express the imputation of 
the alien righteousness of Christ, he also utilizes 
fiducia to express the personal relationship which 
characterizes the believer's confidence that Christ's 
righteousness is his own by God's acceptance and favor. 
The article on justification and the theology of 
justification found in the Augsburg Confession were 
attacked by the Roman party in its Confutation issued 
slightly more than a month after the Diet at Augsburg. 
The Confutation agreed that, "our works of themselves have 
no merit, but that God's grace makes them worthy of 
eternal life."' This Roman position manifestly differed 
from that of the evangelicals: 
4AC, VI, 2. 
'Confutatio Pontificia, in Johann Michael Reu, 
The Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources (Chicago: 
Wartburg Publishing House, 1930), part II, p. 350. 
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if anyone should intend to disapprove of the merits 
that men acquire by the assistance of divine grace, he 
would agree with the Manichaeans rather than with the 
Catholic Church. For it is entirely contrary to Holy 
Scripture to deny that our good works are 
meritorious.6  
The sola gratia of the evangelical party is denied in 
favor of the fides formata (faith formed by love). 
In defending Article IV of the Augsburg  
Confession, Melanchthon in the Apology speaks more 
extensively concerning justification in its relation to 
renewal and good works. The real issue remains the need 
to express the biblical teaching that men are justified 
only by grace through faith on account of Christ: 
because of Christ by faith itself we are truly 
accounted righteous or acceptable before God. And to 
be justified means to make unrighteous men righteous or 
to regenerate them, as well as to be pronounced or 
accounted righteous.' 
In his defense of the evangelical position Melanchthon 
gives rise to what Otto Ritschl in a famous essay has 
termed "Der doppelte Rechtfertigungsbegriff in der 
Apologie der Augsburgischen Confession."8 The ambiguity 
6Reu, pp. 350-51. 
'Ap, IV, 72. 
80tto Ritschl extensively examines the 
distinction between Gerechtmachens and Gerechtsprechens in 
his article, "Der doppelte Rechtfertigungsbegriff in der 
Apologie der Augsbugischen Konfession" (Zeitschrift fuer  
Theologie and Kirche, 20 [1910]: 292-338). Ritschl 
maintains that a careful distinction between these two 
concepts would be a misunderstanding of Melanchthon, who 
made no such distinction. Melanchthon's point is that no 
quality in man originated man's relationship with God. 
Edmund Schlink (Theology of the Lutheran Confessions, 
145 
of the texts suggests that Melanchthon did not intend to 
distinguish what has come to be identified as "forensic" 
or "effective" vocabularies of justification. To impose 
such distinctions on Melanchthon in the Apology is 
trans. Paul Koehneke and Herbert J. A. Bouman, 
[Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1961], pp. 90-116) includes 
a helpful summary of the literature on the subject. 
Citing the research of Eichorn and Thieme, Schlink 
contends that "to be declared righteous is the same as to 
be made righteous and vice versa." "'Justum effici  
regenerari, vivificari' are other terms for 'iustum 
reputari, remissionem accipere, Deo acceptum esse,' but 
one and the same event takes place" (p. 94, fn. 13). 
Holsten Fagerberg (A New Look at the Lutheran Confessions  
[1529-1537], trans. Gene J. Lund [St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1972], pp. 149-155) understands iustos  
effici and iustos reputari to be complementary terms which 
support the one sustained idea of Apology IV, that faith 
alone justifies. With careful use of sources, Fagerberg 
comes to the conclusions that, "The righteousness of 
Christ imputed to man forms the basis of the forensic 
declaration of justification" (p. 155). Michael Rogness 
in his Reformer Without Honor: Philip Melanchthon  
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1969) contends 
that Melanchthon never thought in the alternatives put 
forth by the later debate. Had he intended to outline two 
doctrines of justification, he would have done so. "The 
truth of the matter is that for him, 'to be righteous' was 
the same as 'to be pronounced righteous.' . . . The key to 
understanding this is Melanchthon's use of the word 
'regeneration.' He thought of regeneration and 
vivification . . . in terms of their literal meanings in 
Latin. . . . This is precisely what justification does: 
trusting in Christ, our sins are forgiven, we are 
reconciled and accepted by God, who imputes Christ's 
righteousness to us and pronounces us righteous. This is 
our justification and our regeneration." (pp. 114-115) 
Vinzenz Pfnuer (Einig in der Rechtfertigungslehre?  
[Wiesbaden: Fran Steiner Verlag, 1970], pp. 169-181) gives 
extensive treatment to the question of the two 
descriptions of justification. He concludes that the 
iustum reputari is not an isolated term for Melanchthon, 
but is understood in the context and under the assumption 
of iustum effici (p. 181). It is an oversimplification to 
contend that iustum effici represents the Catholic 
position and iustum reputari represents the Lutheran 
position. Rather, Melanchthon does not wish to make a 
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anachronistic. In fact, Melanchthon expresses the 
evangelical theology of justification in both ways. In 
places, he uses a vocabulary consonant with an "effective" 
or "analytic" concept of justification. 
Therefore we are justified by faith alone, justi-
fication being understood as making an unrighteous man 
righteous or effecting his regeneration.' 
by faith alone we receive the forgiveness of sins for 
Christ's sake, and by faith alone are justified, that 
distinction between being justified and becoming 
justified, but between justification as beginning, a one 
time act, and justification as a continuing act. 
Melanchton's concern is to maintain that forgiveness is 
God's act, not man's, and he wishes to affirm man's 
continuing need for forgiveness after rebirth (p. 178). 
For Melanchthon, faith, Christ, being reputed righteous 
and being made righteous are all bound together (pp. 
180-181). Horst Georg Poehlmann also looks at 
Melanchthon's concept of justification in the context of 
the Roman-Lutheran debate (Rechtfertigung [Guetersloh: 
Gueterslohe Verlagshaus, 1971], pp. 28-30, 320-323). 
Poehlmann understands Article IV of the Apology to stand 
or fall on its christological base, and contends that 
Melanchthon must be understood in this context. 
Justification is the center of theology and Christ is the 
center of justification. Melanchthon has made synonyms of 
justificare, salvare, and regerari because his concern is 
always justification for the sake of Christ, for the honor 
of Christ (p. 28). Poehlmann contends that Melanchthon's 
concept of justification is paradoxical: a vivificari and 
a pronuntiari, a regerari and a reputari, an effici and an 
accipere remissionem. Being declared righteous and being 
made righteous are not two events in Melanchthon's 
theology, but two sides of one event. It is not a being 
spoken righteous and then being made righteous, but rather 
a being spoken righteous and with it a being made 
righteous (p. 321). The conflict between the forensic and 
effective elements in justification is a paradox (p. 322). 
Regeneration is identical with justification, being 
understood as Christ dwelling in the Christain (p. 323). 
9Ap, IV, 78. 
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is, out of righteousness we are made righteous and 
regenerated men." 
Melanchthon's focus is on the gracious gift of forgive-
ness and acceptance by which one is justified by grace, 
through faith, for Christ's sake. As a document asserting 
the historic continuity of evangelical teaching with that 
of the church catholic, the Apology utilizes a vocabulary 
consonant with Augustinianism while expressing also the 
distinctive Pauline emphasis on justification as a 
forensic declaration. Later in Apology IV, when 
Melanchthon does define justification in its biblical 
context, he speaks in forensic terms. 
"to be justified" . . . does not mean that a wicked man 
is made righteous, but that he is pronounced righteous 
in a forensic way, just as in the passage, "the doers 
of the Law will be justified.sell 
Later, Melanchthon affirms in the same vein, 
In this "justify" is used in a judicial way to mean "to 
absolve a guilty man and pronounce him righteous," and 
to do so on account of someone else's righteousness, 
namely Christ's, which is communicated through faith. 
Since in this passage our righteousness is the 
imputation of someone else's righteousness, we must 
speak of righteousness in a different way here from the 
philosophical or judicial investigation of man's own 
righteousness, which certainly resides in the will." 
Philosophical virtue and external morality ("man's own 
righteousness") lie within the framework of man's ability 
'°Ap, IV, 117. 
"Ap, IV, 252. 
"Ap, IV, 306. 
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to choose. In this he has free will. Melanchthon's 
concern here, however, is with the spiritual righteousness 
of the sinner before God. This righteousness is not the 
product of man's action based in free choice, but "is the 
imputation of someone else's righteousness. . 
Recognizing that the righteousness of a Christian 
is the imputed righteousness of Christ Himself does not 
mean indifference about the life of the regenerate. Jus-
tification as the "imputation of someone else's righteous-
ness" cannot be separated from the new life of 
sanctification which is to characterize the Christian. 
After we have been justified and regenerated by faith, 
therefore, we begin to fear and love God, to pray and 
expect help from him, to thank and praise him, and to 
submit to him in our afflictions. Then we also begin 
to love our neighbor because our hearts have spiritual 
and holy impulses." 
Justification and regeneration describe the same divine 
activity on man's behalf." Although Melanchthon uses 
"Ap, IV, 125. 
1 
4On Melanchthon's identification of justifi-
cation with regeneration, Rogness writes: "This is our 
justification and our regeneration. Being justified 
before God, we are made alive again. . . .' It is not 
something altogether apart from us, for it has a profound, 
transforming effect within us. In this context 
Melanchthon could write, 'Justification is regeneration.' 
This is not to say that justification includes the good 
works which followed. . . . But it is not separated from 
good works either, because this regeneration and vivifying 
effect of justification was both reconciliation and 'the 
beginning of our renewal.' For him this regeneration was 
the rebirth from which works flowed. . . . Though 
Melanchthon might have opened the door to a more abstract 
concept of justification with the terms 'pronounce' and 
'impute,' he apparently did not intend to make it less 
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temporal terms to distinguish justification from renewal, 
as in the citation of Apology, IV, 125, above ("After . . 
. we begin . . . then. . . .") his purpose is not to 
provide a chronological ordo salutis which would separate 
renewal from justification, but rather he would "properly" 
distinguish justification from renewal, justification 
being the necessary antecedent for renewal, and renewal 
the necessary consequence of justification. Melanchthon 
makes this point in his article on penitence: 
we put into penitence the parts that properly belong to 
it in conversion or regeneration and the forgiveness of 
sin. Worthy fruits as well as punishments follow 
regeneration and the forgiveness of sin. We have put 
these two parts in order, to emphasize the faith that 
we require in penitence." 
Thus, "to be pronounced righteous" and "to be made 
righteous" have ultimately the same meaning for 
Melanchthon in the Apology. However, the vocabulary of 
forensic justification eliminates the Law-Gospel confusion 
of scholasticism by making the non-imputation of sin and 
the imputation of the righteousness of Christ received 
through faith, the basis of Christian renewal. 
Therefore we reject the Pharisaic opinions of our 
opponents that we do not receive the forgiveness of 
sins by faith but merit it by our love and works, 
and that we ought to set our love and works against 
than something effective within the believer by drawing a 
curtain between it and the restoration of good works." 
Rogness, pp. 115-116. 
'5Ap, XII, 58. 
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the wrath of God. This is a teaching of the Law and 
not of the Gospel, to imagine that a man is justified 
by the Law before being reconciled to God through 
Christ. . . . 16  
Melanchthon's careful distinction between Law and gospel 
provides the focus of his Romans Commentary the follow-
ing year. Here Melanchthon employs extensively a forensic 
vocabulary of justification and investigates exegetically 
the relationship of justification and the functions of the 
Law in explicating the theology of Saint Paul. 
Forensic Justification in the  
Romans Commentary (1532)  
The Romans Commentary develops the exegetical 
basis of the theology of justification and renewal 
formulated in the Augsburg Confession  and its 
Apology." Melanchthon divides Saint Paul's Epistle to 
the Romans into two parts: (1) a disputation on 
justification and (2) precepts of moral admonition. It is 
Paul's discussion of justification which is most important 
to the church because, "it contains the chief and proper 
locus of Christian doctrine; it teaches us of the proper 
office of Christ, of the remission of sins, of 
XII, 84. 
"In Ap IV, "On Justification," Romans is cited 
63 times. The Romans Commentary develops on an exegetical 
basis the insights regarding justification which are 
systematically expressed in the Ap. One result of this 
careful study of Pauline theology is a sharpening of the 
forensic vocabulary of justification which is to charac-
terize the theology of Melanchthon after 1532. 
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justification before God."" In this locus on 
justification the Gospel is properly discerned and 
distinguished from the teaching of philosophy, the Law, 
and Decalogue. Man cannot fulfil the Law. While the Law 
harangues about compassion it always adds a condition, 
that is, that it must be fulfilled. The Gospel continues 
to promise the forgiveness of sin and justification by 
grace. Perfect obedience to the Law is impossible and 
therefore cannot be a completion of the Gospel. "That 
indeed we would be accepted is not because of the 
implementation of the Law, but by the promise of Christ, 
on account of whom we please God, although we are 
unworthy."" 
In the first part of Romans Paul denies that man 
can satisfy the Law. All men are truly under the wrath of 
God and eternal punishment because human nature is corrupt 
and fights against the Law of God. Ignorance of God, 
contempt of God, doubt about God, hatred of God and other 
vices are inherent in human nature. Therefore man is not 
able to be just through the implementation of the Law. 
Certainty of reconciliation to God and justification 
before God cannot depend on a condition of human 
"Robert Stupperich, eds, Melanchthons Werke in 
Auswahl (Studienausgabe), 7 vols. (Guetersloh: Mohn and 
Co., 1953-present, 5:30. Hereafter this work will be 
cited as St.A. 
"St.A., 5:31. 
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worthiness, but only on the promise of God, who for the 
sake of Christ pronounces the sinner righteous. 
Righteousness is contingent on grace, not the Law.2°  
Later in the epistle Paul hands down precepts concerning 
good works. The Gospel preaches repentance and which good 
works are necessary, although those good works are not 
efficacious in making one righteous. Obedience under the 
Law is not a precondition of the Gospel, but the Gospel 
proclamation is a precondition to obedience. Christians 
are righteous following the remission of sins and are 
reputed righteous, that is, they are accepted by God.21  
Melanchthon begins his commentary with a 
Prolegomena de iustificatione in which he explains Paul's 
understanding of Law and Gospel and provides a definition 
of Pauline terms. There are two chief parts to Scripture: 
the Law and the promise of reconciliation. The Law 
requires perfect obedience. The Gospel is the promised 
mercy of God given for the sake of Christ. There would be 
no difference between the Law and Gospel if the promise of 
mercy depended on a condition of the Law. The Law teaches 
mercy and shows God to be merciful but adds a condition of 
its own: perfection. The Gospel offers free remission of 
sin and pronounces the sinner righteous and acceptable to 
God, although he has not satisfied the Law. 
2°Ibid. 
21St.A., 5:31-32. 
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Melanchthon distinguishes the biblical position 
from that of Rome, which teaches that men's sins are 
forgiven if they are sufficiently contrite. When this 
condition is added, however, one cannot but doubt whether 
he has the forgiveness of sins or pleases God. For this 
reason it is necessary that one know that what God has 
promised on account of Christ does not depend on an 
individual's repentance or works. The scholastic view 
"transforms the Gospel into Law."22 Moreover, when one 
speaks of the Law, it is necessary that one recognize that 
natural man is not truly obedient to the Law of God, which 
requires perfect obedience of the heart toward God. 
Therefore the opponents of Luther do not teach correctly 
when "they dream that men through their natural strength 
are able to satisfy the Law of God. . • • "23  Sin dare 
not be understood merely as a working against the Law. It 
is a natural corruption in which all mankind is born.24  
The theological method of Melanchthon is one of 
definition and epitomization. Having outlined the 
distinction between Law and Gospel in relation to the 
grace of God and human works, he now sets forth the 
definitions of justification, righteousness and faith that 
are operative in Paul's epistle. 
22St.A., 5:36. 
22St.A., 5:37. 
24St.A., 5:37-38. 
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Therefore Paul teaches of justification: The Gospel 
preaches repentance and accuses sin and offers 
forgiveness of sins and justification and eternal life 
to all, not for the sake of our worthiness or our works 
or habits or virtues, but through mercy on account of 
Christ. . . . By faith alone men are justified (sola  
fide homo iustificature).25  
To be justified properly signifies to be reputed 
righteous, that is, to be reputed accepted by God.26  
One notes the use of "Gospel" in its broad sense as 
incorporating both repentance and forgiveness of sins (in 
keeping with his earlier Visitation Articles, which 
occasioned the indignation of Agricola). This should not 
be read as indicating some confusion in Melanchthon's mind 
between what the Law is and what the Gospel is, but as 
explicating the necessity of the Law's work in accusing 
man of sin in order that the essential or proper work of 
the Gospel might be accomplished: reputing the sinner 
righteous and acceptable to God by grace, through faith, 
on account of Christ. 
In defining righteousness, Melanchthon 
distinguishes between the iustitia legis (righteousness of 
the Law, centering in man's obedience) and the imputatio  
iustitia (the imputation of another's righteousness, 
centering in the obedience of Christ imputed to men). The 
righteousness of the Law is one's voluntary obedience of 
the Law of God and includes both virtues and actions. It 
25St.A., 5:38-39. 
26St.A., 5:39. 
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is identical with philosophical righteousness. Imputed 
righteousness is the righteousness of Christ which accepts 
the sinner by grace alone and not for the sake of his own 
virtues, which are unworthy. Faith is trust (fiducia) in 
this promised mercy of God. Such faith is not merely an 
historical knowledge, but is properly an assenting to the 
divine promises of mercy, reconciliation and 
justification. For the sake of faith in Christ sinners 
are pronounced righteous. Faith which apprehends the 
grace of God becomes a principle or cause of all other 
virtues. While such new virtues ought to be effected in 
the Christian, only faith justifies. "Sola fide  
iustificamur."22  
There are three aspects to justification: the 
remission of sins, justification, and the gift of eternal 
life. Melanchthon emphasizes that Scripture is replete 
with testimonies affirming that the forgiveness of sins 
must depend on faith in Christ and not one's own merits or 
worthiness. For this reason, Melanchthon stresses the 
sola of grace and faith, although that term (sola) is 
offensive to the Roman party. The exclusive nature of 
faith must be maintained, "because consciences would be 
perpetually in doubt concerning the forgiveness of sins if 
it depended on a condition of our worthiness."28 Nor 
27St.A., 5:40-41. 
28St.A., 5:43. 
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does it follow that subsequent to the forgiveness of sins, 
sinners are pronounced righteous for the sake of their new 
virtues or works. Those who are justified are sons of God 
and coheirs with Christ having the gift of eternal life. 
In this life there ought to be Christian virtues because 
the Gospel preaches repentance and faith is not able to 
exist except in repentance. However, one must distinguish 
between the individual and his works. Even the works of 
the regenerate are far from the perfection of the Law, 
nevertheless, on account of Christ the regenerate are 
reputed to keep the Law.29 When the Gospel preaches 
repentance and reconciliation it offers eternal life, 
which encompasses both new life now in the Holy Spirit and 
eternal life forever with God. 
"Certainly it therefore requires good works and 
obedience toward God because eternal life is spiritual 
life and obedience toward God. . . . And the Holy 
Spirit is given for this, so that when we grow through 
the Word and are consoled, this new and heavenly life 
and obedience in us might be effected."" 
The Christian, although he is pleasing to God by 
grace through faith, will seek to keep the Law as an 
effect and consequence of his reconciliation with God. To 
be justified is to be pronounced righteous, pronounced as 
having righteousness. Therefore a man ought to have both 
a righteousness of faith and a righteousness of works. 
29St.A., 5:45. 
30St.A., 5:46. 
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"But this later righteousness, when it does not satisfy 
the Law is not to be judged to be righteousness, except 
that that person is now accepted in mercy by faith."31  
Melanchthon expands this theme in his commentary 
on Romans 12. "Those who are reborn in Christ are reputed 
righteous, not for the sake of their implementation of the 
Law, which follows renewal, but for the sake of Christ, by 
faith."32 The sacrifices which God requires in the New 
Testament are not those of money or ceremony, but the 
continuing effects of the Holy Spirit in the regenerate 
heart. Such spiritual works include all the works of the 
Decalogue: fear of God, belief in God, prayer, acts of 
kindness, confession, patience in afflictions, obedience 
to those who govern, and chastity. Because the New Testa-
ment offers the spirit of righteousness and eternal life, 
it requires such spiritual sacrifices. The gift of money, 
the use of ceremony, indeed, no work is valid ex opere  
operato, without fear of God and faith. Life in the 
Spirit grows through fear of God, prayer, faith, 
mortification of the flesh, patience, and love.33  
Those who are in Christ, although they sin, yet 
because they believe in Christ, remain in grace. They 
have the favor of God and nothing in them is condemned. 
31St.A., 5:49-50. 
32St.A., 5:283. 
33St.A., 5:290. 
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Commenting on Romans 8:1 Melanchthon notes that the text 
does not say, "There is no sin in those who believe," but 
there is no condemnation. This is because sin, which is 
present also in the believer, is forgiven and not imputed 
for the sake of Christ. Believers are reputed just, not 
for the sake of their previous implementation of the Law 
(indeed, they still have sin in the flesh) but for the 
sake of Christ.34  
In the fifth chapter of Romans Paul deals 
extensively with the consequences of justification. 
"Being justified by faith, we have peace with God through 
our Lord Jesus Christ" (Romans 5:1). The sentence may be 
understood as reflecting both the cause and the effect of 
justification. 
First he repeats the principal proposition of cause, 
that we are justified by faith. Then he adds the 
effect: we have peace with God, etc.35  
This is the principal proposition of the entire 
epistle," "that we might be certain that we are reputed 
righteous before God through mercy for Christ's sake, and 
not on account of our works or our virtues. . . ."37 In 
his examination of Romans 3:21 Melanchthon had previously 
affirmed that to be justified simply and properly means to 
34St.A., 5:226. 
35St.A., 5:156. 
36St.A., 5:98. 
37St.A., 5:99. 
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be reputed or pronounced righteous or accepted by God. 
Faith is trusting (fiducia) in the certainty of mercy. 
Therefore we are justified by faith. Melanchthon rejects 
the scholastic addition of formata to fide, that is, the 
proposition that we are justified by faith for the sake of 
love ("fide iustificatur propter dilectionem") because 
Paul clearly adds that faith does not depend on a 
condition of our love ("fidem non pendere ex conditione  
nostrae dilectionis").38  
It is in this context that Melanchthon argues in 
Romans 5:1 that the Christian is justified by faith alone. 
As long as consciences are angry against the judgment of 
God, they flee from God and hate God and they 
despair.39 The doubting conscience does not have 
peace. The scholastic notion of "satisfaction" and works 
undermines the certainty which comes only through the 
gracious mercy of God in Christ. Likewise, ". . . When 
scholars dispute concerning the forgiveness of sins they 
distinguish between the forgiveness of guilt and the 
forgiveness of penalty. . . " Melanchthon denies such 
distinctions, rejecting scholastic discussions of 
satisfaction and purgatory and maintaining that, 
in the forgiveness of sin there follows joy and peace 
toward God. Wherefore, there is not left the terrors 
38 Ibid. 
39St.A., 5:157. 
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of purgatory, but faith, when it accepts the forgive- 
ness of guilt and encourages and revives consciences 
terrified by guilt.40  
Eternal death is abolished, not by our satisfactions, but 
by the victory of Christ. Afflictions are part of the 
Christian life and they come from God but they are 
mitigated by God for the sake of repentance and faith, 
"without the authority of the church or the loosening of 
the church."'" It is therefore through faith in Christ 
that the Christian has access to God (Romans 5:2). 
Scholastics teach much about works; about faith, they have 
nothing to say. But it is faith which apprehends the 
promise of God in Christ. The grace of God is not a 
quality or a gift infused in man, but the favor of God, 
"the remission of sin and the imputation of righteousness 
and the effecting of new virtues in us."42  
The Christian glories in hope although burdened by 
sin. Christ promises eternal life, that is, new and per-
fect righteousness. "But it appears somewhat distant in 
those who believe. Not only are they held back by death 
and other calamities, but sin also adheres in them."'" 
Nevertheless, Melanchthon finds consolation in Saint 
4 
°St.A., 5:158. 
41 Ibid. 
4 
2St.A., 5:159. 
4 
 2Ibid. 
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Paul's understanding of righteousness, not as the 
consequence of human effort, but as the effect of divine 
monergism. 
Above he has said that we are now righteous, but he 
understands righteous not as a quality in us, but as 
relative to being accepted by God. . . . 
Although Christians do not have completely new lives, 
they have a gift . . . a hoping that God is glorified 
in us. Certainly we know we eagerly seek eternal life 
and a new nature, in which there is no sin, although 
meanwhile we carry around an obnoxious nature in sin 
and death.44  
The Christian is accepted by God, "but we are also foul, 
and we await perfect renewal." 
Although renewal begins in this life, however, since 
sin always adheres in us, the conscience is established 
in us so that we know we are righteous, not for the 
sake of renewal, that is a quality in us, but through 
mercy. . . . What sort of renewal is this? To the 
extent we have renewal and life, to that extent we have 
faith. Wherefore we hold and exercise faith by mercy 
and at the same time, also renewal grows. But in those 
with great and horrible terrors, when the conscience 
knows the magnitude of sin and the wrath of God, the 
work is this, by consolation, that he is clearly 
righteous that is, we are accepted, not for the sake of 
our renewals but for the sake of Christ." 
Even death and other calamities are glorious for the 
Christian, for he knows they are not designed for his 
ruin, but for his health. Afflictions cannot happen 
without the counsel and will of God and God calls 
Christians through these afflictions to repentance so that 
"we are cheered up and call upon him." By this alien work 
44St.A., 5:159-60. 
45St.A., 5:160. 
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of God he afflicts and terrorizes, so that he may save and 
serve. 
When, therefore, we believe this to be the purpose of 
afflictions, not that we are ruined, but that we may 
seek mercy, then afflictions are good and gifts and 
signs, not of wrath, but of grace." 
By faith the Christian expects and receives help from God 
in all these afflictions, not doubting God but loving God 
in patient submission. 
In explicating the text of Romans 5 Melanchthon 
distinguishes between "philosophical patience" and 
"Christian patience." Philosophical patience is "obedience 
of a kind to reason without hope or faith in the mercy and 
help of God." Christian patience consists of obedience and 
faith. It trusts in the mercy of God and demonstrates 
faith as it patiently tolerates afflictions.47 The 
Christian thus lives in hope, "which is a certain, 
continuing trust and expected event," based in the promises 
of God. "So that the conscience would be certain, we 
understand that faith and hope do not have their cause in 
our dignity, but rather in the divine promise." The object 
of faith and hope is not the quality or virtue of the 
individual, but the love of God. 
Wherefore it is held that the object of faith and hope 
is not our qualities, not our virtues, but the love of 
46St.A., 5:162. 
47St.A., 5:163. 
48St.A., 5:164. 
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God toward us shown in certain and infallible 
promises. 49  
Through faith and hope the Holy Spirit prepares to move in 
the hearts of the pious beginning a life of joy and peace 
of conscience.5°  
Romans 5:6-9 affords Melanchthon an opportunity to 
treat of the relationship of Law and grace. "The chief 
question of the conscience concerning the will of God," he 
asserts, "is whether God loves us and whether he is in 
fact angry."51 The answer to that question lies in the 
sacrifice of Christ. "Christ's death is neither from a 
debt nor in any way for the sake of himself."52 With 
the comparison of Christ and Adam in verses twelve to 
nineteen, Saint Paul touches on the three chief points of 
Christian doctrine regarding God's wrath and his love; 
these topics are sin, Law, and grace. 
Paul's theology does not support scholastic 
distinctions. When Paul speaks of original sin here he 
does not distinguish between the "names" original and 
actual sin, because "simultaneously they are completed as 
basis and fruit, namely a total sin, a corruption of 
49St.A., 5:166. 
50St.A., 5:167. 
51Ibid. 
52St.A., 5:168. 
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nature and a fruit of the corruption of nature."3  
Reason cannot comprehend the filth inherent in natural man 
or the horrible power of sin inherent within man's nature 
(including ignorance of God, contempt for God, and hatred 
for God). Basing their view in philosophy and ignoring 
Christian doctrine, scholastics affirm that sin is not sin 
unless it is voluntary. On the other hand, it is the 
teaching of Scripture that the strength of body and soul 
are so corrupted that man is not able to obey or satisfy 
the law of God. 
Original righteousness is not imputed or approbated to 
man, but is an integrity of man by which body and soul 
were able to obey truly the Law of God. But after the 
fall of Adam natural man spoiled this integrity. This 
ruin followed the corruption so that now natural man of 
himself neither truly believes God nor truly fears nor 
is able to love God, but he understands and loves the 
good subjects of the senses. He is ignorant and 
contemptuous of God; he flees from God and has hatred 
for the judgment of God. He trusts in temporal things 
and does not trust God. This sickness has not lessened 
nor is it a fickle kind of stupidity, but it is a 
horrible impulse of the soul and body against the Law 
of God.54  
This corruption makes it impossible for man to do the 
Law of God. 
Although reason in the things subject to it (the things 
which are subject to the senses) is able to do the 
civil and external works of the Law, nevertheless in 
man there is horrible ignorance of God, contempt and 
hatred for God.55  
53St.A., 5:170. 
54St.A., 5:171. 
55St.A., 5:172. 
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Those who would lessen or disregard the doctrine 
of original sin also undermine the doctrine of grace. 
Melanchthon identifies scholastic teaching with that of 
the Pelagians, who imagine that a man of his own natural 
strength is able to satisfy the Law and to obey the Law 
of God and that the concupiscence of man can be lessened 
by right will. "This they call tinder and do not teach it 
to be sin, but scarcely the punishment of original 
sin."" For Paul original sin is truly sin. This is 
the testimony of the whole of Scripture. Because the 
scholastics do not understand sin, they cannot understand 
justification as the imputation of righteousness. 
Plainly the scholastics' judgment is preposterous. 
Justification in the Gospel is the imputation of 
righteousness even if there is an inherent fault in 
nature, because the Gospel pronounces us righteous for 
the sake of Christ and not for the sake of our own 
virtues. Original sin as a thing in itself is not 
imputed, but is a fault in our own nature, fighting 
with the Law of God. But the scholastics teach against 
original sin that it is by imputation; righteousness in 
the Gospel they deny to be an imputation of righteous-
ness and they teach that by our own virtues we are 
pronounced righteous before God. See, reader, the 
scholastics invert the doctrine of Law and Gospel. 
They do this not only in this controversy, but in many 
others.57  
Melanchthon recognizes that many clever men laugh 
at this evangelical understanding of original sin. 
However, these men do not mock the evangelicals, but 
Scripture itself. ". . . This is the proper, simple, 
understanding of Scripture concerning original sin that we 
56St.A., 5:175. "St.A., 5:176. 
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follow." Moreover this interpretation has the testimony 
of church fathers and other knowledgeable teachers of the 
church.58  
Sin is no slight defect in man that can be cor-
rected by right reason and resolution of the will, but is 
something worthy of the wrath of God and his condemna-
tion." Man's reason blindly fails to recognize that 
death is the consequence of sin and not merely a natural 
phenomenon. Therefore Melanchthon rejects "those who dis-
pute that original sin damns no one, although it is a 
condition of mortality. . . .n60 Original sin fights 
against the whole Law of God, offers death, and brings 
eternal damnation unless it is conquered by trust in the 
benefits of Christ. 
In commenting on Romans 5:13-15 Melanchthon 
develops his understanding of the Law and of its function 
for both believer and unbeliever. Sin is not abolished by 
the Law. Only the Gospel can accomplish this. What then 
is the profit of the Law? Briefly, it accuses sin. 
Through the Law comes recognition of sin. Not if the 
law, however, accuses sin, certainly it is not 
abolished but aggravated so that it terrifies us, 
judges us, and condemns us, driving us to death." 
58St.A., 5:176-77. 
59St.A., 5:177. 
60St.A., 5:178. 
61St.A., 5:180. 
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The Law does not console the sinner; it does not revive 
the conscience burdened with death, but it oppresses the 
sinner with infinite terrors. The Gospel alone abolishes 
death because through Christ the resurrection is promised 
to all believers. The Gospel alone lifts up and consoles 
and brings new life to men. Thus the Law must be 
understood as the antithesis to the grace of God, as in 
the antithesis Saint Paul draws between those who are 
children of Adam and those who are reborn in Christ. In 
Adam all men are accused. In Christ, all who believe are 
pronounced righteous." This is God's gracious act 
(Romans 5:15). 
"Grace" continually means for the Hebrews: forgiveness, 
mercy, favor, to be pleased, as has been said, gracious 
acceptance. This is the appropriate and most true 
interpretation of the word grace. Therefore grace 
ought to be understood as acceptance, as mercy, as the 
benevolence of God toward us, and it ought not be 
understood as a quality or virtue of our own toward 
God. Grace is completed by these two things: for-
giveness of sin and the imputation of righteousness.63  
What is "given through grace" is the gift of the Holy 
Spirit and eternal life. 
Now the Gospel at the same time offers in the for-
giveness of sins the Holy Spirit, who through faith is 
accepted. When the conscience is stirred up and 
consoled, he prepares new impulses and new life." 
Thus, both justification as a forensic proclamation and 
62St.A., 5:182. 
63St.A., 5:185. 
"Ibid. 
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renewal as the bestowal of the Holy Spirit undergird the 
monergism of divine grace. 
Although sin continues "to adhere in our nature," 
it does not invalidate the gift of grace because it is the 
pronouncement of another's righteousness. 
To such a degree Christ has power over the reign of sin 
so that grace covers up present sin. . . . The renewed 
are pronounced righteous not for the sake of the 
implementation of the Law, but for the sake of Christ, 
although nature continues to contain faults." 
The promise of the Gospel is that grace abounds over sin. 
"Christ is far greater and has overcome the universal 
reign of sin."66 Christian consolation rests not in 
one's own obedience or good works, but in the Gospel 
promise, that "we are pronounced righteous by the merits 
of another, because of Christ, and not because of our own 
virtues."' 
Romans 5:18-20 occasions an excursus on the nature 
of the Law itself. There are two functions of the Law. 
The first is the civil function which coerces man by 
external discipline to obedience. Such external 
righteousness merits physical rewards in this life. 
Disobedience brings punishment in this life and in the 
next. Melanchthon identifies this Law with "the Law of 
morals or the universal philsophy of morals, in so far as 
"St.A., 5:189. 
"Ibid. 
67St.A., 5:190. 
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it follows right reason."" This "natural judgment" is 
divinely instituted and arises not only in the mind of 
many but as "a divinely imparted light." That human 
philosophy and right reason may attain to such natural Law 
does not lessen "that they are the Law of God, just as the 
Decalogue in the divine Scriptures, and plainly the same 
still continue as Law, since God inscribed them earlier in 
the mind of men."" 
The other function of the Law is spiritual. "It 
shows sin; it accuses and terrifies consciences with the 
judgment of God." This is a Law no one satisfies, for no 
one fears and loves God with his whole heart. Not only 
does the Law not console human hearts, but it does not 
reconcile men to God. Indeed, the Law only increases sin 
and enmity against God. But this does not leave the 
Christian without comfort. 
We can have as much sin as we please, however, we know 
grace, mercy, to be more productive. We do not allow 
the magnitude of sin to oppress us or to conquer the 
glory of the mercy of Christ. We would not imitate the 
voice of Cain who said, "My sin is greater than I am 
able to bear." But we oppose that voice with this 
sentence, "Where sin abounds, there grace abounds more." 
Grace reigns through righteousness to life eternal; 
that is, through mercy at the same time we are reputed 
righteous and we are given life eternal, not for the 
sake of our virtues, but for the sake of Christ. Here 
you see clearly the conjunction of justification and 
eternal life so that we certainly know eternal life is 
given through the forgiveness of sins, and if it is 
68St.A., 5:192. 
"Ibid. 
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given not because of our worthiness or merits, but for 
the sake of Christ, then it is necessary that it be 
grasped." 
As an evangelical theologian and a northern 
European humanist, Melanchthon brought together both the 
biblical insights of the Lutheran reformation and the 
considerable skills of a pilologist to his study of Saint 
Paul's Roman epistle. Theologically, Melanchthon began 
his study recognizing that Saint Paul cannot be understood 
properly apart from a careful distinction of Law and 
Gospel. This distinction Melanchthon found self-evident 
in Saint Paul's formulation of justification as a forensic 
declaration by which the righteousness of Christ is 
imputed to the penitent sinner. Utilizing the Greek text 
in the best edition then available (the Novum Testrumentum 
of Erasmus) Melanchthon sought to elucidate Saint Paul 
according to the clear and simple meaning of the 
text.'" In this Melanchthon was willing to utilize the 
insights of Augustine and earlier church fathers, but he 
"St.A., 5:196-97. 
71In a chapter entitled "The Perspicuity of 
Scripture," Peter Fraenkel characterizes Melanchthon's 
doctrine as including, ". . . its absolute purity of 
doctrine and its absolute antiquity; the direct vocation 
of the authors; the 'incarnation' of the Gospel in 
authoritative human statements in which God is the 
speaking subject. . . . They have been written down by 
the commandment of God and more particularly in view of 
the certainty, permanence and security which belong to the 
written word." Peter Fraenkel, Testimonia Patrum: The  
Function of the Partistic Argument in the Theology of  
Philip Melanchthon (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1961), p. 
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was unwilling to compromise the text to accommodate 
theological traditions and scholastic perceptions not in 
accord with the Word of God.72  
The Romans Commentary accents Law and Gospel as 
the central doctrines of Christianity. Departing from 
Saint Thomas Aquinas and later scholasticism, Melanchthon 
understood Saint Paul to utilize the terms Law and Gospel 
not as complementary messages by which man accomodates 
himself to God through an infusion of grace and a 
perfection of his own qualities, but as antithetical 
messages of judgment and promise by which man is accused 
of sin by the Law and made righteous by grace through 
faith in the imputation of Christ's righteousness. A 
biblical understanding of justification necessarily 
excludes all human merit and worthiness and affirms the 
monergism of divine acceptance by which the righteousness 
of Christ is imputed to those who trust only in the mercy 
of God. 
Scholastic theology, on the other hand, reflects 
both an inadequate view of the Law and a disregard for 
208. "A close corollary of this emphasis on certainty is 
that on the perspicuity of Scripture which after all is 
nothing more than the fact that God lets us know with 
certainty the Scripture's import and meaning. . . ." 
(Fraenkel, p. 209). 
"An extended treatment of this theme is found 
in Melanchthon's De ecclesia et de autoritate verbi Dei  
written in 1539. For a discussion of this writing, see 
chapter V, pp. 217-20. 
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Paul's forensic theology of justification by grace through 
faith. Original sin is not merely imputed to man. Man is 
sinful in himself; incapable of loving God and incapable 
of doing God's will. Melanchthon's emphasis is on the 
wholeness of sin: sin as reflecting the complete 
alienation of man from God. Sin reflects not only the 
"actual" doings of the sinner, but the "origin" of sin in 
man's rebellion against God, in his failure to love and 
trust in God above all else. Righteousness cannot come by 
the Law because natural man cannot love God and in 
consequence cannot keep God's Law perfectly. 
If man is to be righteous before God, it can only 
be through the non-imputation of man's sin and the 
imputation of Christ's righteousness. Stressing that 
man's righteousness is not his own but is the 
righteousness of another, Melanchthon consistently 
utilizes the verb imputare. Man is reputed or accounted 
righteous (reputare) by grace through faith. But how? 
Imputare stresses the forensic nature of justification. 
The righteousness of the regenerate is the imputed 
righteousness of Christ himself. Justification is not a 
divine fiction by which God ignores the sin of man and 
declares the unrighteous to be righteous. The penalty of 
sin is death and man is justified by death:" The grace 
73Werner Elert, Lowell C. Green, and Arthur Karl 
Piepkorn all note significantly that the word justifi-
cation does not imply for St. Paul or for sixteenth 
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of God is that favor of God by which He is willing to 
accept the death of His Son as payment for the Law's 
curse. The righteous dies for the ungodly in order that 
the ungodly may be declared righteous. The accusation of 
century thinking what it implies for twentieth century 
English speaking people, that is: innocence. "To be 
justified" in contemporary society implied that one has 
been falsely charged or accused or that there was "good 
reason" for a particular act. In sixteenth century 
Germany, "to be justified" denoted that one has received 
the due penalty of has act. No presumption of innocence 
is implied. "Saxon law could speak, for example, of 'the 
body of the person justified by the sword,' meaning 
thereby corpse, minus sword-severed head." Arthur Karl 
Piepkorn, Profiles in Belief, 3 vols. (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1978), 2: 62. Lowell C. Green cites Werner Elert 
similarly. "Werner Elert clarified this problem in the 
light of legal history. In the legal code of Luther's day 
the concept of justification was not applied at all to one 
who showed himself innocent of a crime. In sixteenth 
century German, justification '. . . denoted either the 
painful trial by ordeal, which might go so far to claim 
the life of the person being tried, or more commonly the 
carrying out of a penal sentence, especially the execution 
of the one convicted.' Elert noted that during the 
seventeenth century it was still common to speak of the 
expenses to the state for corporal punishment as the 
'coats of painful justification,' and that mention is made 
of '. . . the body of one justified with the sword.'" 
Lowell C. Green, How Melanchthon Helped Luther Discover  
the Gospel (Fallbrook, CA: Verdict Publications, 1980) p. 
206. See also Werner Elert, Der Christliche Glaube  
(Hamburg: Furche Verlag, 1956), pp. 459,470,472; and 
Werner Elert, "Deutschrechtliche Zuege in Luthers 
Rechtfertigungslehre," Zeitschrift fuer Systematische  
Theologie 12 (1934-35): 23-26; Robert C. Schultz, "Baptism 
and Justification." Una Sancta, 18 (Easter, 1960): 
11-14. It is with this understanding that Melanchthon 
writes in Apology IV, 305: "In this passage 'justify' is 
used in a judicial way to mean 'to absolve a guilty man 
and pronounce him righteous' and to do so on account of 
someone else's righteousness, namely, Christ's, which is 
communicated to us though faith." This opinion reflects 
St. Paul in many places: Romans 6:3-7; Romans 5; 
1 Corinthians 15, 2 Corinthians 5:21, Galatians 3:13. In 
light of the above, Green's summation is helpful. 
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the Law is satisfied by the death of Christ. The 
righteousness of Christ is given by grace to those who 
believe. Thus justification consists of both the 
non-imputation of sin and the imputation of the 
righteousness of Christ. For this reason Melanchthon 
frequently identifies justification with the forgiveness 
of sin (non-imputation of sin) and regeneration (the 
imputation of the righteousness of Christ and the bestowal 
of the Holy Spirit). He identifies grace with divine 
favor and acceptance. He identifies faith with trust 
(fiducia) in the promises of God. The scholastic 
distinction between fides  formata and fides  informata  is 
denied. The scholastic concept of grace as an infused 
quality (gratis infusa), of sin as merely concupisence, 
and of satisfaction (of the Law's penalty by penitence and 
works) are likewise rejected. They deny the sola qratia, 
sola fides of Scripture. 
Melanchthon affirms both a righteousness of the 
Law and a righteousness of God. Righteousness of the Law 
"Through the forensic declaration man is removed from the 
unjustified to the justified state. This is a profound 
change. However, justification means no outward change in 
the qualities of the individual. . . . Thus, justifi-
cation by imputation of alien righteousness need not be 
called a fiction, but something that actually takes place 
in the decision of God, something that alters the destiny 
of the individual. God regards him as a just person. For 
the sake of Christ God is pleased to regard the sinful 
self as purged. God reckons his faith to him for 
righteousness." Green, How Melanchthon Helped Luther  
Discover the Gospel, p. 208. 
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is not an imputed righteousness, but a righteousness of 
works, demanding perfection. The righteousness of God is 
the righteousness of another, imputed by grace through 
faith. Those who are righteous by grace through faith are 
not perfect according to the Law for they continue to 
sin. Nevertheless, by God's favor and acceptance, they 
remain in grace. The regenerate thus remain sinners while 
declared saints. But the regeneration of the sinner by 
the grace of God does result in a new man who lives in the 
Spirit of God. This man, reborn by grace through faith 
and the bestowal of the Holy Spirit, reflects the mercy of 
God in his life now. His heart moves in new ways. Faith 
which trusts in the favor of God becomes also the source 
of new virtues by which a man seeks to do that which 
pleases God. Good works are a necessary consequence of 
faith and reflect the effects of the Holy Spirit in the 
life of the regenerate. 
The Law of God is written in the minds of all men, 
although now obscured by rebellion against God and sin. 
This natural Law is identicel with the revealed Law of the 
Decalogue. Philosophers are capable of formulating morals 
based on the natural Law, although inadequately. What 
philosophy cannot discern is the spiritual function of the 
Law, which accuses man of failure to love God, trust God, 
or obey God. This discernment is available only to those 
who have received the Spirit of God by faith and who 
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recognize the enmity of God against sin, as revealed in 
the Scriptures. Consequently, only those in Christ can 
truly repent of sins and seek to do the will of God. For 
this reason Melanchthon frequently includes in the term 
Gospel not only the promises of God, but repentance as 
well. Repentance is an essential part of the life of the 
regenerate, who feel the accusation of the Law and 
trustingly turn to the favor of God, confident in the 
righteousness of Christ which is theirs through 
justification. 
Recognizing the civil or political function of the 
Law in governing the affairs of all men, and the spiritual 
or accusing function of the Law which brings recognition 
of sin and continuing dependence on the mercy of God in 
Jesus Christ, Melanchthon emphasizes the continuing 
validity of the Law for both regenerate and unregenerate. 
Moreover, when one recognizes that the spiritual function 
of the Law in bringing about repentance is essential to 
life in the Spirit of God (renewal), it is not surprising 
that Melanchthon should begin to emphasize the didactic 
function of the Law in training the regenerate in 
righteousness. 
By grace through faith, the First Table of the Law 
has become a divine indicative describing the believer's 
love of God, instead of a divine imperative accusing the 
sinner of rebellion against God and of failure to love and 
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trust God. The Law, of course, continues to accuse the 
regenerate of their sin. As Melanchthon notes regarding 
Romans 8:1, Paul does not say there is no sin in those who 
believe, but there is no condemnation. The regenerate, 
however, possessing the Spirit of God, are motivated to do 
the will of God, not from fear, but from love, not in 
order to justify themselves before God, but as fruits of 
the righteousness already imputed to them by grace. In 
the regenerate, then, the Law has a new function; not 
merely the civil ordering of human conduct, not only the 
spiritual accusation of sin, but that of a guide to those 
works which please God and reflect the indwelling of the 
Holy Spirit. The Law has nothing to do with the seeking 
of righteousness before God. Righteousness is already the 
possession of the regenerate whose sins are forgiven and 
to whom the righteousness of Christ is imputed. But in 
those who believe, the Law has to do with the effecting of 
righteousness as the fruit and consequence of faith 
itself. The Law does not motivate Christian obedience, 
but it reveals God's will. These insights into the nature 
and function of the divine Law become fixed in the second 
edition of the Loci (1535) and are subsequently described 
as the "third office of the Law." 
The Third Use of the Law in the Loci (1535)  
Fragmentary student notes of Melanchthon's lectures 
on the Loci (1535) "de lege Dei" add nothing to the 
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excursus on the Law in the Romans Commentary as summarized 
above." In 1535 Melanchthon himself published an 
expanded version of the Loci communes theologici. The 
extended locus de lege divina is subdivided into topics 
dealing with the division of the Law (Divisio legum), the 
Ten Commandments (Decalogus), the natural Law (De lege  
naturae), the uses of the Law (De usu legis divinae), the 
distinction between commandment and counsel (De discrimini  
praeceptorum et conciliorum), of poverty (De paupertate), 
and of chastity (De castitate). The first four subtopics 
contain Melanchthon's teaching concerning the Law as it 
relates to justification and renewal. The introduction to 
the topic de lege divina reiterates the text of the Romans  
Commentary and the lecture fragments recorded by 
Pommerani. The Law commands what one is to be, what one 
is to do, and what one is to omit in life. It requires 
perfect obedience to God and condemns those who do not 
present to God such perfect obedience. Melanchthon 
provides a catalogue of scholastic errors and Saint Paul 
is cited against these "pharisaical opinions." The Law of 
"These student notes from Pommerani are 
contained in Melanchthon's Corpus Reformatorum, 28 vols., 
compiled by Carol Bretschneider, ed. Henry Bindsell 
(Brunswig and Halis: C.A. Schwetschke and Son, 1842-1858), 
21: 253-332 and are listed as belonging to the second 
edition of the Loci although the second edition was not 
published until 1535. The locus de lege Dei in 
Pommerani's notes is found on pp. 294-95. Hereafter this 
work will be cited as CR. 
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God not only requires civil or external works, but perfect 
obedience toward God. It accuses not only actual sin, but 
man's inherent depravity. Unless one knows this, he is 
not able to understand the benefits of Christ:" 
In the first subtopic, Divisio lequm, Melanchthon 
distinguishes between natural law, divine Law, and human 
law, but it is with the divine or Mosaic Law that he is 
chiefly concerned. The Law of Moses contains moral Law, 
civil Law, and ceremonial Law, but only the moral Law 
appertains to all mankind. This is true, not because the 
Law was given by Moses, but because the moral Law 
(Decalogue) coincides with the natural Law, and because 
the moral Law is cited in the gospels as teaching 
spiritual righteousness and obedience toward God. The 
moral Law thus illustrates and interprets the natural Law. 
The two tables of the Decalogue are distinguished 
in that the First Table focuses on the spiritual nature of 
righteousness, and the Second Table teaches what one ought 
to do toward the neighbor (civil righteousness). Although 
Melanchthon instructs his reader in all the commandments, 
he emphasizes the First Table. The explanation to the 
First Commandment stresses the forensic nature of 
righteousness, that for the sake of Christ the Christian 
is pronounced righteous. Therefore the First Commandment 
75CR, 21:320. 
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is fulfilled by the imputation of the righteousness of 
Christ. Without the Gospel one is not able to keep the 
First Commandment, for one is not able to trust God 
without Christ. The Law itself always accuses and 
condemns. The highest and chief work of the First 
Commandment is to command an internal (spiritual) worship 
of God.76  
The Second Commandment teaches of external worship 
and of the effects of faith in the proper use of God's 
name. It requires prayer, acts of kindness, preaching of 
the Word of God, and confession. The Third Commandment 
relates to the external ceremonies of worship. The Word 
of God commands that ceremonies ought to be preserved 
which serve the ministry of the Word. They pertain to all 
mankind in all times and places so that the public 
ministry of the Word of God might be preserved." 
The Church of Rome distorts these commandments of God. It 
violates the First Commandment when it denies the natural 
corruption of man and fails to teach of faith (fiducia) 
which trusts in the gracious mercy of God. It violates 
the Second Commandment by destroying true prayer and 
worship in insisting on the idolatry of the mass and 
monasticism. It violates the Third Commandment when it 
76Ibid., p. 392. 
"Ibid., p. 392-95. 
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teaches that the perfunctory use of ceremonies merit the 
remission of sin ex opere operato without faith." 
The Second Table of the Mosaic Law pertains to 
those virtues which are necessary for society including 
obedience of civil authorities and of parents. All the 
promises of the Law are conditional, and it is only 
through the Gospel that, "when we are pronounced righteous 
by grace, through faith, for the sake of Christ that we 
are reputed to implement the law."'" Natural Law is the 
knowledge of the divine Law placed in human nature." 
This knowledge of divine Law has been obscured by original 
sin," nevertheless vestiges of this implanted knowledge 
remain, for the conscience testifies that there is a God 
who blesses righteousness and punishes unrighteousness.82  
It is under the title, De usu legis divinae, that 
Melanchthon introduces the threefold office of the Law. 
He begins this subtopic by reiterating what he has already 
established concerning the use of the Law. The Law of God 
requires the perfect obedience of human nature. But 
perfect obedience is not possible; consequently, man is 
"Ibid., p. 395. 
"Ibid., p. 398. 
81Ibid., p. 399. 
82Ibid., p. 400. 
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not righteous because of the Law, since sin always adheres 
in natural man. Under the subtitle Legis officia, 
Melanchthon sets forth the threefold office of the Law 
with regard to man's corrupt nature. The first office of 
the law is the civil office, which coerces human 
discipline and establishes a condition of peace in which 
the Gospel might be proclaimed. The second, proper, and 
principle office of the Law is to show sin, to accuse, 
terrify, and condemn sinful consciences. It is this 
function of the Law to which Melanchthon usually refers 
when describing the effect of the Law. Through the 
accusation of the Law the sinner is prepared to hear the 
gracious promises of the Gospel. The second office of the 
Law must be understood always in its relation to 
justification. 
The third office of the Law relates to the 
function of the Law in the lives of those who are 
justified in Christ and seek to do the will of God. 
The third office of the Law is in those who are 
righteous by faith, so that it might teach them of good 
works, seeking the works which please God. It commands 
certain works in which obedience toward God is 
exercised.83  
One notes that this office of the Law, like the first and 
second offices, is for those who continue to exist in the 
natural corruption of the flesh. All men are sinners. 
However, the third use of the Law pertains only to those 
83Ibid., p. 406. 
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sinners who are declared righteous by faith. The third 
use of the Law thus applies to sinners to whom the 
righteousness of Christ is imputed by grace. Melanchthon 
emphasizes the duality of the corrupt sinner who has been 
justified by faith when he continues, "although we are far 
from the Law as it pertains to justification, however, as 
it pertains to obedience, the Law remains. Justification 
is necessary in order to obey God."84 Those justified 
by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ begin in 
part to do the Law; they begin to be obedient. The nature 
of this obedience Melanchthon does not discuss at this 
point (under the locus, De lege divina) but only later 
under the locus, De bonis operibus, concerning good 
works. Between this discussion of the Law and the later 
discussion of good works, Melanchthon develops the meaning 
of the Gospel (De evangelio), grace and justification (De 
gratia et de iustificatione). 
Although the third function of the Law is an 
office of the Law and therefore included under the topic 
De lege divina it exists only for those who have received 
the promises of the Gospel, being justified by grace 
through faith. The third function of the Law is not to be 
understood in the scholastic sense as a fides formata, a 
faith formed by love, describing how man is justified 
before God. With regard to justification, the Law has 
84Ibid. 
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only one function: to accuse and condemn sin. But in 
those who are righteous by faith the Law teaches of good 
works which please God and of those works in which God 
commands obedience. Melanchthon thus distinguishes 
between the accusatory function of the Law and the 
function of the Law which teaches obedience. Only those 
reborn in Christ have imputed to them the righteousness of 
Christ and are capable of loving God. Only when a person 
is imputed righteous can he do works acceptable to God. 
The second function of the Law is necessary in 
order that a sinner might know his estrangement from God 
and seek forgiveness by grace through faith. The third 
function of the Law is a fruit and consequence of 
justification. Having the favor and acceptance of God 
already by grace through faith, the believer seeks 
instruction in the Word of God concerning those works 
which please God and by which he may exercise obedience in 
faith. Therefore the third office of the Law, while 
included under the locus concerning the Law, does not 
relate to the chief and proper use of the law (second 
office) which relates to justification, forgiveness, and 
the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. Rather, 
the third office of the Law relates to sanctification, 
good works, and the effects and fruits of the Holy Spirit 
within the hearts of believers. 
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The locus De bonis operibus underscores 
Melanchthon's emphasis on the centrality of justification 
understood as the divine favor of God and acceptance for 
the sake of Christ. Believers are not given eternal life 
for the sake of good works, but for the sake of Christ. 
"Good works" refers to the civil or external righteousness 
which reflects obedience to the Second Table of the Law, 
but more importantly, "good works" consist of the 
spiritual works of faith. Melanchthon affirms that, 
"obedience must follow reconciliation,"" but adds that 
it is not enough to teach that obedience is necessary for 
the Christian. One must also continually repeat that for 
the Christian also the Law never loses its proper and 
chief function of accusing sin, because ". . . no one is 
able to satisfy the Law."86  
"Obedience must follow reconciliation," but even 
for those reconciled to God in Christ perfect obedience is 
impossible. Nevertheless the believer's obedience is 
pleasing to God, although it is imperfect, because he is 
reconciled to God by faith. God does not abolish the Law 
by faith, but effects it so that he is pleased. "It is 
necessary, therefore, that the reconciliation of the 
person come first, and this is reconciliation . . . by 
faith, which is given, not for our worthiness, but through 
85Ibid., p. 429. 
p. 430. 
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mercy."87 Following reconciliation the works of the 
Christian truly please God and obedience follows, because 
he is in Christ. Thus, Melanchthon insists, "it is not 
for nothing that a person is distinguished from his 
works."88  
Good works are done then in the exercise of faith 
to the glory of Christ. Faith is especially exercised in 
prayer, repentance and the growth of confidence before God 
in the midst of dangers. Obedience is a fruit and effect 
of faith. The Law in its chief and proper use continues 
to show even regenerate man that he cannot keep the 
commandments of God. The Gospel promises that God will 
not look at the works of the believer, but at the faith of 
the believer who trusts in Christ and has received the 
imputation of the righteousness of Christ. 
Although the believer is imperfect and his works 
are imperfect, they are accepted by grace, through faith, 
and reputed good, for Christ's sake. Certain of 
reconciliation to God by grace and no longer seeking 
reconciliation through works, the believer willingly seeks 
to do that which pleases God and is commanded by God, not 
through the coercion of the Law but by the gift of the 
Holy Spirit. In this the Christian is instructed by the 
87Ibid., p. 431. 
88Ibid. 
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Law (the same Law that accuses sin), knowing that in 
Christ he is imputed righteous (although a sinner) and 
that eternal life has now already begun in him. The 
Christian trusts not in what he has done, but in what he 
has become, by grace, and in what he has received, through 
the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. The 
renewed heart of the Christian, once bound by sin, has 
been freed to choose those works which please God and are 
commanded by God. These three, the revealed Word of the 
Law, the efficacious power of the Holy Spirit, and the 
regenerate heart of the Christian enable the believer to 
live in obedience to the Law and in the fruits of the 
Spirit, to the glory of Christ. By grace, Christian 
obedience although imperfect has begun. 
Free Will in the "Loci" (1535)  
The first comprehensive statement of the 
evangelical church on the subject of free will was written 
by Melanchthon in his first edition of the Loci (1521).89  
Melanchthon maintains that since all things happen through 
necessity according to divine predestination, the human 
will (voluntas) is not free. Consequently there is no 
free choice (arbitriurn). Human reason affirms that there 
89St.A., 2, pt. I, pp. 8-16. English 
translation: Philip Melanchthon, "The Power of Man, 
Especially Free Will," Loci Communes Theologici in 
Melanchthon and Bucer, trans. Lowell J. Satre, ed. Willman 
Pauck (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), pp. 22-30. 
Hereafter cited "1521 Loci." 
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is free will in external things, "But Scripture tells 
nothing of that kind of freedom since God looks not at 
external works but at the inner disposition of the 
heart."9° The affections are not under the power of the 
will for by experience people discover that the will 
itself cannot control love, hate, or similar affections. 
Affections are able to be overcome only by more powerful 
affections. Since the will is itself the source of 
affections, Melanchthon opposes the scholastic teaching 
that the will (voluntas), "by its very nature opposes the 
affections or that it is able to lay an affection aside 
whenever the intellect so advises or warns."91  
Although one affection can overcome another 
affection, Melanchthon denies "that there is any power in 
man which can seriously oppose the affections."92 God 
requires purity of heart (in biblical language) or of the 
will (in philosophical language), therefore whatever 
freedom man may seem to have in external acts is of no 
importance, since man cannot control his own affections. 
When free will (voluntas) is related to predestination, 
there is no freedom in either external or internal 
activity, since all things take place according to divine 
90St.A., 2, pt. I, 13. "1521 Loci" p. 27. 
91Ibid.; Ibid. pt. 
92Ibid., p. 15; Ibid., p. 29. 
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determination. However, according to natural judgment, 
there seems to be a certain amount of freedom in external 
things. On the other hand, when the will is related to 
human affections, there is clearly no freedom, even to 
natural judgment, because "when an affection has begun to 
rage and seethe, it cannot be kept from breaking 
forth. 93 
In this first edition of the Loci Melanchthon is 
clearly deterministic. Free will in both external and 
internal activities is denied. In contradistinction to 
scholastic teaching (as seen in Aquinas, for example) it 
is denied that the intellect moves the will by presenting 
its object to it. The will is not capable of opposing the 
affections. Moreover, there is no free choice because the 
affections are not free. Melanchthon avoids using words 
like "reason" and "free will" choosing instead to speak of 
"the cognitive faculty" and "the faculty subject to the 
affections." 
In the locus on sin which follows immediately the 
locus on the will the question of free will and sinful 
affections are drawn closely together. Sin is "a depraved 
affection, a depraved activity of the heart against the 
Law of God."94 This depraved affection results from a 
93Ibid., p. 17; Ibid., p. 30. 
94Ibid., p. 18; Ibid., p. 31. 
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force within man driving him toward sin. There is no will 
in natural man to oppose this affection. However, "in 
those who have seen justified by the Spirit, good 
affections struggle with the bad. • • • n 9 5 Con-
sequently, Melanchthon denies the position of medieval 
scholasticism. 
What works of free will will you preach to us and what 
power of man? Do you not imagine that you are denying 
original sin when you teach that a man is able to do 
something good in his own strength? A bad tree cannot 
bring forth good fruit." 
The scholastics focus on external works and judge those 
works according to the letter of the Law. But God judges 
the heart and its affections. The affections of natural 
man have been perverted by sin, and the cognitive faculty 
of man's intellect cannot conquer the affective faculty of 
man's sinful heart. Man cannot will or do what is good. 
He has no free will. Even in those who have been 
justified, the good affections must struggle with the bad. 
The notes of Pommerani based on Melanchthon's 
lectures in 1533 expand this theme.97 Evangelical 
doctrine destroys free will because it teaches that in man 
there are horrible corruptions which struggle against the 
Law of God. This corruption within man, however, human 
95Ibid., p. 16; Ibid., p. 29. 
"Ibid., p. 24; Ibid., p. 35. 
97CR, 21:274-281. 
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will is not able to destroy. The will of natural man is 
neither able to effect nor to fulfill obedience to the Law 
of God. Apart from the Holy Spirit, the human will cannot 
dispel doubts about God, have true fear of God, or grasp 
true faith in the mercy of God. Scripture teaches 
everywhere that human nature is subjected to sin, and that 
without the Holy Spirit man is incapable of truly fearing 
God or trustingly believing the promises of God. The 
human will cannot make natural man spiritually alive. 
Without the Holy Spirit men cannot please God, be 
righteous before God, or have eternal life. 
One notes in these lectures that the strict 
determinism of the 1521 Loci is abandoned. Melanchthon 
does acknowledge that the will has some liberty in natural 
man. The unregenerate are able to effect to some extent 
the external works of the Law. Nevertheless, Melanchthon 
continues to label as false the scholastic teaching that 
natural man is able to satisfy the Law of God without the 
Holy Spirit. Against the scholastics he affirms that sin 
is inherent in man; he denies that a man can be righteous 
before God for the sake of his good morals or merit, 
either de congruo or de condigno; he denies that the 
forgiveness of sins is given for works of mercy or that 
natural man is able to love God apart from God's gracious 
gift of his own Spirit. The scholastics further err when 
they say that man is able, without the Holy Spirit, to 
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love God above all things or to have true faith in God or 
similar spiritual impulses. 
The second edition of the Loci (1535) incorporates 
the less deterministic view of the will with regard to 
external works found in the 1533 lectures. In man is 
found reason (that is, a mind which judges) and will 
(which is either obedient to or struggles against that 
judgment). The will commands the lesser powers of man: 
the senses and sensual desires (affections). This 
position markedly differs from that held in the first 
edition, where Melanchthon writes, 
If you relate the will to the affections, there is 
clearly no freedom, even to natural judgment. When an 
affection has begun to rage and seethe, it cannot be 
kept from breaking forth.98  
The freedom of the will is conjoined with the power of 
reason. If natural man were not corrupted by sin, he 
would have a certain and clear knowledge of God. He would 
have true fear, true faith, and obedience to the Law. 
Now, however, man is oppressed by death, filled with doubt 
and error and he does not truly fear God. The Law of God, 
moreover, requires not only external, civil obedience, but 
perpetual and perfect obedience of the heart. 
With regard to the power of human will, Melanchthon 
asks, "by what means is human will able, by its own 
strength, without renewal in some way, to do the external 
98St.A., 2, pt. I, 17. "1521 Loci" p. 30. 
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works of the Law?" He answers that question by affirming 
the power of human will to do the external works of the 
Law. "This is free will (voluntas) which the philosophers 
rightly attribute to man." Because the Scriptures teach 
that there is carnal righteousness to some extent, 
Melanchthon concedes that human will is able to effect 
civil righteousness to a limited extent without 
renewal.99  
Although Melanchthon appears to have changed his 
position from one of holding that there is no freedom of 
the will with regard to the affections, to holding that 
there is a freedom of the will with regard to the 
affections, the change is more apparent than real. In 
1521 Melanchthon is describing the reality of natural 
man's condition. "When an affection has begun to rage and 
seethe, it cannot be kept from breaking forth." In 1535 
Melanchthon is describing man's ideal condition in which 
the will either acquiesces to or struggles against the 
judgment of human reason. Melanchthon is clearly less 
deterministic about the ability of natural man to effect 
works of civil righteousness. But he is no less 
deterministic about the ability of natural man to do what 
pleases God spiritually, as is clearly seen in the 
development of the locus regarding free will in the second 
edition of the Loci. 
99CR, 21:373-378. 
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In human nature there is a horrible corruption 
which fights against the Law of God. The human will 
cannot eliminate this corruption from the nature of man. 
In consequence, man is not able to satisfy the Law of God, 
which requires not only external obedience, but internal 
beauty, fear, faith, highest love of God, and perfect 
obedience. The human will cannot, without the Holy 
Spirit, effect the spiritual affections God desires: true 
fear of God, true faith in the mercy of God, obedience, 
tolerance of afflictions, love of God, and so forth. 
The Holy Spirit is efficacious through the Word, 
as Saint Paul writes in Romans 8:26: "The Spirit helps us 
in our infirmity." The regenerated human spirit (anima) 
is encouraged so that it is enabled to retain the Word. 
It is not discouraged, because it is taught that the 
promise of the Gospel is universal and we ought to 
believe. In the context of Romans 8:26, Melanchthon 
continues, "We see conjoined these causes, the Word, the 
Holy Spirit, and the will, which is certainly not idle, 
but fights against its infirmities." Citing Basil of 
Cesarea, "Only will, and God has come before hand." 
Melanchthon continues, "God anticipates us, he calls, he 
moves, he delights, but we shall have seen and shall not 
have resisted. Sin constantly begins with us and not from 
the will of God." Chrysostom says, "He draws, but he 
draws the one who wills." Melanchthon warns his readers, 
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"We ought not indulge in indifference or natural 
desires. 0100 Melanchthon concludes this locus with the 
understanding that obedience to the Law is possible 
through grace. This interpretation is necessary so that 
one might understand that the obedience of the pious is 
distant from the perfection of the Law, but that the 
regenerate are pleasing to God for the sake of Christ."' 
Three developments can be identified in this 
edition of the locus on free will. First, Melanchthon 
uses "mind" and "will" rather than "cognitive faculty" and 
"voluntary faculty" in describing the two parts of man. 
Fagerberg suggests that this is the result of Aristotelian 
influence and a desire to adopt a more precise termi-
nology. The will and the affections which were identified 
with one another in the first edition are now separated 
and the affections subordinated to the will.102 This 
observation is helpful. Melanchthon is more positive 
about the usefulness of philosophy and especially 
Aristotle in developing definitions. It is less clear 
that the will and affections are identified in the first 
edition. Clearly they are separated in the second edition 
although one looks in vain for substantiation to the 
assertion that the affections are subordinated to the 
°°Ibid., p. 376. 
p. 378. 
t 0 2 Fagerberg, p. 127. 
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will. Secondly, Melanchthon specifically allows for free 
will in works of civil righteousness without the addendum 
in the first edition that ". . . there is freedom in 
neither external nor internal acts, but all things take 
place according to divine determination."103 Thirdly, 
Melanchthon emphasizes a more positive role for the will 
in the regenerate. In natural man the affections cannot 
be overcome. But by the power of the Holy Spirit, 
regenerate man is empowered to make choices (arbitrium) 
which reflect his rebirth: choices not to sin, choices to 
do the will of God. This positive function of the 
regenerate will does not happen in man innately, but in 
the context of the Word and the efficacious power of the 
Holy Spirit. "We see conjoined these causes, the Word, 
the Holy Spirit, and the will, which is not idle, but 
fights against its infirmities." 
If Melanchthon had conjoined the Word, the Holy 
Spirit, and the will in the context of justification, his 
position would clearly be one of synergism. This however 
is not the case. Melanchthon is speaking of the new life 
of the regenerate following justification and the 
reception of the Holy Spirit. Forensic justification 
includes both the imputation of the righteousness of 
Christ, by grace through faith, and the gift of the Holy 
103St.A., 2, pt. I, 17. "1521 Loci" p. 30. 
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Spirit, who effects a new life of love and obedience in 
the Christian. That this is the context of this 
conjoining of causes (the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the 
regenerate will) is attested by the following. First, 
Melanchthon strongly affirms in the preceeding paragraphs 
that the human will cannot satisfy the Law of God or bring 
about faith, love of God, or the other spiritual 
affections that God desires and requires. Secondly, 
Melanchthon uses Romans 8:26 in the immediate context of 
the conjoining of causes, a text which addresses itself to 
the Christian condition following justification, not the 
initial conversion of the unregenerate. Thirdly, 
Melanchthon emphasizes that it is the Holy Spirit who 
helps the Christian spirit "retain the Word." Fourthly, 
the context immediately following the three causes exhorts 
the Christian not to indulge in indifference and natural 
desires. Finally, the locus concludes with a discussion 
of how obedience to the Law is possible by grace through 
faith so that the pious live pleasing to God for the sake 
of Christ. This is also the emphasis in the locus  
concerning the third use of the Law. 
Thus by 1535 Melanchthon has developed (1) his 
forensic vocabulary of justification; (2) a concept of 
free will in the regenerate by which those who have 
imputed to them the righteousness of Christ by grace 
through faith and have received the gift of the Holy 
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Spirit are enabled to choose to do the will of God in 
loving obedience; and (3) the distinctive third office of 
the Law which describes the function of the revealed Law 
in the Word of God in the lives of those imputed 
righteous, having the Holy Spirit within their hearts and 
in consequence, a changed heart or will. For those in 
whom are conjoined the Word of God (Law and promises), the 
gift of the Holy Spirit, and a regenerate free will --
true fear of God, true love of God, and obedience to the 
Law of God are begun. Because this good work of God is 
only begun and not accomplished, the second, chief, and 
principal function of the Law remains. The Law continues 
to accuse the regenerate also of sin. But for the 
Christian the accusation of the Law results in neither 
despair nor work righteousness but rather in repentance 
and in dependence on the righteousness of Christ, imputed 
by grace. Forgiven and restored the Christian utilizes 
the Word of God, the Spirit of God, and his own regenerate 
free will (renewed heart) to choose that which pleases 
God. Resolving not to sin again and instructed by the Law 
in the abiding and immutable will of God, the believer 
freely chooses those works which please God and in which 
God would have him exercise obedience. 
CHAPTER V 
FORENSIC JUSTIFICATION, THIRD USE OF THE LAW, 
AND REGENERATE FREE WILL IN THE 1559 LOCI 
The final edition of the Loci was published in 
1559, one year prior to Melanchthon's death. What had 
begun in 1521 as a theological handbook had now become a 
major dogmatics of evangelical teaching. Although the 
years between 1535 and 1559 had been filled with 
theological controversy among the evangelical, Roman, and 
reformed parties, and within the evangelical party itself, 
the final edition of the Loci in 1559 does not 
theologically differ from that of 1535. What one does 
find is a reiteration, often verbatim, of the theological 
positions put forth in 1535. 
The emphasis on justification as a forensic 
proclamation, on the instructional function of the Law for 
the regenerate, and on the role of the renewed will in 
choosing the will of God, were already intact by the 
second edition as seen above. The expansive final edition 
of the Loci provides Melanchthon's definitive explication 
of those themes which had shaped his theology for the past 
forty years: Law and Gospel, sin and grace, faith and 
obedience, justification as the imputation of the 
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righteousness of Christ, and renewal as the efficacious 
activity of the Holy Spirit within the obedient hearts of 
those who trust in Christ. 
Of Grace and Justification 
The locus, De gratis et de iustificatione, is 
divided into four parts: De vocabulo fidei, De vocabulo  
gratiae, De bonis operibus, and De argumentis  
adversariorum. One notes Melanchthon's juxtaposition of 
grace, faith, and good works under the rubric of 
justification. In so doing it is not his purpose to 
confuse justification and renewal or to separate 
justification by grace through faith from renewal and good 
works, but to distinguish them. The content of the locus  
is the biblical relationship between the imputation of the 
righteousness of Christ and the response of obedience 
manifested in those who trust in Christ. This locus comes 
midway in the Loci. Melanchthon thus far has developed 
the loci regarding the Trinity, creation, the cause of sin 
and its effects, free will, original sin and actual sin, 
the divine Law, and the Gospel. These loci are replete 
with references to and definitions of grace, faith, and 
justification. With the locus "on grace and 
justification" Melanchthon provides a summation of his 
theology of justification and begins to direct the 
attention of his reader to the effects of justification 
for those renewed by grace through faith. 
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The loci which follow focus on what may be 
described as practical or functional questions. What is 
the church? What is the meaning of repentance? What are 
the number and benefits of the Sacraments? Other topics 
addressed include predestination, the resurrection of the 
dead, prayer, ceremonies in the church, the mortification 
of the flesh, Christian liberty, and the place and 
function of civil authority. In this locus regarding 
grace and justification Melanchthon conjoins the 
imputation of the righteousness of Christ with the new 
obedience effected by the Holy Spirit in the regenerate. 
Melanchthon emphasizes the priority of the first 
subtopic, De vocabulo fidei, for the task of doing 
theology. This topic contains the summation of the Gospel 
and points to the chief benefit of Christ, which 
distinguishes the church of God from all who would imagine 
that man is justified by the Law or by self-discipline. 
Recognizing that there is a difference of opinion 
regarding this topic, he describes this difference as one 
that exists between those who adhere to the word of God 
and those who follow human opinion or judgment and neglect 
the simple teaching of the prophets, of Christ, and of the 
apostles. When the clear teaching of Scripture is 
neglected, theology is transformed into philosophy and it 
is imagined that there is no difference between 
philosophical righteousness (righteousness by works) and 
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Christian righteousness (justification by grace through 
faith).' 
Ignorance of Christ's work and benefits has often 
obscured the true teaching of the church as can be seen in 
the Old Testament and the subsequent history of the New 
Testament church. The Pharisees thought themselves to be 
righteous according to the Law and in consequence could 
find no need for the coming of the Messiah. Thinking that 
he would be established as a ruler by the world, they did 
not understand that it was right that he should be a 
victim for all people to placate the wrath of God against 
sin. Righteousness would be a gift; not something of 
themselves but from another. The prophets sought to 
appraise the people of God of this error, proclaiming that 
sin is not removed by the righteousness of the Law since 
it remains in human nature. They affirmed that righteous-
ness is believing, hearing, and receiving eternal life 
from God for the sake of the promised savior. This is 
clearly taught in the psalms of David (Ps. 2:12; 143:2) 
and in the prophecies of Isaiah (Isa. 53:11) among others. 
"Fanatical spirits" coming immediately after the 
time of Christ and the apostles also distorted the Gospel 
into Law, holding man to be righteous by the Law. Some of 
'Robert Stupperich, ed., Melanchthons Werke in 
Auswahl (Studienausgabe), 7 vols. (Guetersloh: Mohn and 
Co., 1953-present), 2, pt. II, p. 353. Hereafter this 
work will be cited as St.A. 
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the pious, nevertheless, preserved the true understanding 
of the Gospel as the Scriptures testify: that we receive 
the remission of sins by grace, through faith, for the 
sake of Christ alone. Others, then and now, teach that 
men are able to satisfy the Law of God of themselves; that 
righteousness is a consequence of keeping the Law, and 
that such obedience is meritorious and worthy of eternal 
life. These do not admit that faith signifies trust in 
the mercy of God. They affirm, rather, that those reborn 
ought to doubt even that they are in grace. This 
understanding is not Christian, but pagan.2 These 
errors do not edify God's people but lead the light of the 
Gospel into darkness, obscuring the benefits of Christ, 
true consolation of the conscience, and genuine prayer. 
It is necessary therefore that the church expose this 
error and warn against it.3  
Melanchthon begins his warning against such 
teaching in the church by emphasizing the coercive nature 
of the Law. Aristotle is cited with approval when the 
philosopher describes righteousness as the most beautiful 
morning and evening star. Civil order is necessary 
because the preaching of the Gospel cannot be efficacious 
in a world without order or in those who persist in doing 
2lbid., pp. 354-56. 
3Ibid., p. 354. 
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what is against the conscience. The notion that we merit 
the forgiveness of sin by implementation of the Law or 
that by the Law man is righteous or reconciled to God must 
be rejected. When the Law and the recognition of sin are 
brought together with the Gospel, many accuse the 
evangelicals of stoic determinism. But this is mere human 
opinion, and not the teaching of Saint Paul or of the 
other apostles and prophets.4  
With this warning Melanchthon develops his second 
point, that it is through the preaching of repentance and 
the promised deliverer that men are received by God, and 
not because of obedience or works. This proclamation has 
constituted the ministry of the church from the time of 
Adam through Christ and the apostles, who were commanded, 
"Go and preach repentance and the remission of sins in my 
name." The preaching of repentance is the true voice of 
the Law, through which God reveals both external sin 
(wicked deeds) and internal sin (not fearing God, not 
loving God, not trusting God). The Gospel itself accuses 
the world of its unbelief when the world does not listen 
to the Son of God and is not moved by his passion and 
resurrection. The Holy Spirit convicts the world of sin 
because it does not believe (John 16:8-9). The Law of 
God's wrath denounces all mankind, and in part the 
4lbid., pp. 356-57. 
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calamities of men are the effect of God's Law admonishing 
men and calling all to repentance.5  
When human minds hear the voice of the Law and are 
terrified by sin, only then can the open promise of the 
Gospel be heard, which sets forth the forgiveness of sins 
by grace for the sake of Christ. This is Melanchthon's 
third point. Faith comes by the mercy of God and not from 
any worthiness in man. Faith is given to men by God in 
order that men's minds might be encouraged through 
forgiveness and reconciliation. If faith were based on 
the habits of men, if human contrition or worthiness were 
to be the standard of judgment, then the soul would be 
plunged into desperation or doubt. 
But we have a certain and firm consolation. It depends 
on the benefits of God and not from a condition of our 
own worthiness. Our consolation is solely from mercy 
for the sake of Christ's promise. And when God 
forgives sin, he also gives us the Holy Spirit, who 
begins new virtures in the pious.6  
. . To justify is a forensic word. . 
Justificare est forense verbum. . Men are 
pronounced righteous, their sins are forgiven, and they 
are reconciled to God. 
When God forgives sin, at the same time he gives the 
Holy Spirit to begin new virtues. However, first 
terrified minds must seek remission of sins and 
reconciliation.a 
5lbid., pp. 357-58. 
6lbid., p. 359. 
'Ibid. aIbid. 
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The rigtheousness or worthiness of man is never 
the cause of forgiveness. Righteousness is by grace 
alone, but the forensic righteousness of justification 
inaugurates a new person who has received the Holy Spirit 
in order that he might begin to live a life pleasing to 
God. 
The next subtopic of his locus on grace and 
justification focuses on the biblical description of 
faith. Melanchthon begins by distinguishing the Roman 
position from the evangelical understanding of 
justification. 
To Roman ears . . . to be justified by works signifies 
to obtain forgiveness and to be righteous, that is, to 
be acceptable to God, for the sake of proper virtues 
and deeds. On the contrary, to be justified by faith 
in Christ means to obtain forgiveness and righteousness 
that is, to be reputed acceptable, not for the sake of 
proper virtues, but for the sake of the Mediator, the 
Son of God.9  
This understanding is discerned from the Gospel itself and 
especially in the writings of Saint Paul, who opposes any 
other point of view as the voice of human reason and the 
Law. 
As the Baptist exclaimed, "Behold the Lamb of God who 
takes away the sin of the world." Paul wishes for us 
to put forth this sacrifice and teach that for the sake 
of the Son of God forgiveness and reconciliation is 
given, and not for the sake of our own virtues." 
The righteous Son of God, seated at the right hand of the 
9lbid., p. 360. 
"Ibid. 
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Father, intercedes for us and forgives our sins. 
Therefore faith points to him as Mediator and applies his 
gifts to us. 
Melanchthon underscores that such faith is not 
only an historical knowledge, but a confident trust in the 
promises of God, for the sake of Christ. Those who object 
to this teaching do not understand Scripture and they do 
not understand the certainty of God's promises. They 
remain burdened by fear and doubt and they are distressed 
about being forgiven. Consolation, however, comes from a 
source outside themselves, the promised mercy given for 
the sake of the Mediator. For those who trust in 
themselves and not in Christ, the words of the Creed, "I 
believe in the forgiveness of sins," are said in vain." 
Faith is to assent to every word of God intended for us 
and chiefly also to the promise of grace and 
reconciliation given for the sake of Christ the 
Mediator, as well as trust in the mercy of God's 
promise for the sake of Christ. Now trust is a 
movement of the will necessary for the response of 
assent. The will which rests in Christ is kindled by 
the Holy Spirit.12  
This understanding of faith is clearly attested by Saint 
Paul, who in Romans 4 makes the promise correlative to 
faith. 
The promise is firm because it is by grace, 
through faith. We assent to the promise and we are able 
"Ibid., pp. 360-61. 
"Ibid., p. 363. 
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to assent by grace. If the Law were added as a condition, 
desperation would follow. Romans 5:1 ("Justified by faith 
we have peace. . . .") teaches that mere historical 
knowledge of Christ does not effect peace with God but 
only augments terror and desperation. What, indeed, is a 
more terrible sign of the wrath of God against sin than 
that no other victim was possible other than the death of 
God's Son. . . . . It is not possible to placate the wrath 
of God except through the Son." Faith is trusting that 
these benefits of Christ apply to us. "This trust 
consoles the terrors of the mind and affords peace."" 
The Christian's consolation is found in submission 
to the judgment of God, which is wrath against sin. 
Faith rests in the mercy of God, who has been propitiated 
through the death of his Son. It is a very personal 
confidence, as was recognized by both the Psalmist (Ps. 
2:12) and by Saint Paul (Eph. 3:12). The heart is not 
purified by the righteousness of the Law. But faith alone 
purifies the hearts of those who believe they are saved by 
the grace of God in Christ Jesus. By faith, the Christian 
can call in trust upon God and expect from God consolation 
and help. 1 4  Those who do not teach that such 
consolation comes from Christ do not rejoice in his 
"Ibid., p. 365. 
"Ibid., p. 366. 
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benefits. When it is said, "We are justified by faith," 
nothing other is said than that for the sake of Christ one 
receives the remission of sins and is reputed righteous. 
This is the continuing witness of the Gospel and is 
certainly the true consensus of the church and a true 
explanation of Pauline teaching. But human reason 
understands only the righteousness of works. The biblical 
and evangelical understanding of faith is that to which 
all the articles of Christian belief point. 
Faith is to assent to every word of God intended for us 
and chiefly also to assent to the promise of grace and 
reconciliation given for the sake of Christ the 
Mediator. By faith a man apprehends and applies the 
promises of God and quiets the human heart. The 
Creed's other articles point to this article: "I 
believe in the remission of sins and life everlasting." 
This is indeed the highest promise and end, to which 
other articles refer, because "the Son of God is sent" 
as John says, "to destroy the works of the devil," that 
is, to put away sin and to renew righteousness and 
eternal life.'s 
The third subtopic of the locus "on grace and 
justification" focuses on the meaning of the word "grace." 
Philosophy obscures the benefits of Christ and the 
imputation of grace, which is the free remission of sin, 
mercy, and the gracious acceptance of God. This gift of 
grace signifies also the reception of the Holy Spirit and 
eternal life. "Eternal life" is a comprehensive term 
including new life and eternal righteousness which is 
begun now and is later perfected. The Law cannot offer 
"Ibid., p. 371. 
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true, eternal life, but only a discipline of external 
morals, which is not eternal, not enduring, and not the 
perpetual righteousness that God requires." 
Melanchthon develops the content and meaning of 
the term grace through an exegetical study centering in 
Romans. This study is largely a repristination of the 
insights already found in his Romans Commentary (first 
published in 1532, but continuously edited and republished 
throughout Melanchthon's lifetime). Melanchthon 
structures his study of grace under four headings. First, 
grace is the remission of sins, the imputation of 
righteousness, and the gift of the Holy Spirit. It gives 
the honor to Christ due to him as savior and mediator 
(John 1:29; Isa. 53:10). Secondly, grace offers 
consolation to the stricken conscience. Men need not 
doubt that God has acted on their behalf in Christ (Rom. 
4:16; John 1:18). Thirdly, grace exalts prayer and 
dependence upon God through Christ as mediator. Finally, 
this scriptural understanding of grace properly 
distinguishes between Law and Gospel. 
The Law has its own kind of promises, but they do 
not include the remission of sin, reconciliation to God, 
or the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. The Law 
prescribes that man is righteous if he excels in obedience 
"Ibid., p. 372. 
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and is without sin. The Gospel proclaims the Son of God 
as Mediator and claims Christians for his sake, being 
reconciled by grace, alone. Therefore any opinion which 
teaches that there is forgiveness for the sake of works 
buries the doctrine of faith, the honor of Christ, and the 
consolation of consciences in the Gospel." 
The remainder of this subtopic on grace develops 
the biblical foundation of the sola qratia, focusing on 
Romans, chapters 3-5, but including exegetical studies of 
Ephesians 2:8; Galatians 2:16; Galatians 3:14. It is 
Melanchthon's continuing concern to anchor the evangelical 
position in the Word of God and not in the traditions of 
the church or philosophy of man. The following are also 
cited as attesting to the truth of the evangelical 
position regarding grace and faith: Matthew 11:28; John 
3:16; Acts 10:43; Romans 10:11-13; 11:32; 1 Timothy 2:4; 2 
Corinthians 6:1 and Luke 11:13. The position of the Roman 
party leaves Christians in perpetual doubt concerning 
forgiveness and detracts from Christ's honor, as Scripture 
clearly attests." 
Melanchthon concludes the locus, De qratia et de 
justificatione, with a subtopic on good works, De bonis  
operibus. Obedience, the righteousness of a good 
"Ibid., pp. 373-77. 
"Ibid., pp. 383-86. 
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conscience and of good works which God commands, 
necessarily ought to follow reconciliation to God. This 
is the teaching of Scripture: Romans 8:12; 1 Corinthians 
6:9; 1 John 3:7-9; Ephesians 2:10.'9 What good works is 
the Christian to do? Those which are commanded in the 
Word of God and summarized comprehensively in the 
Decalogue. The chief good works are those of the first 
table of the Law: believing God, trusting God, and fearing 
God. The Roman opponents ignore the first table of the 
Law and teach nothing of faith, which is the principal 
good work. How are Christians able to do such good 
works? The internal obedience of the heart cannot begin 
without knowledge of the Gospel and without the gift of 
the Holy Spirit by grace (Gal. 3:14). Love of God is not 
possible unless one first hears the voice of the Gospel. 
Faith must preceed works. By grace the Holy Spirit is 
received, who exalts new, spiritual impulses in the 
regenerate which are congruent with the Word of God. 
How do such good works please God? The Christian 
lives with an infirmity which is evidenced by his failure 
to overcome those things which impede good works, by the 
imperfection of his works, and by the continuing 
condemnation of the Law. Obedience is a necessary 
response to the Gospel, but sin remains in the regenerate 
'9Ibid., p. 386. 
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when they continue to fight against the Law of God.2°  
Nevertheless, although sin continues in the regenerate, 
the believer does good works as one whose hope is in the 
Lord and not in the merit of those works. 
Melanchthon summarizes the relationship of grace, 
faith, and good works to one another in three points: (1) 
the regenerate are renewed or reconciled to God for the 
sake of God's Son and are received by grace through faith 
for Christ's sake; (2) in the regenerate there remain 
infirmities, sin, and vicious affections which are 
contrary to the Law of God; (3) obedience and 
righteousness of conscience begin in the regenerate but 
are far from perfection in the Law. Nevertheless, the 
reconciled are able to please God for the sake of Christ, 
who continues to bring before the Father the prayer and 
worship of all believers. It is for the sake of Christ 
that the believer himself is reconciled to God. 
Reconciled to God in Christ, the works of the believer are 
received by God in grace." Faith is excercized in 
works because the regenerate believe in God and trust that 
God will be pleased with even these works, done for the 
sake of the promise in Christ. Christians then do good 
works from three causes: (1) because they are commanded 
20Ibid., p. 396. 
"Ibid., p. 399. 
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by God; (2) because they are obliged to obedience by faith 
(faith requires good works); (3) in order that faith may 
be retained, because the Holy spirit is expelled from the 
heart when that heart persists in sins against the 
conscience.22 The Christian seeks to do the will of 
God, as God has revealed that will. II . . . We judge 
concerning the will of God from the point of view of the 
Word of God."23 
 
Melanchthon concludes his locus on grace and 
justification with a scriptural refutation of the Roman 
position (De argumentis adversariorum). Expressing the 
objections of the Roman party through syllogisms, 
Melanchthon demonstrates that these positions are refuted 
by the clear teachings of Scripture and cannot be 
maintained. What is maintained is that man is saved by 
grace through faith for the sake of Christ, and not from 
works, although works are a necessary consequence of 
faith. Such works done in faith are graciously accepted 
by God for the sake of his Son and the regenerate, in 
seeking to please God and to do his will, finds the 
testimony to those works which God desires and commands in 
the clear witness of the Scriptures and summarized in the 
Decalogue.24  
221bid., p. 404. 
"Ibid., p. 415. 
241bid., pp. 415-440. 
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Third Use of the Law  
The description of the third use of the Law in the 
final edition of the Loci is largely unchanged from that 
of the 1535 edition. It remains brief and is specifically 
directed to the office of the Law in the life of the 
renatis (those reborn by grace through faith to whom the 
righteousness of Christ is imputed and the ministry of the 
Holy Spirit is bestowed). 
In so far as the reborn are justified by faith, they 
are free from the Law. . . . They are free from the 
Law, that is they are free from its cursings and 
condemnation and from the wrath of God which is set 
forth in the Law. When the reborn retain faith and 
trust in the Son of God, they fight against sin and 
conquer the terrors of sin. Meanwhile, however, the 
Law is taught. It shows the residue of sin in the 
reborn so that knowledge of sin grows and with it 
repentance. At the same time the Gospel of Christ is 
heard so the faith grows. The Law is set forth for the 
reborn so that it might teach certain works in which 
God wills us to exercise obedience. Certainly God does 
not wish us to devise some work or worship on our own, 
but he wishes to rule us by his Word, as it is written, 
"In vain do they worship me with the mandates of men," 
"your Word is a light to my feet." Human reason, when 
it is not ruled by the Word of God, easily errs. It is 
enraptured by desire so that it approves evil works (as 
appears in the laws of the nations). The divine 
ordinances remain immutable, so that we might submit to 
God. Although we are free from the Law and from 
condemnation because we are righteous by faith, for the 
sake of the Son of God, however, so that we might 
attain to obedience, the Law remains. The Law remains 
because the divine ordinances remain in order that the 
justified might be obedient to God and so that they 
might have the beginnings of obedience. . . .25  
Melanchthon's explanation of the Law's third office can be 
summarized under three headings: (1) freedom from the 
25St.A., 2, pt. I, 325. 
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Law's condemnation for the renatis; (2) the abiding 
necessity of teaching both Law and Gospel; and (3) the 
Word of God as the instrument of God's self-revelation. 
Insofar as the reborn are those justified by 
faith, they are free from the Law's condemnation. 
Melanchthon recognizes the duality of the Christian who is 
both justified by grace through faith and in consequence 
free of the Law and its condemnation, and yet remains a 
sinner who stands accused by the Law. The third office of 
the Law addresses the continuing function of the Law in 
the regenerate who, although they are sinners and stand 
accused by the Law, nevertheless are free from the Law's 
condemnation through the imputed righteousness of Christ. 
They are unwillingly sinners because those justified by 
faith struggle against sin although sin continues to be a 
part of their fallen nature. 
Consequently, both Law and Gospel must be preached 
to the regenerate, who are free from the Law's con-
demnation by grace and yet stand accused by the Law as 
sinners. The Law demonstrates the residue of sin in the 
regenerate. In so doing the Law brings about in the 
regenerate a heightened sensitivity to sin. Moreover, in 
addition to showing that which God condemns, the Law also 
teaches those works in which God wills the regenerate to 
excercize obedience. Since the Law continues to function 
in the life of the regenerate, the Gospel must continue 
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also to be preached so that faith, a trusting confidence 
in the mercy of God through Jesus Christ, will continue to 
grow. Only by faith can the believer look beyond his own 
sin with confidence to the gracious acceptance of God. 
The preaching of both Law and Gospel must be 
anchored in God's Word. God's Word is his instrument. 
"God wishes to rule us by the Word. . . ." Human reason 
or wisdom easily errs when it is not ruled by the Word. 
The Christian continues to struggle with the affections of 
sin; he is enraptured by the desires of the flesh. But 
the divine ordinances of God's Word are immutable. As the 
church must be obedient to the Word of God, so the 
individual Christian must live in accordance with that 
Word. 
The third use of the Law may be described, then, 
as the rule of God's Word in the life of the regenerate. 
God does not desire that the regenerate should devise 
works or worship according to human reason which, "when it 
is not ruled by the Word of God, easily errs." 
Melanchthon emphazises that the Word of God is the rule 
and norm of both Christian doctrine and the Christian 
life. One of the writings which most concisely develops 
Melanchthon's understanding of the normative character of 
the Scriptures is his treatise De ecclesis et de  
autoritate verbi Dei (Of the Church and the Authority of 
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the Word of God), written in 1539. Melanchthon reacts 
against both the false claim of the Roman church that the 
teaching of the church is to be preferred to the Word of 
God26 and against the false teaching of "fanatics" on 
the right who distort the Word of God for their own 
purposes." 
But I call the church the assembly of true believers 
who have the Gospel and sacraments and who are being 
sanctified by the Holy Spirit, as the church is 
described in Ephesians 5 and John 10. . . .28 
These then constitute the church: the assembly of 
believers, the Gospel (Word of God), the sacraments, and 
the sanctifying activity of the Holy Spirit. Melanchthon 
affirms that the "church" through the ages has always 
existed, but he acknowledges also that at times its 
teaching and practices have been less pure and have even 
obscured the Gospel through erroneous opinions. Articles 
of faith have been denied. "Therefore, whenever the 
authority of the church is adduced, one must ascertain 
whether it has been the consensus of the true church, 
congruent with the Word of God.29  
"St.A., 1:326; Philip Melanchthon, "The Church 
and the Word of God," in Melanchthon: Selected Writings, 
trans. Charles Leander Hill, ed. Elmer E. Flack and Lowell 
J. Satre (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1962) p. 
133. Hereafter cited Hill, citations in the text are 
those of the Hill translation. 
27St.A., 1:327. Hill, p. 134.  
28St.A., 1:328. Hill, p. 135.  
29St.A., 1:334. Hill, p. 140. 
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The majority of the work treats of church councils 
and Latin and Greek fathers of the first seven centuries. 
Melanchthon evaluates the writings of these individuals 
and the pronouncements of these earlier Synods "according 
to the Word of God, which abides always in the rule of 
doctrine."30 Augustine receives positive treatment 
because of his careful distinction between Law and Gospel 
and his consistent reliance on Scripture. It may indeed 
be argued that Melanchthon understands Augustine to be 
more of an "evangelical" than he actually was in his 
understanding of justification.31 In any case, his 
treatment of Augustine allows Melanchthon to reiterate his 
own understanding of the relationship of Law and Gospel. 
It is as Paul says: therefore to be freed from the Law 
is to be freed from that verdict that we are subject to 
the wrath of God and eternal death. It is to be 
liberated not only from rites or external spectacles, 
but much more to be delivered from the Law which 
completely terrifies, curses, damns, and slays us, 
when, to be sure, another factor is proposed because of 
which we are pronounced righteous, namely the Son of 
God who has been made a victim for us.32  
The church, the Word, the sacraments and the activity of 
the Holy Spirit in the lives of believers constitute the 
instruments by which the will of God is accomplished among 
men. This church is no mere ideal, but exists by the 
30St.A., 1:337. Hill, p. 143. 
31See footnote #1, Chapter II. 
32St.A., 1:361. Hill, p. 164. 
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grace of God where the Gospel is proclaimed and where 
believers practice worship of God, repentance of sins, 
study of the Word, and the Christian life according to 
God's revealed will. 
Let us not think that the church is only a Platonic 
state. The assembly is the true church in which the 
pure doctrine of the Gospel shines forth and in which 
the divinely instituted Sacraments are rightly 
administered. In such an assembly there must be some 
living members of the church who practice true worship 
of God, who repent, call upon God in true faith, devote 
themselves to study, and work for the propagation of 
the gospel, declare their confession and serve their 
vocation. Finally, they practice the pious duties 
demanded by God and as they face dangers of every kind, 
they practice prayer and other good works." 
In this concise description of the church Melanchthon also 
provides an integrated analysis of the third use of the 
Law in the lives of those reborn by grace through faith. 
Melanchthon summarizes his exposition of the third 
office of the law emphasizing the roles of Law and Gospel 
in the life of the Christian. The Christian is free from 
the curse of the Law and its condemnation, by grace 
through faith in Christ. The Law remains, however, so 
that those justified by the imputation of the 
righteousness of Christ might begin obedience through the 
efficacious ministry of the Holy Spirit. Melanchthon 
never wavers in affirming that the chief and principal 
function of the Law is that of accusing sin. The third 
office of the Law, however, emphasizes the continuing 
33St.A., 1:384-85. Hill, pp. 184-85. 
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reliance of the Christian on the Word of God so that he 
might do the will of God according to the revealed Word of 
God and not according to works of his own choosing or 
devising. It is through works of human devising that the 
church of his own time had come to abrogate the 
distinctive messages of the Law and Gospel so that the 
Gospel was subsumed into a category of the Law and the Law 
of God was temporalized into philosophical legalism. 
Through the third use of the Law Melanchthon emphasizes 
the Word of God as the rule and norm for Christian 
doctrine and practice in opposition to both the church of 
Rome and fanatics on the right who distort that Word of 
God, confuse Law and Gospel, and rob Christians of their 
confidence in the sola gratia, sola fide and the soli per  
Christum of the Gospel. 
Regenerate Free Will  
Melanchthon is aware that the question of free 
will has intrigued man through the ages. Natural 
philosophers (physicis) have made distinctions and named 
processes by which choices are made in their psychological 
investigstions. Some of these distinctions are of human 
origin; others were given by the prophets and apostles. 
In natural man there is a part that knows and judges which 
is called the mind (mens) or the intellect (intellectus) 
or reason (ratio). This knowing and judging is called 
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knowledge (notitis). The other part of man is that which 
desires (appetens) and is called the will (voluntas). The 
will may be either complient or resistant to the knowledge 
of the intellect. Under the desiring part of man are the 
sensual desires or affections (affectus) which originate 
in the heart of man and incite impulses in man toward the 
object of desire.34  
Melanchthon begins his discussion with a 
definition of free choice (libero arbitrio). "Free choice 
is the mind (mens) and will (voluntas) working together. 
Free choice is that faculty of the will (voluntas) which 
is able to choose or to desire what is pointed out to it 
by the intellect, or to reject it." The will does this 
according to its own unprejudiced nature (nature  
integra). Although there are impediments to this process, 
yet man has free choice (arbitrium). The ancients attest 
to it and this vocabulary is common also to the prophets 
and apostles, when they speak of the mind and heart, which 
correspond to the philosophers' use of intellect and 
will.35  
While some philosophers deny that the human will 
is free, the concern in the church is whether human will 
is able to obey the Law of God, given man's natural 
34St.A., 2, pt. I, 237. 
351bid., pp. 237-38. 
223 
depravity. Melanchthon responds that the natural man is 
not even able to address this question because of the 
greatness of the sin in which he is born. Unless a man 
knows the Law of God, he is not able to do even outward 
civil works, but perfectly and perpetually obeys his 
corrupt human nature. The Law commands that man is to 
love God with his whole heart. If human nature were not 
corrupted by sin, if human nature had a clear and strong 
knowledge of God, if it did not doubt the will of God, if 
it had true fear and trust in Good, then human nature 
would be outstanding in its complete obedience to the 
Law. If this were the case in natural man, a firm light 
would be set up concerning God and the impulses of all 
consciences would be in accord with God. However, natural 
man is oppressed by the illness of his ancestry; he is 
full of doubt concerning God. He does not truly fear God 
or trust in him, nor is he incited to love God, but "the 
many flames of the affections are corrupt." As a result 
natural man by no means is able to satisfy the Law of 
God. What then is the will able to do?36  
There remains in natural man some measure of 
judgment and an ability to choose among the things that 
are subject to reason and senses. The human will is able 
on its own, without renewal, to do the outward works of 
"Ibid., p. 238. 
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the Law to a limited extent. This is free will (libertas  
voluntas) which philosophy rightly attributes to man. 
Paul himself distinguishes between carnal and spiritual 
righteousness, acknowledging that those who are not reborn 
do have choice, within limits, and can do, within limits, 
the outward works of the Law. For example, man is able to 
keep his hand from murder, from robbery, from plunder. 
Paul calls this carnal righteousness.37 The Law 
instructs unregenerate man and it punishes his violations, 
as it reveals and punishes the sorrowful sins of this life 
(such as incest and murder). "The Law is set down for the 
unjust" (1 Tim. 1:9). That is, the Law is to coerce the 
unregenerate and to punish stubborness. Likewise, "the 
Law is a teacher" (Gal. 3:24). That is, it coerces and 
teaches. Man's external obedience does not merit the 
remission of sins; neither does it justify ("by which we 
are declared to be righteous before God"); however, it is 
necessary, for by the civil righteousness which the Law 
constrains the church in the meantime is able to teach 
Christ. The Holy spirit is not efficacious in those who 
are stubborn, those who persevere in delinquency against 
the conscience.38  
The freedom to do the Law is greatly impeded by 
two causes: the infirmities with which man is born, and 
37Ibid., pp. 238-39. 
381bid., p. 239. 
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the devil. The corrupt affections in man are sharply 
stimulated and greatly incited by the fallen nature of 
man. Natural man is often obedient to impulses which are 
contrary to the counsels of the mind. The devil too is 
active in the impious. He impedes government and he 
impels many things which lead to ruin. Citing biblical 
and historical examples of the devil's destructive 
influence, Melanchthon concludes that the frailty of man 
is very great since all of history and indeed one's daily 
experience ("in which so much misery is seen") teach that 
man's wisdom is only so much confusion from which the most 
dismal death results. Nevertheless, despite these 
impediments (man's nature and the devil) there remains 
some liberty in the average mind when outward morals are 
reborn. 39  
The church, however, is not concerned with free 
will as it relates to external matters. The church is 
concerned with free will as it relates to the Law 
imprinted on human hearts. Carnal man is full of doubt 
concerning God, without trust in God, and has an innate 
hostility to the Law of God. 
Though natural man is oppressed by sin and death, the 
greatness of this evil is not seen by human 
discernment, but in the revealed Word of God. It is 
certain that man does not have the freedom to set aside 
this depravity, which is with him from birth, or to set 
aside death. This great and chief evil of mankind 
39Ibid., pp. 239-40. 
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becomes evident when free will is weakened. The will 
is not able to burn out the depravity in us from birth, 
nor is it able to satisfy the Law of God because the 
Law of God not only concerns outward discipline and 
somewhat darkened works, but it also demands an inner 
obedience of the heart, as the Law says: "Love the Lord 
your God with your whole heart and with all your mind 
and with all your strength." The Law judges and 
condemns sin in natural man which is not removed. Just 
as we are not able to deprive death of all its power, 
so also we are not able to burn out the depravity with 
which we are born. This evil can be acknowledged only 
when one perceives the benficia Christi, who removes 
sin and death and renews natural man. Thus the will is 
captive, not free, except of course to exalt natural 
depravity and death." 
Natural man has a captive will and in his weakness cannot 
understand his own condition. His will is free only to 
violate the Law of God and to merit the cure of that Law: 
death. 
Melanchthon's third point concerns the spiritual 
actions of regenerate man. The church has existed since 
the beginning of the world. Those who are the church are 
not guided by human strength or human weakness, but are 
illuminated to spiritual impulses by the Holy Spirit: 
fearing, believing and loving God. In some this is true 
to a greater extent than in others. Philosophers and 
Pelagians may ridicule this idea, but the Spirit of God 
has been poured out upon the hearts of believers." 
Melanchthon continues his discussion of the 
Christian life with an exegetical study. "Those who are 
40Ibid., pp. 240-41. 
"Ibid., p. 241. 
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led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God," "If one has 
not the Spirit of Christ, he is not of Christ" (Rom. 8:14 
and 8:9). These two sentences are "clear and plain 
witnesses of the gift of eternal life and the rule of the 
Holy Spirit." "Spirit of God" does not signify 
philosophic reason, but the Holy Spirit sent into the 
hearts of the pious and kindling knowledge of God through 
the Gospel and the proper influence of God's Law. 
Melanchthon also cites 1 Corinthians 2:14. "The natural 
man does not perceive those things which are sent from the 
Spirit of God." He understands homo pyschikos to refer to 
natural man with only his natural senses and reason, being 
without the Holy Spirit. Paul distinguishes between the 
natural (animalem) and spiritual (spirituali) life.42  
Although limited knowledge is naturally impressed 
on man concerning divine Law, nevertheless man has many 
doubts about the providence of God and about the Gospel. 
Man says to himself: perhaps we are regained, perhaps we 
are heard clearly, but perhaps not. Each man considers 
the darkness of his heart; he considers God's wrath, he 
considers whether he is regained, whether he has heard 
clearly, whether he delights in affliction. It is in the 
context of these considerations concerning the security 
and freedom of the soul versus flight from God, that this 
"Ibid. 
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writing of Paul is to be understood: "The natural man does 
not receive the things which are of the Spirit of God." 
Natural man does not clearly perceive God's wrath against 
sin; he does not understand the peace of God or truly fear 
God. This is also the testimony of Saint John (John 3:5; 
6:44; 15:5). "Unless one is born of water and the Spirit, 
he is not able to enter the Kingdom of God." "No one is 
able to come to me, unless the Father draws him." 
"Without me, you can do nothing."43  
Melanchthon continues his exegetical study 
emphasizing divine monergism with a reference from Isaiah 
59:20-21. These words contain "a most sweet description 
of the church and teach who is the church and where the 
church is to be found and who has received the benefits of 
God." The church is that gathering which proclaims the 
Gospel tradition of the prophets and apostles. Where 
there are living members of the church possessing the Holy 
Spirit, there must also be found the Word of God, the 
remission of sins, the Holy Spirit, and eternal life. 
These are the posessions of those who are the church.44  
Here the Holy Spirit is efficacious in the regenerate 
through the proclamation of the Gospel, as is taught in 
Galatians 3:14 ("that we might receive the promise of the 
43St.A., 2, pt. I, 242. 
441bid. 
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Spirit through faith"). Free will in relation to the 
unregenerate has already been denied. The context here is 
a discussion of the regenerate, who are not to seek God 
apart from his Word. 
It is often said that understanding concerning God must 
begin with the Word of God, for God is not sought apart 
from his Word. At any time we begin with the Word, 
there are three concurrent causes of good actions: the 
Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will, 
assenting to and not resisting the Word of God. It is 
possible, indeed, to discard the Word of God as Saul 
himself voluntarily discarded it. But when the mind, 
hearing the Word and being sustained by it does not 
resist it, does not indulge in the Word with 
indifference and understands it, it is enabled to 
assent by the Holy Spirit. In this certainly the will 
is not idle. The ancients said, "Grace leads the way, 
the will only accompanies to do good works." So also 
Basil says, "Only will and God has come beforehand" 
(monon thelason, kai theos proapanta). Will a little 
and God already come into the thoughts. God 
anticipates us; he calls, he moves, he delights, but we 
shall have seen and shall not have resisted. Sin 
constantly begins with us and not from the will of 
God. Chrysostom says, "He draws, but he draws the one 
who wills" (0 de elkon ton boulomenon elkei). Just as 
in this same place John writes, "All who have heard the 
Father and would learn, come to me." . . . [Christ] 
commands us, "Teach," that is, "hear the Word and do 
not resist," but assent to the Word of God and do not 
give way to indifference."" 
The regenerate have received the Word without asking for 
it, while their human will continued to struggle against 
that Word. Nor would it have helped the regenerate if the 
will had been as that of a statue. The only time the will 
does not struggle against God and his Word is when it too 
has.become holy. Even the regenerate must struggle 
against their natural depravity. 
45St.A., 2, pt. I, 243-44. 
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With those who 
most difficult 
assents feebly 
except for the 
are called and 
the Spirit." 
are holy, however, there are certainly 
times. Still, the will is not idle, but 
and would fall down in desperation, 
promises and examples among those who 
are repeatedly called and delighted by 
Only the continuing activity of the Spirit keeps the 
Christian from falling. 
Melanchthon attacks the license of the Epicureans 
who would maintain that if man is justified by grace and 
not works, then he may indulge in indifference and other 
depraved affections. Nor will Melanchthon allow the 
opinions of "the crazy Manicheans" who maintain that there 
are some men for whom conversion is not possible. 
"Conversion did not happen for David as if the lapsed were 
turned into a fig tree, but it happened with some free 
will in David when he heard rebuking and the promise, and 
then willed to be free of the offense."" It is 
important to note here that Melanchthon is using 
"conversione" in the sense of conversio continuata. David 
was certainly already one of the people of God, but he had 
sinned against God. It is David's repentance that 
Melanchthon is here terming "conversion." 
Melanchthon has no intention of calling the sola 
gratia, sola fide into question. Indeed, the whole 
paragraph is a defense of divine monergism against those 
"Ibid., . 244. 
"Ibid., pp. 244-45. 
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who would contend that good works are necessary to be 
justified before God. Further evidence of this 
interpretation of Melanchthon comes immediately with a 
citation of Romans 1:16, "The gospel is the power of God 
unto salvation." But the Gospel cannot be that power when 
it is resisted, when its promises are thought of lightly. 
The Gospel must be assented to and believed. How is this 
done? "The Gospel is the ministry of the Spirit. We 
receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." What 
Melanchthon is resisting is the notion that faith is a 
kind of infused quality within man. God, through the Holy 
Spirit, brings the Christian to faith; in faith the 
Christian must respond. Reconciliation between God and 
man requires the grace of God and the response of faith. 
If so much is to be expected of this infused quality 
without any of our action, like the enthusiasts and 
Manicheans imagine, it is not the work of the gospel 
and there is no light in the soul. But God instituted 
the ministry and it is heard so that the mind might 
know the promises and embrace them. Then we may resist 
indifference, because the Holy Spirit is efficacious in 
us at the same time.48  
There is no excuse for delay in responding to God's 
gracious gift of faith with a life of good works. "The 
mandate of God is eternal and immovable, the voice of the 
gospel most be obeyed, the Son must be heard, the Mediator 
must be acknowledged." If one says, "I cannot," 
Melanchthon answers, "In some way you are able, when the 
48Ibid., p. 245. 
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voice of the Gospel sustains you, when you are helped by 
God. I beseech and I know that the Holy Spirit is 
efficacious in being a consolation within you."49  
Melanchthon exhorts his readers to struggle 
against their natural depravity. "I know God in this same 
manner converts us when, exalted by the promise, we 
struggle with ourselves, when we call upon and resist our 
indifference and other depraved affections." There is a 
struggle going on within the Christian: the Word, the 
Spirit, and the regenerate will versus man's depravity, 
captive will, indifference to God, and the devil. 
Free will in man is the faculty to apply oneself to 
grace. That is, one hears the promise and is able to 
assent and to give up sins against the conscience. 
This does not happen when one is in league with the 
devil. . . . Since the promise is universal and since 
there is in God no contradicticn of the will, it is 
necessary that there be in us some cause of 
discrimination, why Saul was cast down and David was 
received. Therefore it is necessary that there is a 
dissimilar action in these two. Properly understood, 
this is true and is used in the exercise of faith and 
in true consolation, when the soul's rest is in the Son 
of God shown in the promises. It illustrates this 
conjoining of causes: Word of God, Holy Spirit, and the 
will." 
The free will to which Melanchthon refers is that possesed 
by those who rest in the Son of God in the exercise of 
faith. He employs the examples of Saul and David as an 
illustration of the "joining of causes" he earlier used in 
49Ibid. 
"Ibid., pp. 245-46. 
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the context of bonae actionis. The regenerate, having the 
Holy Spirit and dependent on the Word of God, must 
exercise their renewed hearts and minds in choosing God's 
will. 
"Even if the weakness is great, nevertheless there is 
still free will, when indeed already, by the Spirit, 
one is able to help and to do something to the external 
guarding against falling."51  
Melanchthon continues to address the problem of 
obedience in the Christian life. His point is that the 
Christian, although imputed righteous, remains weak and 
must perpetually guard against falling by the power of the 
Spirit mediated through the Word and the use of his own 
regenerate will (heart). He cites the example of Joseph, 
who was able to resist the allurement of adultery. There 
were two causes why he was able to resist this sin: first, 
"the Word of God and the Holy Spirit influencing the mind, 
so that the Word might ardently be understood," and 
secondly, "the mind's understanding, depending upon how 
much it is ruined when the devil is obeyed." Even for the 
regenerate, then, there may be a loss of gifts, the 
eternal wrath of God, punishment in this life and in the 
future, plus many lapses and scandals. But the Holy 
Spirit working in man's regenerate will strengthens the 
Christian in his weakness and restrains the flames of the 
heart. This same Spirit continuously incites fear of God 
s'Ibid., p. 246. 
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and faith which rests in God. "In this the will is not 
idle, but resists such allurements and handles the eyes 
and feet so as to avoid occasional lapses. These examples 
show clearly the causes of good actions."52  
Melanchthon concludes this third section of the 
locus on free will by emphasizing that bonae actionis  are 
(1) increased by the help of the Holy Spirit, and are (2) 
stimulated by our diligence, as Christ said, "He gives the 
Holy Spirit to those who ask." Melanchthon condemns 
"those who disdain, are idle, who resist, who petulantly 
throw others to wickedness." He reminds his Christian 
readers, "Paul orders us to be on guard, so that it is not 
in vain that we receive grace," and exhorts them 
"diligently to remember how much Christ promises kindness 
and how many times and how often he commanded us to 
pray." "Ask and you shall receive." If the Christian 
does this, then he will know how to make progress in a 
life of good works. Faith is incited prayerfully to 
petition to God for strength. If the Christian does not 
do so, "Indifference is increased, because we neglect the 
understanding of these precepts and promises of 
Christ."53 Melanchthon's concern is pastoral and 
homiletical. He is not arguing a theological point so 
"Ibid. 
"Ibid., pp. 246-47. 
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much as he is addressing the spiritual needs of his 
Christian readers. 
The fourth part of the locus on free will 
addresses "the many things which happen to man which are 
incomprehensible to human judgment and are certainly not 
begun in us." There are aspects of this life over which 
we have no control and this constricts human free will. 
Joseph had no control over his banishment into exile by 
his brothers. Other things which happen are errors of men 
in judgment, as when Josiah pondered what was the right 
thing to do when he made war with the Egyptians. The 
prophets prophesied concerning this danger in various 
places. Moses was called to lead the people out of Egypt, 
but by no means foresaw that they would spend forty years 
in the desert, or that the multitude would wander around 
without water or food because of the sins of the people 
and the sedition of their leaders. Moses only knew that 
he would have no success by himself, but that he would be 
leading by God's command. All this shows, as Jeremiah 
said (Jer. 10:23), that the way of man is not in man's 
power and that it is not possible to direct one's way and 
calling by human counsel or human diligence, nor can one 
lead successfully unless God helps. 
Thus also the Baptist says, "Man is not able of himself 
to undertake anything, unless it as given to him from 
heaven." Hezekiah was successful in governing, because 
he was helped by God. Ahijah was not successful 
because he was not helped by God. Anthony desired to 
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rule alone, but it was not given to him from heaven but 
it was given to Augustine. These writings do not 
abolish freedom of the will, which pertains to the 
choosing of those things which have been foreseen, but 
is said concerning objects outside us and concerning 
events which happen at the same time as those various 
other causes in addition to our own will, as the will 
of Pompey alone was not able to be the cause of 
victory.54  
While there is freedom of choice, therefore, it is 
limited by these external impediements. Man should be 
taught to place his trust in God and to ask for help from 
God, since many things which happen are incomprehensible 
to man. Melanchthon quotes Jehoshaphat, "When we do not 
know what to do, let us turn our eyes to you, 0 Lord." 
Christ himself promises, "I will not leave you orphans" 
(John 14:18). The same is said in the Psalms, by Paul, 
and by the Lord. "You may be sure you will be successful 
in your endeavor, when God helps you." It is for this 
assistance that the Christian is to pray.55 The reason 
for confusion concerning this question is that, "Men for 
the most part act as if they were drunk and without 
discipline, without diligence, and they live without any 
exercise of faith and calling. How are they then able to 
discern concerning actions or objectives?" Melanchthon 
answers, pointing to Paul. Paul recognizes that his 
understanding is a gift of God alone and is not mixed with 
54Ibid., pp. 247-48. 
55Ibid., p. 248. 
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inference or error nor is it entangled with corruption of 
doctrine or other evils. "Thus he prays that his great 
cares could be ruled and helped by God."56  
At this point Melanchthon recapitulated what has 
been assessed concerning free will. First: Human nature 
is corrupt. Therefore the knowledge of God in man's heart 
is obscure and man's heart and will are aberrant before 
God. Man does not fear, trust, or love God, but is rather 
seized by many corrupt emotions. Second: The devil, with 
a horrible hatred of Christ, "develops each opportunity by 
which he can implicate man in snares and sins and increase 
man's passion for dangerous crimes, as he did in Cain, 
Saul, Judas, and others." Third: "this life is one of 
trouble and danger in which many daily experience 
unexpected and confusing opinions, as David did not 
foresee the sedition of his son. 'You don't know what the 
late evening brings."" "If man's nature were 
unimpaired, he would not be impeded in his freedom, nor 
would he be in darkness and perversions nor would he be 
disturbed by the devil or by trouble." Rather, "He would 
be most free to choose and could have the faculty to 
act." But this is not the case. 
The Law of God is not incited without the Holy Spirit. 
The lowest outward discipline is often impeded. There- 
"Ibid., p. 249. 
"Ibid. 
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fore if one contends that the saying of the church 
concerning the present nature is to be accepted, it is 
necessary to add many restrictions. . . . But through 
God man is able to hurl down evil and he is able to do 
rightly when encouraged by the Holy Spirit. Now and 
then the will is not idle, nor does one have a will as 
if one were a statue. . . . The will is made one of 
helping the Holy Spirit in great freedom, that is, being 
a circumspect and a constant agent and ardently calling 
upon God.58  
Melanchthon concludes his discussion of free will 
with a look at two citations from Jerome. "Let him be 
anathema, if anyone says that it is impossible for God to 
have foreknowledge." Melanchthon maintains that, if anyone 
should say that God does not have foreknowledge, it is 
certain that that man does not understand why the Law of 
God was given. Certainly political law judges that Law 
should do a certain thing, and it does. But the Law of God 
was given chiefly because it shows the judgment of God 
against sin. God desires to look with his wrath upon the 
man in sin and he shows sin, "by the voice of the Law." 
The righteous man loves God with his whole heart. But 
because man is not able to do this, the Law judges and 
accuses man and declares its wrath against man. This is 
what Melanchthon describes as the second, chief and 
principal work of the Law.59 
 
The second reason the Law was given was so that 
obedience to the Law might begin in Christ (third office of 
581bid., p. 250. 
"Ibid., pp. 323-25. 
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the Law). Because men are reconciled to God, their 
obedience is begun in Christ with the help of God. This is 
carefully explained by Paul in Romans 3. Works do happen, 
but these are external acts, and Paul denies that, for the 
sake of these works, a man is justified or that he 
satisfies the Law. When it is said that "the Law is 
impossible" it is meant that due to man's corrupt nature 
the Law judges both inward and outward sin. Finally, the 
benefits of Christ must to recognized, for it is he alone 
who removes sin. The Law does not remove sin; rather, it 
accuses man of sin. By the Law no man is righteous. 
Therefore Christ gives us the Holy Spirit, so that in 
our infirmities the law is begun and makes us somewhat 
wholesome, and the teaching of the devil against all 
mankind is suppressed.6° 
 
For the natural man, the Law is impossible. For the 
regenerate, the Law is possible. The Law is God's will for 
his people and by the power of the Holy Spirit, obedience 
is begun. 
Melanchthon then considers a second saying of 
Jerome: "Let him be anathema, if anyone says he is able to 
do the Law without grace." Grace is to be understood as 
including not only the imputation of righteousness by grace 
for the sake of Christ, but also as the continuing activity 
and help of the Holy Spirit. The imputation of the 
righteousness of Christ would necessarily preclude works 
"Ibid. 
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because of its recognition of Christ's work and its faith 
in the satisfaction for sin accomplished by Christ. 
First, it must be said of grace that, "the law of God 
happens through grace." For the sake of Christ man is 
received and becomes a member of the body of Christ. In 
this it is certain that already man pleases God, just as 
if he had done the whole Law. By the imputation of grace 
man is received, though unworthy, and overcomes sin. 
Secondly, grace is to be understood as the many faceted 
work of the Holy Spirit. 
Minds are incited to the true light and preserved in 
the Word of God. The impulses of faith are excited in 
the heart and minds are moved so that they undertake 
what is beneficial for us and for others." 
He who has received the grace of God is to pray therefore 
that he might do what pleases God and what is useful for 
himself and for the church. He is unable to do this 
unless God helps and sustains him. It is certain, 
however, that God wills to be with the believer and to 
make him strong when he prays, as Christ clearly says, 
"How much more will your heavenly Father give the Holy 
Spirit to those who ask." But man seldom prays for help. 
Rather, in desperation he flees from God and seeks human 
counsel. This is why men do not come to a recognition of 
the promises and benefits of Christ. Therefore the 
regenerate should cast off their indifference and 
"Ibid., pp. 250-51. 
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ignorance and understand the greatness of one's misery and 
danger so that they might incite themselves truly to call 
upon God. The promises of God are true, "Ask and you 
shall receive." "God is near to all those who call upon 
him in truth." Jerome writes: 
"Law works through faith," that is, by imputation for 
the sake of Christ and by the help of the Holy Spirit, 
so that when obedience as begun, though we are far from 
perfection in the Law, nevertheless we are accounted 
righteous for the sake of Christ." 
The Law is established then both by the imputation 
of the righteousness of Christ in the initial conversion of 
the Christian (conversio prima) and by the Holy Spirit in 
the continuing conversion (conversio secunda, conversio  
continuata) which characterizes the Christian life. 
The Law is established through faith, first by impu-
tation because for the sake of Christ we receive 
reconciliation, without which theology is the voice of 
condemnation, and secondly, because by faith we receive 
the Holy Spirit and he begins and continues obedience 
for the sake of Christ." 
This concluding paragraph summarizes Melanchthon's 
position throughout the locus. It is evident that Law is 
used here not only in its accusatory function, but also as 
the revealed will of God for the regenerate (third use of 
the Law). The righteousness of God is established in man 
first by faith; that is, it is imputed to man for the sake 
of Christ. Secondly, the righteousness God requires is 
"Ibid., pp. 251-52. 
"Ibid., p. 252. 
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established in the Christian life through the sanctifying 
activity of the Holy Spirit. In the first case, the 
righteousness of imputation, man is entirely a passive 
agent, fulfillment of the Law is imputed to the sinner. 
God, for the sake Christ, imputes the benefits of Christ's 
vicarious satisfaction. In the second case, however, the 
Christian man, having received the benefits of Christ, is 
now enabled by the Holy Spirit to resolve and to begin 
active obedience to God's will, as a consequence of faith. 
Melanchthon affirms the monergism of God's activity 
in bringing men to faith, but in accordance with Saint Paul 
(Romans 5-8) affirms also that once God has acted, man must 
respond with a faith active in love (Gal. 5:6). Man makes 
this response of loving obedience by the power of the Holy 
Spirit. Melanchthon's locus on free will is directed to 
the regenerate and predicated on faith in the imputation of 
Christ's righteousness and the gift of the Holy Spirit. 
Forensic justification is the foundation on which 
Melanchthon builds his understanding of the Law's 
pedagogical function in the regenerate and of the 
regenerate will's function in choosing what God desires and 
commands. The imputation of righteousness and the bestowal 
of the Holy Spirit renew the hearts of those who believe 
and by faith the regenerate are enabled to know and to 
choose God's will. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The repetitious (often verbatim), didactic style 
of Melanchthon facilitates summarizing his theology. Two 
themes predominate: divine monergism (justification by 
grace through faith for the sake of Christ's imputed 
righteousness) and Christian piety (new spiritual life 
mediated by the Holy Spirit through the Word of God and 
impelled by the Spirit through the regenerated heart of 
the Christian). These themes reflect what Melanchthon 
terms "the two chief parts of Scripture" -- Law and 
Gospel. The Gospel is the non-imputation of sin and the 
imputation of the righteousness of Christ. The Law is the 
immutable will of God, written in the hearts of men, 
obscured by sin, and revealed in the Decalogue. The Law 
always accuses sin in the sinner. For those righteous by 
grace through faith, the Law remains the immutable will of 
God to be sought out in loving obedience. 
Melanchthon's theological method is synthetic. It 
is his purpose to show how the revelation of God in the 
Old and New Testament Scriptures join in proclaiming the 
beneficia Christi. The key to this synthesis is the prop-
per distinction between Law and Gospel. Gospel focuses in 
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the righteousness of God. Law focuses in the righteous-
ness of men. Justification is God's act by which he 
forgives sin, imputes to the sinner the righteousness of 
Christ, and bestows his Holy Spirit. Sanctification is 
the resultant co-operation of regenerate man working with 
God the Holy Spirit in effecting the revealed will of God. 
In order for man to work with God, God must first work 
within man. In the act of justification God bestows his 
Holy Spirit, who works within human hearts through Word 
and sacrament, enabling men to love God, to trust God, and 
to obey the will of God. This regenerated heart 
(voluntas) is capable of free choice (libero arbitrio). 
Apart from God's Spirit, man has no free choice. He can 
only sin. Indeed, even with the Spirit of God, the 
choices of the regenerate often remain tainted by sin and 
it is only by grace (God's gracious favor and acceptance) 
that the "works" of the Christian are reputed "good." 
For the Christian, then, the Law has two 
distinctive functions. The primary office of the Law 
(second use) is the accusation of sin. Daily the 
Christian must throw himself on the mercy of God, 
imploring forgiveness and seeking pardon of all sins for 
the sake of Christ. Such repentance characterizes every 
aspect of the Christian life, including "good works." The 
other office of the Law (third use) is that the Law 
instructs the Christian through the Scriptures in God's 
245 
immutable will. Because the Christian, although imputed 
righteous, is also a sinner, his knowledge of God's will 
remains obscured by sin. Were the Christian to rely only 
on his inherent knowledge of God's will, he would choose 
not the works that please God, but works of his own 
devising. Therefore the Christian remains dependent on 
God's revelation of his will throughout the Scriptures and 
codified in the Ten Commandments. This Law is taught by 
Christ in the gospels and interpreted by the apostles in 
the epistles. In this sense the Law is for Melanchthon a 
codification of the natural Law which was written into 
human hearts at the time of creation. 
Ragnar Bring is partly correct when he writes that 
Melanchthon identifies the content of the new life in the 
Spirit with the fulfillment of the Law.' This is true, 
Melanchthon would maintain, of that part of the Law which 
relates to "external righteousness" (the second table of 
the Law). The real foundation and meaning of the Law is 
found, however, in the first table where love of God, 
trust in God, true worship, prayer and study of the Word 
are required. The fulfillment of the First Commandment is 
faith, trust (fiducia) in God's imputed righteousness and 
the non-imputation of sin, for the sake of Christ. It is 
not adequate to conclude, as Bring does, that Melanchthon 
'Ragner Bring, Das Verhaeltnis von Glauben and 
Werken in der Lutherischen Theologie (Munich: Chr. Kaiser 
Verlag, 1955), 142. 
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has a moralistic concept of sin.2 For Melanchthon, as 
for Luther, sin has its basis in unbelief, which is 
evidenced in a failure to love God, trust God, and to look 
to God alone for peace and reconciliation. Natural man 
cannot bring himself to fear, love or trust in God. This 
is God's work. Melanchthon thus stresses the sola of 
grace and faith, and the total helplessness of man's 
condition. 
Melanchthon does not distinguish between the names 
"original" and "actual" sin. Actual sin has its source in 
original sin, and both the origin and the act of sin are 
descriptive of the total sinfulness of man. Man's natural 
depravity cannot be removed by doing one's best ("facere  
quod in se est") because the Law demands perfection, a 
perfection no man can give. The only cure for sin is that 
God would not impute sin to the sinner and would instead 
impute the righteousness of Christ and bestow the gift of 
his Holy Spirit. Bring, who describes Luther as holding 
to a theocentric view of salvation and Melanchthon as 
holding to an anthropocentric view of salvation, fails to 
understand Melanchthon precisely at this point. Bring 
contends that Luther links the new life of the regenerate 
with justification, but that Melanchthon sees this new 
life only in the context of fulfilling the Ten 
Commandments.' According to Bring, Luther finds a unity 
2lbid., p. 143. 
3Ibid., pp. 59-62. 
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in faith and works, but a radical opposition between Law 
and Gospel, while Melanchthon blends Law and Gospel 
together and separates faith from works.4 Moreover, 
Bring continues, Christian liberty is the opposite of a 
Law-activated ethics and Melanchthon's emphasis on free 
choice belongs with legalistic thinking.s 
The study of Melanchthon provided in chapters IV 
and V shows this to be a distortion of Melanchthon's 
position. Like Luther, Melanchthon is completely 
theocentric when it comes to describing the monergism of 
divine grace by which the unregenerate are reborn. In the 
resultant "new life" Melanchthon has two foci: (1) the 
enabling activity of the Holy Spirit through Word and 
sacrament and (2) the need for the regenerate will to 
utilize the Word to ascertain the will of God and to 
utilize the sacrament as an instrument of the Holy 
Spirit's enabling power for new life. Seeking God's 
revelation of himself in his Word and finding in that same 
Word both the promise of reconciliation and instruction in 
the abiding will of God, Melanchthon emphasizes the sola  
Scriptura principle for Christian renewal. The Christian 
who truly fears, loves, and trusts in God is not accused 
by the Law. Rather, the Law instructs the Christian in 
God's will. On the other hand, when the Christian does 
4lbid., pp. 142-43. 
sIbid., pp. 156-57. 
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not fear, love and trust in God above all else, but gives 
into the passions and affections of the flesh, the Law is 
not merely instructional, it accuses of sin. The same 
Word from God can have different effects for different men 
(regenerate and unregenerate) and differing effects within 
the same man (when repentant and when unrepentant). This 
is not a blending of Law and Gospel nor is it a moralistic 
theology. It is a proper distinction of Law and Gospel. 
Melanchthon would never affirm that the Law impels 
Christian obedience. This is the work of the Holy Spirit; 
it is a gift of grace. The Law does not empower 
obedience; it accuses and instructs. The Gospel does not 
accuse sin or instruct in righteousness; it empowers 
obedience through the forgiveness of sin and the bestowal 
of the Holy Spirit. Melanchthon does not separate faith 
from works. He distinguishes the one (faith) as the 
antecedent to the other (works). Works depend on faith. 
Men are justified, not by obedience or works, but by faith 
alone. Nevertheless, works are necessary for the faithful 
because the Spirit of God cannot persist within a heart 
that willfully sins against God's Law. In this sense 
Melanchthon could affirm that good works are necessary for 
salvation. The works of the regenerate have no salvific 
merit in themselves. But they are necessary as the 
fruits, evidence, and effects of faith. 
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ring inquires, "Does the indwelling of Christ 
have the same meaning for Melanchthon as it has for 
Luther?" He admits that Luther and Melanchthon did not 
recognize a difference in their positions.6 The 
"indwelling of Christ" motif does not blend easily with 
the juridical imagery of forensic justification: the 
imputation of Christ's righteousness and the non-
imputation of sin. But forensic justification is the 
vocabulary of Saint Paul. The "indwelling" imagery of 
renewal is prominent in the gospel and epistles of Saint 
John. This does not mean that Paul and John (Melanchthon 
and Luther) are expressing different theologies of 
justification, but that one is speaking of the cause of 
justification and the other is emphasizing the effect of 
justification. In justification God forgives sins and 
imputes the righteousness of Christ. This is 
Melanchthon's understanding of forensic justification. In 
justifying the sinner, God the Holy Spirit is also 
imparted to the regenerate. Melanchthon describes 
sanctification as the Holy Spirit's efficacious activity 
within the Christian heart through Word and sacrament. 
Melanchthon, then, speaks not of the indwelling of Christ, 
but of the indwelling of the Spirit of God. The 
righteousness of Christ is imputed. The Spirit of God is 
6lbid., pp. 56-58. 
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imparted. In this sense, Melanchthon clearly differs from 
the early Luther who held to an "effective" rather than a 
"forensic" view of justification. Those who typify 
Luther's theology as the "Christ in us" are describing the 
young Luther still influenced by John Tauler, the 
Theologia Deutsch,' and the Augustinian (Thomistic) view 
of justification. 
Using Thomas Aquinas as typical of the scholastic 
view of justification (for reasons given in the introduc-
tion) it is clear that Melanchthon's desire to be faithful 
to Saint Paul made it impossible for him to utilize the 
'The impact of John Tauler on Luther is well 
documented in the studies of Steven Ozment. Steven 
Ozment, Homo Spiritualis: A Comparison Study of the  
Anthropology of Johannes Tauler, Jean Gerson and Martin  
Luther (1509-1516) in the Context of their Spiritual  
Thought (Leiden: n.p., 1969). Steven Ozment, The  
Reformation in Medieval Perspective (Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 1971). George Williams provides thorough 
documentation both chronologically and theologically of 
Luther's use of Tauler's sermons in his Romans lectures 
and of his high opinion of them. Between 1515 and 1544 
Luther makes twenty-four references to John Tauler as a 
good German theologian. Ozment, The Reformation in 
Medieval Perspective, p. 227. Luther mistakenly believes 
Tauler to be the author of the Theologia Deutsch, which he 
prized as a demonstration that his teaching was not new 
and that good theology could be written in the German 
language. In his opinion, the Theologia Deutsch was 
evidence that "German theologians are without a doubt the 
best theologians." Martin Luther, "Preface to the 
Complete Edition of A German Theology," in Luther's Works, 
55 vols., gen. eds. Helmut Lehmann and Jaroslav Pelikan 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press/St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1955-present), 31:76. Hereafter this 
work will be cited as AE. Luther edited the Theologia  
Deutsch and it was his first published work. In an age of 
cultic formalism and philosophic theology, Tauler rejected 
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Augustinian, "effective" vocabulary of justification in-
herited from the middle ages and mediated in the sixteenth 
century through the interpreters of Thomas Aquinas 
(especially Cajetan). 
Melanchthon and Thomas clearly differ in their 
formulations regarding the function of the Law, the 
relationship of Law and Gospel, imputation and renewal in 
justification, the relationship of justification and 
sanctification, the definition and function of faith, the 
relationship of faith and love, the nature of grace, and 
the place of sin and grace in the life of the Christian. 
For Melanchthon, Law and Gospel are antithetical. Thomas 
identifies the Gospel with the new law of Christ. For 
Melanchthon, sin is forgiven. In Thomas, sin is removed. 
Melanchthon distinguishes between justification as the 
imputation of righteousness and sanctification as 
renewal. Thomas includes forgiveness and renewal in the 
transformation of the Christian. For Melanchthon, man is 
justified by faith alone. For Thomas, man is justified by 
the externals of religion and appealed to the inwardness 
of the Christian soul reposing in the Spirit of God. In 
conseqence, although Tauler respected reason, he was not 
uncritical of its effects. Although Tauler encourages 
Christians to be faithful in worship, he recognized the 
uselessness of an ex opere operato performance of 
externals. Tauler distinguished between the inward man of 
faith who is formed in the image of God and who shares in 
all the riches of God through grace and the outward man 
who is turned in on himself and overwhelmed by the pain 
and problems of life. A mystic, Tauler emphasized the 
indwelling of Christ. 
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faith informed by love, including the movement of the free 
will and the assent of the intellect. For Melanchthon, 
justification is the forgiveness of sins and the 
imputation of the righteousness of Christ. For Thomas 
justification is also the forgiveness of sins but not in a 
primary sense; justification is rather the acquisition of 
righteousness -- transformation and renewal. For 
Melanchthon, faith is a confident trust (fiducia) in the 
imputed righteousness of Christ and the forgiveness of 
sins. For Thomas, faith is an intellectual assent that 
unites man with God as first truth; faith is knowledge. 
For Melanchthon, justification is the continuing 
imputation of the righteousness of Christ to men who 
continue to resist God and his will, who continue to 
violate his Law. For Thomas, justification is the result 
of God enforcing his intentions against the resistance of 
man, who is ultimately powerless. 
Melanchthon describes the Christian as both 
justified and a sinner. For Thomas, the Christian is 
healed through the infusion of habitual grace so that the 
love of God, formerly impossible, is now possible. 
Righteousness and sin are mutually exclusive and do not 
exist in the same individual. For Melanchthon, the 
Christian's good works are good only in so far as they are 
done in faith and accepted by God in mercy. For Thomas, 
good works have a merit in themselves. For Melanchthon, 
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justification is a function of the Gospel over against the 
continuing accusation of the Law. For Thomas, justifi-
cation serves to fulfill the Law. For Melanchthon, 
theology begins with man's need to be reconciled to God. 
For Thomas, theology is a science, the imprint of God's 
own knowledge. Thomas experiences no turmoil about his 
relationship with God. 
Ultimately for Thomas, justification is the 
acquisition of justice. For Melanchthon, justification is 
the imputation of righteousness. It is in the context of 
this difference that one must understand Melanchthon's 
rejection of "effective" justification and the 
formulations of scholastic theologians describing 
justification as an "infusion of grace" and as a 
qualitative transformation of the regenerate. That Thomas 
is in the Augustinian tradition and part of the catholic 
tradition of western theology cannot be doubted. That 
this tradition adequately represents the dynamics of New 
Testament theology and in particular Saint Paul's theology 
of justification must be denied. For this, one must turn 
to the carefully exegized theology of Melanchthon in his 
Romans Commentary and the epitomizing of that theology in 
the Loci. Melanchthon's forensic vocabulary of 
justification is a repudiation of Rome and of the 
Augustinian tradition on the basis of Saint Paul. For 
Luther the vocabulary of forensic justification and the 
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distancing of evangelical theology from the Augustinian 
tradition came more slowly. 
Some would deny that Luther ever utilized the 
forensic vocabulary of justification found in 
Melanchthon. Karl Holl is most often cited in defense of 
an understanding of Luther's theology of justification 
which affirms that for both the early and mature Luther, 
justification means to make unrighteous men righteous 
(effective justification). 
In justification, Luther regards it as essential that 
the one with whom God -- out of free grace -- has 
entered into relationship will also actually become 
righteous in this relationship; otherwise God's 
judgment of justification would amount to a lie. To be 
sure, it is not a case of forming a good intention to 
'mend one's ways' after one has been justified; rather, 
God himself transforms the person within the new 
relationship.8  
In this citation Holl has expressed the concern which is 
essential to the effective justification -- forensic 
justification debate. If God declares that an unrighteous 
man is a righteous man and there is in actuality no 
difference in the man, those holding an effective view 
conclude that forensic justification is a legal fiction and 
God is misrepresenting reality or is altogether 
capricious. Holl's solution is one that affirms that there 
is indeed a difference in man made by justification. Man 
8Karl Holl, What Did Luther Understand by 
Religion? ed. James Luther Adams and Walter F. Bense, 
trans. Fred W. Meuser and Walter R. Wietzke (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1977), p. 117. 
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is "transformed" within the new relationship of grace. 
Holl is in fact holding to the western, catholic tradition 
of Augustine. 
Erich Seeberg in his Luthers Theologie in Ihren 
Grundzuegen holds a similar position. Justification, as 
the declaration and act of God, is the means by which God 
makes sinful man pure and righteous, and one may even say, 
pious. The "religious man" does not make himself what he 
is. Through the declaration of God, a new man is made.9  
Justification is not a one time act but a process of 
renewal.1° Through faith one receives the righteousness 
of Christ who is indeed the sinner's righteousness. Faith 
makes this "alien righteousness" of Christ one's own 
righteousness so that the one who believes in Christ 
becomes one with him. Faith thus makes the Christian 
actually righteous so that the Christian has in reality a 
new righteousness." Similarly, Julius Koestlin 
describes Luther's theology in terms of "inward 
transformation," "a making righteous," and a "process of 
becoming righteous."12  
9D. Erich Seeberg, Luthers Theologie in Ihren 
Grundzuegen, (Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1950), p. 
117. 
"Ibid., p. 121. 
"Ibid., p. 123. 
12Julius Koestlin, The Theology of Luther, 2 
vols., trans. Charles E. Hay (Philadelphia: Lutheran 
Publication Society, 1897), 2: 439. 
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There is general agreement that such a description 
of justification is appropriate to the theology of the 
young Luther, who often expresses his theology of justi-
fication in the Augustinian sense of iustum facere, to make 
righteous. Regin Prenter and Uuras Saarnivaara, each of 
whom stresses the forensic nature of justification in the 
mature theology of Luther, also recognize that the younger 
Luther speaks in this effective way." Ewald Plass notes 
the difference in definitions of justification given by 
Luther. 
At first the term "to justify" (iustificare) appears in 
Luther's writings in a broader sense than the Pauline 
sense of simply pronouncing righteous. It includes the 
making personally righteous. This is the Augustinian 
(and essentially Catholic) view of justification. If 
Luther, even after he had come to recognize the sola  
fide, for a while occasionally uses the term in such a 
sense, this is not surprising. He then speaks of 
justification as a growth. But later the use of the 
term disappears and he tells us that the justification 
takes place, "at once, and does not come piecemeal." 
Scholarly criticism of Holl and others relates to their 
contention that Luther continued to maintain this 
Augustinian position throughout his life. Such an 
opinion, it is affirmed, is a distortion of Luther's 
theology. Saarnivaara describes Holl as maintaining that, 
"Uuras Saarnivaara, Luther Discovers the Gospel  
(St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1951), pp. 9-18. 
Also: Regin Prenter, Spiritus Creator, trans. John M. 
Jensen (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1953), p. 70. 
"Ewald M. Plaas, What Luther Says, 3 vols. (St. 
Louis: Concordis Publishing House, 1959), 2: 701. 
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Justification means renewal and only after God has 
renewed man and made him righteous, he declares him 
righteous. The actual basis of the divine judgment 
which justifies is not the merit of Christ, but the 
renewal of man. . . . As we shall see, Holl is in the 
main right if we consider Luther's early teaching on 
justification. But he is wrong with regard to his 
final teaching. Holl's mistake was that he inter-
preted Luther in light of his early or pre-Reformation 
statements regarding justification." 
Prenter writes in similar vein in the classic, Spiritus  
Creator. 
It is impossible to agree with Karl Holl and R. Seeberg 
in speaking of a gradual real Gerechtmachung (process 
of justification) as a content of Luther's doctrine of 
justification. The source of Holl's and Seeberg's 
presentation, as we shall see later, is the pietistic 
attitude which the positive theology of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries inherited partly from 
Schleiermacher and partly from the revivalistic pietism 
of the nineteenth century. 1 6  
Holl for his part maintains that the union of 
Christ with the believer is a union not only with the 
crucified Christ but the resurrected Christ, and that 
Luther is affirming the Pauline doctrine that one is 
buried with Christ and raised with Christ to newness of 
life. "Luther recovered the meaning of the Pauline unity 
of the death and resurrection of Christ; but his recovery 
was slow to bear fruit within Lutheranism."" 
Melanchthon was unable to appreciate this insight and 
through his emphasis on justification as a forensic 
"Saarnavaara, pp. 13-14, footnote 38. 
"Prenter, p. 69. 
17Holl, p. 117. 
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declaration, Luther's peculiar insight was lost to later 
Lutheran orthodoxy as well." 
Michael Rogness concurs with Holl's judgment that 
Melanchthon's description became normative for Lutheran 
Confessional theology. Noting Melanchthon's emphasis on 
"forensic justification," Rogness concludes that 
Melanchthon did "determine the course of the doctrine [of 
justification] among succeeding Lutheran theologians." 
This emphasis gave, 
his doctrine a distinctive flavor compared with Luther. 
By basing justification on a pronouncement from God 
about something outside of us, imputed to us, the whole 
process acquired a somewhat abstract coloring. In 
removing justification from any quality or work in us, 
it tended to become something apart from us 
altogether. This was certainly not the case with 
Luther. Justification for him was very concrete, a 
uniting of ourselves with Christ. Luther, of course, 
agreed in substance with the imputatio of Christ's 
righteousness, since it was really his righteousness 
which God counted as ours, but he never really uses the 
word much himself." 
To be sure, Rogness is correct in ascribing to Melanchthon 
a continuing emphasis on justification as a forensic 
activity of God. However, his description of forensic 
justification as "somewhat abstract," fails to give 
adequate attention to Melanchthon's emphasis that in 
justification the Holy Spirit is bestowed to the 
regenerate and that the Holy Spirit begins new spiritual 
"Ibid. 
"Michael Rogness, Reformer Without Honor:  
Philip Melanchthon (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing 
House, 1969), pp. 112-113. 
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impulses in the justified. His analysis of Luther, that 
Luther "never really much used the word [imputatio] 
himself" is not born out in even a cursory reading of the 
Galatians Commentary or the Disputation on Justification. 
Here Luther repeatedly uses the verb "imputare" with 
reference to the non-imputation of sin and the imputation 
of the righteousness of Christ. 
Bengt Haegglund concurs that it was Melanchthon 
who gave "precise formulation to the Reformation position, 
but in so doing he altered to some extent the basic ideas 
which we find in Luther.n20 Haegglund's point is that 
Melanchthon carefully distinguished between imputation of 
righteousness and regeneration. Haegglund describes 
Luther, on the other hand, as affirming that, 
a man participates in the Spirit from the time he 
appropriates the merits of Christ to himself by faith. 
Faith signifies participation in Christ. Regeneration 
results, simultaneously, from imputation. For the 
latter (imputation) is not simply a legalistic act of 
judgment but also God's life giving Word which raises 
man up and gives him the new birth.2I  
Haegglund'a distinction between Luther and Melanchthon is 
unclear. Melanchthon also asserts that man participates 
in the Holy Spirit from the time of his justification. 
Nor is imputation for Melanchthon "simply a legalistic act 
of judgment." Melanchthon could easily affirm the 
20Bengt Haegglund, History of Theology, trans. 
Gene J. Lund (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
1968), p. 251. 
2IIbid. 
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description of justification Haegglund here posits of 
Luther, except that Melanchthon would not describe faith 
as a "participation in Christ," but as a confident trust 
in the vicarious satisfaction of Christ. Haegglund admits 
that in Melanchthon's dispute with Osiander, "It then 
appeared as though Melanchthon's presentation of justi-
fication was a veritable defense of the essential refor-
mation position," but he adds, "at the same time . . . 
something of the richness of Luther's point of view had 
been lost."22  
It is a consistent opinion of those who describe 
Luther as maintaining an effective understanding of 
justification that his insight has been distorted or lost 
by the "forensic view" of justification held by 
Melanchthon and later Lutheran Confessional theology. The 
concern is that a purely forensic description of 
justification perpetuates a legal fiction with no basis in 
reality. This is, of course, the criticism the Roman 
Catholic tradition has always leveled at Lutheran 
theology. But the real problem is that it misrepresents 
what is meant by forensic justification in the theology of 
Melanchthon and in the theology of the Formula of 
Concord. Arthur Carl Piepkorn provides a helpful 
summation of what Lutherans understsnd by forensic 
22Ibid. 
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justification. Forensic terminology is not original with 
Lutheran theology, but is based on the scriptural witness 
of Saint Paul. 
The appeal to or the rejection of "purely forensic" 
terminology in the doctrine of justification must be 
made carefully. On the one hand, the biblical language 
of Law and accusation and wrath and judgment seems to 
make the use of juridical terminology unavoidable. On 
the other hand, the mere continued use of forensic 
vocabulary will not guarantee that one is reproducing 
the substance of the New Testament teaching on 
justification. For one could, purely forensically, 
speak of God as simply declaring a sinner to be 
innocent and in that process "bury Christ" completely 
and do away with the whole teaching of faith, as the 
Apology puts it. 
Forensic justification does not exonerate man as 
sinner. God executes a just sentence, the sentence of 
guilty and deserving of death. . . . If the sinner 
gets justified, that means that he has that sentence 
executed. If the sinner nevertheless lives, then that 
does not mean a simple exoneration or even an instance 
of justice tempered by mercy. Rather, it produces the 
happy surprise reflected in St. Paul's exclamation, 
"Dying, and behold we live!"23  
The wrath of God against sin has had its way. Jesus 
Christ died for sinners. "The death sentence on the 
guilty sinner has been executed on the righteous Son.u24 
The non-imputation of sin and the imputation of the 
righteousness of Christ are essential if God is to pro-
nounce the repentant sinner righteous. In order that 
God's "forensic declaration" is not merely an exoneration 
of the sinner's guilt, it is necessary that the penalty of 
23Arthur Carl Piepkorn, Profiles in Belief, 3 
vols. (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), 2: p. 62. 
24Ibid. 
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sin has been paid. In order that the righteousness of God 
is not merely a legal fiction, it is necessary that the 
righteousness of another ("alien righteousness") be 
imputed to the sinner. The believer has died to sin and 
come alive through Christ. This is precisely 
Melanchthon's theology of forensic justification. 
Does Luther then hold an understanding of 
justification that differs from Melanchthon's? Gerhard 
Ebeling provides a key to understanding Luther's theology 
of forensic justification in his recognition that, for 
Luther, grace does not alter man, but man's 
situation.2s Thomas McDonough, a Dominican priest, 
makes a valient effort to understand how the imputation of 
the righteousness of Christ changes man's situation 
although leaving man himself unchanged, and concludes that 
"the believer's righteousness or justice is not intrinsic 
or ontological, but merely imputed or alien. . . . God no 
longer looks upon the believer's sins as meriting 
damnation; they are cloaked over by the infinite merits of 
Christ."26 McDonough is half right. The believer's 
righteousness is not intrinsic or ontological, as it is in 
Thomas Aquinas. It is imputed. It is the righteousness 
2sGerhard Ebeling, Luther, trans. R. A. Wilson 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press), p. 156. 
"Thomas M. McDonough, 0.P., The Law and Gospel  
in Luther (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 53. 
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of another. But God does not cease to look upon the 
believer's sins as meriting damnation. Sin damns. But 
when God looks at the believer's sin, he sees that the 
curse of sin has already been paid through the vicarious 
atonement of Christ. McDonough's conclusion recognizes 
this. Christ constitutes the totality of the Christian's 
goodness, even after justification.27  
Regin Prenter analyses Luther in similar fashion. 
Whether the struggle against sin takes place in us or 
not, is not determined by our own real qualification in 
general but our situation: whether we are under grace 
and therefore possess as the gift of God that faith in 
Christ Jesus which can struggle against sin, which 
under grace is regarded to be sin that is not imputed 
and not mastering, or whether we find ourselves under 
wrath and thereby the power of the Law in the 
conscience is robbed of every iota of real 
righteousness." 
Prenter's point is that it is not the regenerate piety of 
the transformed Christian which struggles against sin and 
gradually overcomes it; it is rather the "alien 
righteousness" of Christ which is a gift of God mediated 
through faith in Christ, which struggles against sin.29  
This alien righteousness is not merely a legal 
proclamation, it is the living Christ himself. "He it is 
"Ibid., pp. 53-56. 
"Prenter, p. 73. 
"Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
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who in a living and struggling presence overcomes sin. It 
is not something his presence has made to grow in us.“30  
Saarnivaara maintains that it was through this 
forensic understanding of justification that Luther made 
his break with Augustinian-catholic tradition and returned 
to the theology of Saint Paul. In this Luther recognized 
that "justification is not a gradual process but an 
instantaneous act of God whereby He pronounces the sinner 
free from his guilt."" The consequence is that the 
sinner is completely righteous, guiltless and blameless in 
the sight of God, claiming as his own the righteousness of 
Christ. Saarnivaara's analysis is helpful in under-
standing Luther, although as McDonough emphasizes, Luther 
is not providing a systematic schema but a biblical 
theology confirmed in the Christian's experience as sinner. 
Melanchthon's theology is more simple because it 
is less existential. Melanchthon simply wants to 
reproduce the theology of Saint Paul by definition and 
epitomization so that the teaching of the church may be 
true to the Scriptures and the piety of the people might 
not be confused by philosophy or undermined by erring 
tradition. It has been noted (chapter III) that Luther's 
description of justification in forensic terms is 
3°Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
31Saarnivaara, p. 10. 
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paralleled by the antinomianism of Agricola and the need 
to define the roles of Law and Gospel in conversion and 
regeneration. It is also the case that the forensic 
vocabulary of justification becomes classically Lutheran 
at this time through the publication of the Augsburg  
Confession  and its Apology. A third factor in Luther's 
development in affirming the forensic nature of 
justification might well have been Melanchthon's 
publication of the Romans Commentary in 1532. This 
careful exposition of Romans provided the exegetical basis 
for the Lutheran understanding of justification as 
confessed at Augsburg. In the Smalcald Articles Luther 
draws upon this understanding of Romans (Part II, Article 
I. Christ and Faith).32 Certainly Melanchthon's Romans  
Commentary received his highest praise.33  
Thus the evidence in the later writings of Luther 
(as seen in chapter III of this study) does allow one to 
affirm that the mature Luther did hold to a forensic view 
of justification. Melanchthon's theology, rather than a 
distortion of Luther, may have provided some of the 
stimuli for that mature position. This is not to imply 
that Luther was indifferent about the "making righteous" 
of the Christian, but that this "outward righteousness" 
32SA, II, I, 1-5. 
33Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke, 94 
vols. (Weimar: Herman Boehlaus Nachfolger, 1883-present), 
Tr., I: 130. Also Tr., II: 235. 
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is properly descriptive not of justification, but of 
sanctification. Haegglund offers a helpful analysis of 
what the imputation of righteousness meant to Luther. 
But this so-called imputation concept must not be 
interpreted to mean that it refers only to an external 
form of judgment. For it was precisely in this con-
text . . . that Luther spoke of an "inner righteous-
ness." The verdict which exonerates, which makes a man 
just, is God's own living and creative Word, which 
gives the new life and changes man entirely. Therefore 
there is no contridiction (as some have wanted to main-
tain) between the concept of imputation as the basis of 
justification and the idea of faith as a living, 
active, power.34  
Justification and sanctification must be distinguished, 
but never separated. "True faith is not idle. We can, 
therefore, ascertain and recognize those who have true 
faith from the effect or from what follows."35  
Regin Prenter is correct when he describes 
sanctification for Luther as the condition of the 
Christian between baptism and resurrection, taking refuge 
in Christ's alien righteousness.36 Hans Iwand,37 Jan 
Siggins,38 Lennart Pinomaa,39 Philip Watson," and 
34Haegglund, p. 228. 35AE, 34:183. 
36Prenter, pp. 75-76. 
37Hans Joachim Iwand, Rechtfertigungslehrer and  
Christusglaube (Mucich: Kaiser Verlag, 1961), p. 56. 
38Jan D. Kingston Siggins, Martin Luther's  
Doctrine of Christ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 
p. 157. 
39Lennart Pinomaa, Faith Victorious, trans. Walter 
J. Kukkonen (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), p. 64. 
4°P. S. Watson, "Luther and Sanctification," 
Concordia Theological Monthly, 30 (1965): 255. 
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William Landeen41 all describe Luther's mature doctrine 
of justification as the non-imputation of sin and the 
imputation of the righteousness of Christ. Neither Luther 
nor Melanchthon would separate the imputation of 
righteousness from the effects of renewal. The separation 
of forensic justification from effective renewal is a 
distortion of Lutheran theology. Edmund Schlink writes, 
"If the sinner is declared righteous by God, he is no 
longer regarded as righteous; he is righteous."42 In an 
accompanying footnote Schlink notes, 
As a matter of fact, it must be said plainly as 
possible: to be declared righteous is the same as to be 
made righteous and vice versa. "Justum effici," 
"regenerari," "vivificari" are other terms for "justum 
reputari," "remissionem accipere," "Deo acceptum esse," 
but one and the same event takes place.43  
Affirmation of a forensic view of justification need not 
imply an abstract meaning for justification. John 
Loeschen captures the dialectic of Luther's understanding 
of justification as both imputation and regeneration in 
his threefold analysis of the simul Justus et peccator. 
From one perspective Luther can say that the Christian 
is at the same time (simul) wholly (totus) sinner and 
wholly just. From another perspective he can say the 
41William Landeen, Martin Luther's Religious  
Thought (Mountain View: CA: Pacific Press Publishing 
Assoc., 1971), p. 153. 
42Edmund Schlink, Theology of the Lutheran 
Confessions, trans. Paul F. Koehneke and Herbert J. A. 
Bouman, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1961) p. 94. 
43Ibid., p. 94, footnote 13. 
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Christian is at the same time (simul) partly (partim) 
sinner and partly just. Only by combining the two 
perspectives do we arrive at the complete formulation 
of his teaching: the Christian is at the same time 
(simul) wholly and partly sinner and justified. Three 
senses of simul.44  
What Luther expresses with his simul dichotomy, 
Melanchthon expresses with his emphasis on forensic 
justification, regenerate free will, and the third use of 
the Law. The Christian is righteous by the imputation of 
the righteousness of Christ and the non-imputation of sin 
(totus iustus). With the bestowal of the Holy Spirit in 
the moment of justification, the Christian heart is re-
newed so that it begins to see the will of God revealed in 
his Law, although feebly and with recurrent sin (partim 
iustus, partim pecoator). So for Melanchthon too, the 
Christian is one who is perfectly righteous having the 
righteousness of Christ in justification, and imperfectly 
righteous in the beginnings of new life in the Spirit of 
God. 
The difference between Luther and Melanchthon, 
then, is not one of effective verses forensic 
justification. If forensic justification is understood as 
the imputation of the righteousness of Christ and the 
non-imputation of sin, then both Luther and Melanchthon 
clearly taught the doctrine of forensic justification. 
Neither did Luther or Melanchthon deny that the effects of 
44John R. Loeschen, Wrestling with Luther (St. 
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1976), p. 75. 
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justification must result in a life of renewal and 
sanctification. Nor did Luther or Melanchthon find the 
impetus for this new life in "the new Law of the Gospel" 
(Aquinas). For Luther, the power of Christian renewal was 
often expressed as the indwelling of the Spirit of 
Christ. For Melanchthon, the power of Christian renewal 
was found in the imparting of the Holy Spirit. What then 
is the difference? For Luther the indwelling of the 
Spirit of Christ accents the incarnate Word, the 
Christian's participation in Christ. For Melanchthon, the 
bestowal of the Holy Spirit emphasizes the means the 
Spirit uses to empower new life -- the written Word of the 
Scriptures and the promise of Christ in the sacraments. 
One notes with interest that in the Smalcald Articles, 
when Luther accents forensic justification, he also 
specifies the means by which God communicates his grace. 
First, through the spoken word, by which the forgive-
ness of sin (the peculiar function of the Gospel) is 
preached to the whole world; second, through Baptism; 
third, through the holy Sacrament of the Altar; fourth, 
through the power of the keys; and finally, through the 
mutual conversation and consolation of brethren." 
The difference between Luther and Melanchthon is that 
Melanchthon emphasized the Word, not as preached, but as 
written. A small difference, perhaps, but a difference 
reflective of the men: Luther, the pastor, preacher of the 
Word; Melanchthon, the teacher, pedagogue of doctrine. 
45SA, III, IV. 
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One may say then, in this sense, that Melanchthon was more 
bound to the written Word as the instrument of the Spirit 
than was Luther, who rejoiced that the Word might come 
alive through preaching and the "mutual conversation and 
consolation of brethren." For Luther, the dynamics of the 
Word were fulfilled in the proclamation of the gospel. 
For Melanchthon, the power of the Word was to be found in 
its revelation of Law and Gospel so that men might be 
schooled in pure doctrine and true piety. It is not 
surprising, then, that Melanchthon emphasized the 
continuing necessity of the written Word as the revelation 
of God's will for Christians seeking to do those works 
that please God. 
Melanchthon's understanding of libero arbitrio  
(free choice) cannot be correctly understood unless one 
carefully notes his distinction between the forensic 
nature of justification and the effective nature of 
sanctification. In justification man is entirely 
passive. In sanctification man must be actively seeking 
the will of God. For the regenerate Christian, good works 
are necessary for salvation. Thus the third use of the 
Law and the regenerate free will play prominent roles in 
Melanchthon's description of Christian renewal. Without 
the Holy Spirit, there could be no new obedience. Without 
free will in the Christian there could be no free choice 
and Christian responsibility. Without free choice, the 
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only function of the Law would be to accuse and condemn 
sin, also in the regenerate. But because the Holy Spirit 
has regenerated man's heart and his ability to choose 
God's will, the Christian can seek in the Law that which 
pleases God and is efficacious for Christian renewal. 
With that freedom to choose also comes responsibility. 
The Christian who uses his free choice to choose against 
God's revealed Law will suffer the same fate as did Saul. 
Therefore the Christian must "apply himself unto grace;" 
that is, hearing God's promise of grace, he is to cling to 
it and to abandon all sins against God's Law and his 
Christian conscience. 
The human being is never merely a block of wood or 
a piece of stone or a statue in relation to God. Unregen-
erate man is totally and completely opposed to God in 
everything and is incapable of moving toward God. His 
sinful affections overwhelm him and he cannot conquer 
them. Regenerate man, on the other hand, has free will to 
choose to hear God's Word, to hear God's address of Law 
and Gospel, and through repentance, the Christian is able 
to seek the forgiveness of sin and the beneficia Christi. 
The Christian can and must choose to obey the Law of God 
in a life of "spiritual righteousness," giving to God the 
obedience he requires. The will of the non-Christian is 
captive. He cannot aspire to "spiritual righteousness" 
because natural man cannot overcome his spiritual 
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privation, the affections of sin. Those who have 
"spiritual righteousness" are those who are illuminated to 
spiritual impulses by the Holy Spirit and who fear, 
believe, and trust God. Human will in the regenerate is 
not always able to bring about the spiritual effects God 
demands. Sometimes Christians are unrepentant. They 
choose works of their own devising. But God is not to be 
sought apart from his Word. Therefore, there are always 
three causes of bonae actionis in the regenerate: the Word 
of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will, "assenting to 
and not resisting the Word of God."46  
When Luther wrote his De Servo Arbitrio, it was in 
the context of the conversion of the unregenerate. Can 
the will of natural man contribute anything to the restor-
ration of the relationship between God and man? Luther's 
unequivocal reply was "no." In Melanchthon's discussion 
of libero arbitrio the context is not that of initial 
conversion (conversio prima) as was Luther's but the 
continuing conversion (conversio secunda, conversio  
continuata) endemic to the Christian life." One who 
does not distinguish the difference in context and 
opponent in these writings is likely to misinterpret 
"Robert Stupperich, ed., Melanchthons Werke in 
Auswahl (Studienausgabe), 7 vols. (Guetersloh: Mohn and 
Co., 1953-present) 2, pt. I, p. 243. Hereafter this work 
will be cited as St.A. 
"Ibid., pp. 243-244. 
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Melanchthon as a synergist. Only the Christian may freely 
choose to obey the Law in love and thus live a life 
pleasing to God and in conformity with the Law. But the 
obedience of the regenerate is always imperfect and it is 
not because of his obedience that he is termed 
"spiritually righteous" but because he has received by 
faith the beneficia Christi, the forgiveness of sin and 
the righteousness of Christ. 
God alone converts man and only by grace, through 
faith, alone, is man's initial indifference to God 
replaced by fiducia and repentance, so that "one hears the 
promise and is able to assent and to give up sins against 
the conscience." The Christian life then centers in the 
renewing act of God, the continuing ministry of the Holy 
Spirit though Word and sacrament. As a Christian, 
regenerate man has the necessity to choose to do the will 
of God or to reject God's will. This is why Melanchthon 
affirms there are three causes of "good works": the Word, 
the Spirit, and the regenerate will. 
If we speak of the total life of the pious, even if the 
weakness is great, nevertheless, there is still free 
will when, indeed, already in the Spirit, one is able 
to help and to do something in the external guarding 
from falling.48 
In speaking of free will to choose or reject the Law and 
the promises, Melanchthon is speaking of the "life of the 
pious." 
48Ibid. 
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Melanchthon counters the arguments of the 
enthusiasts and of the Manicheans who suppose that men do 
not have free will. The enthusiasts err because they do 
not recognize that God is not to be sought apart from his 
Word. The Manicheans err because they deny the Christian 
man's ability to choose and make him merely a pawn for the 
forces of good and evil, powerless to seek the good or to 
repress the evil. In this Melanchthon is anticipating 
some of the concerns of the writers of the Formula of  
Concord.49 While the unregenerate may have some freedom 
to choose to do the external works of the Law, only the 
Christian can truly love and trust God, which is the true, 
internal fulfillment of the Law. Melanchthon often quotes 
the words of Christ, "He gives the Holy Spirit to those 
who ask" (Luke 11:13). The Christian is constantly to 
petition God for the power of the Spirit who alone enables 
man to will and to do God's will. 
Melanchthon's emphasis in the Loci on libero  
arbitrio does not concern how man comes to faith, but how 
man lives in the faith. His concern is that the sola fide 
may be misunderstood in an epicurean fashion; that is, 
that a man may feel that it does not matter how one lives, 
but only that one believes. Melanchthon reflects the 
epistles of Paul and the epistle of James in affirming 
49FC, SD, II, 74 and 80. 
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that one shows what one believes by how one lives. If a 
Christian does not push away spiritual indifference and 
other vices of the flesh, he cannot trust solely in God. 
One's faith must have an impact on one's life so that the 
believer is able to live with afflictions and troubles, 
even the pain of death, in conformity with God's good 
will. If the Christian gives in to affliction and trouble 
and fears death, then his will is not in conformity with 
God's will and the impediments of life have separated the 
believer from God. Even after regeneration man's nature 
remains corrupted, and the devil's horrible hatred of 
Christ implicates the Christian in many sins. The 
troubles and afflictions of this life bring uncertainty, 
darkness and perversity, but against these impediments the 
Christian will is helped and strengthened by the Holy 
Spirit and the regenerste will becomes a circumspect and 
constant agent against these impediments as it calls 
ardently upon God. 
Because of Melanchthon's emphasis on the 
functional aspect of the regenerate will his locus de 
libero arbitrio continually speaks of the function of the 
Law as it impinges in the life of the regenerate. For 
natural man, the Law is a curse. For spiritual men who 
have received the promise, the beneficia Christi, the Law 
is the will of God to be sought out and performed in 
love. Even for the Christian, however, Melanchthon is 
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quick to affirm that righteousness rests not in the 
fulfillment of the Law, but in the benefits of Christ. In 
this position Melanchthon expressed precisely the doctrine 
of the Formula of Concord regarding the third use of the 
Law." The bestowal of the Holy Spirit impels those 
forgiven and imputed righteous for Christ's sake to seek 
out the will of God in his Word and to live according to 
the Law of God in love. When the spiritual man fails to 
live according to God's Law, the Law accuses him and 
declares its wrath to him (second use). It is for this 
reason that Melanchthon reiterates that "the Law is 
impossible," for it is God's judgment on both outward sin 
(failure to love the neighbor) and internal sin (a lack of 
faith and trust in God). At the same time, Melanchthon 
constantly repeats that the Christian is not a man of the 
Law but of the promise. The benefits of Christ, which the 
Law is not able to take away, remain with the regenerate. 
This is why Christ is the mediator, because, for his sake, 
sinful man is declared righteous. By the Law is no one 
made righteous, for the purpose of the Law is to show sin. 
Therefore God gives to us the Holy Spirit, so that in 
our infirmities, nonetheless, the obedience of the Law 
is begun and makes us somewhat wholesome, and the 
teaching of the devil is suppressed." 
50FC. SD. VI. 
51St.A., 2, pt. I, pp. 250-51. 
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In carrying through his dual emphasis on what 
Christ has done for man (forensic justification) and that 
man by the power of the Spirit must do (through libero  
arbitrio and tertio usus legis), Melanchthon speaks of the 
grace received by the Christian from two perspectives. 
First he speaks of imputed grace: grace received for the 
sake of Christ by which a man is declared just. Being 
justified, it is certain that a man pleases God just as if 
he had done the whole Law. Secondly, Melanchthon speaks 
of grace as the continuing activity of the Holy Spirit 
through Word and sacrament. It is this grace which 
sustains the Christian life. 
Minds are incited to the true light and preserved in 
the Word of God. The movements of faith in the heart 
are excited; minds are moved so that they undertake 
what is beneficial for us and for others. . . . 
Always, therefore, we pray that we might do what 
pleases God and is useful for us and for the church. 
And neither way is one able to do anything unless God 
helps and guides us.sz 
This remains the primary focus of Melanchthon's 
later loci on libero artitrio and the third use of the 
Law, the need for the forgiven sinner, having received the 
benefits of Christ and the gift of the Holy Spirit, to 
discipline his life according to the Law of God. This he 
cannot do on his own, for he is afflicted with the 
affections of sin. Only a new heart, made alive through 
the Word of promise by the Spirit of God, can bring about 
"Ibid., pp. 251-52. 
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renewal and the capacity for true piety and obedience. 
The freedom of the regenerate will and the third use of 
the Law complete each other in the psychology of Christian 
obedience. Christian renewal expressed in loving 
obedience is the fruit and effect of the imputed 
righteousness of Christ and the imparting of God the Holy 
Spirit. 
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